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8. FLIGHT OPERATIONS

FLIGHT OPERATIONS

• Changes in the Way Pilot Proficiency Checks Are Conducted in the Commercial World
• Cabin Safety: Spreading the Word on Aviation Child Restraints
• Flying the Wrong SID: Why Does It Happen?
• The Importance of the Underwater-Egress Pre-Flight Briefing for Passengers

Changes in the Way Pilot Proficiency Checks Are Conducted in the Commercial World

by Wayne Chapin, Civil Aviation Safety Inspector, Chief, Certification and Operational Standards, Standards, Civil Aviation, Transport Canada

Last year alone, there were over 14700pilot proficiency checks(PPC) conducted on pilots who fly for commercial air operators in Canada. TransportCanada CivilAviation(TCCA) inspectors cannot conduct every PPC. For many years, TCCA has delegated the authority to conduct check rides to industry pilots who have met specific requirements in experience, knowledge, and skill. The Approved Check Pilot(ACP) Program oversees the competencies of ACPs and pilots operating under Part VII of the Canadian Aviation Regulations(CARs). Recently, policy changes to this program have been developed that place increased checking activity in the hands of ACPs. These changes have been ongoing since 2004, and should have been transparent to you, the pilot-candidate.

To become an ACP, a pilot must meet general and practical training requirements, and demonstrate knowledge and skill in conducting a check ride. At least once a year, TCCA conducts a quality assurance review of an ACP; an inspector will conduct a check ride on the ACP during an actual PPC ride. These days, you are more likely to see an inspector in the back of the aircraft flight deck(or simulator) watching an ACP conduct your PPC than you are to have an inspector conduct a check ride on you. The inspector is there to evaluate the ACP's performance. Except for the additional person on board the aircraft or in the simulator, there should be no difference in how the PPC is conducted.

TCCA is continuously striving to improve the ACP program by educating the ACP community and exploring better checking techniques. In the last five years, the rating scale changed to a more discriminating 4-point scale, the evaluation of crew resource manage­ment(CRM) skills has become an essential element of every test exercise, and overall weak performance can now result in a failed PPC. The next challenge will be to incorporate the Threat and Error Management model in the evaluation process as it has the potential to radically change conventional thinking on the individual's proficiency and/or the crew's ability to manage a flight.

These days, you are more likely to see an inspector in the back of the aircraft flight deck(or simulator) watching an ACP conduct your PPC than you are to have an inspector conduct a check ride on you.

If you are curious about the standards used to conduct a PPC, or wish to learn more about becoming an ACP, you can consult the ninth edition of the Approved Check Pilot Manual(TP6533), which details all ACPrequirements. In addition, the Pilot Proficiency Check and Aircraft Type Rating Flight Test Guide(Aeroplane) (TP14727) and the Pilot Proficiency Check and Aircraft Type Rating Flight Test Guide(Helicopter)(TP14728) may interest pilots who would like more information on the PPC. These publications are available at http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/standards/commerce-operationalstandards-acp-menu-380.htm. The guides cover items such as admission requirements to the PPC, flight crew concept, single-pilot IFR requirements, CRM, and the 4-point marking scale. They also provide a detailed list of the flight-test exercises as well as an explanation of your rights, should you fail a check ride.

Cabin Safety: Spreading the Word on Aviation Child Restraints

by Erin Johnson, Cabin Safety Project Officer, Cabin Safety Standards, Standards, Civil Aviation, Transport Canada

Whether you are a passenger, crew member or pilot, you may be able to appreciate that travelling with a child can be a daunting experience. Along with concerns over the safety of your child, there are a number of things to consider, such as what to pack and how to keep a child entertained and occupied during flight. Another common concern, and the focus of this article, involves the use of child restraint systems. Questions about age limits, certification, installation and stowage of child restraint systems are often forwarded to TransportCanada.

Use of child restraints for flight is a very important issue to Transport Canada Civil Aviation(TCCA) and to the aviation industry as a whole. The issue has also been a very difficult one at that. Because aircraft seats are designed differently than car seats, not all car seats are compatible in design and function for use on airplanes. There are therefore many operational difficulties associated with the use of car seats on aircraft. As a result, the rules for the use of car seats on airplanes differ. While most parents would never dream of travelling by motor vehicle without their child strapped securely into a car seat, use of child restraints is currently not mandatory under the Canadian Aviation Regulations(CARs). According to the Regulations, children under the age of two may be held securely in the arms of an adult during flight. Nonetheless, Transport Canada highly recommends the use of an approved child restraint for all phases of flight, as such a system provides the greatest degree of protection for the infant or child and will help in unanticipated turbulence.

Types of child restraints and labelling requirements
There are a number of child restraint devices currently on the market; however, not all are permitted for use on board aircraft. An approved child restraint system is one that meets the Canadian Motor Vehicle SafetyStandard(CMVSS)213 or 213.1. To be accepted for use on board the aircraft, the restraint system must bear a Statement of Compliance Label indicating compliance with CMVSS213 or 213.1.

Types of child restraint systems that may be accepted on aircraft include infant restraint systems, child restraint systems, convertible restraint systems and combinationsystems.

An infant restraint system is an aft-facing restraint system that is generally restricted to an occupant weight of less than 20lbs. Weight restrictions are specified on the system and can vary from one system to another. Infant restraint systems are certified to CMVSS213.1.

A child restraint system is a forward-facing restraint system that is generally restricted to an occupant weight of 20 to 40lbs. However, some systems can accommodate occupants of greater weight. Weight restrictions are specified on the system and can vary from one system to another. Child restraint systems are certified to CMVSS213.

A convertible restraint system is a restraint system that can be used as an aft-facing system for infants and as a forward-facing system for children. These restraint systems are certified to both CMVSS213 and213.1.

Certain manufacturers are also marketing a combination system, which is a combination of a child restraint system and booster cushion. When used as a child restraint system, the booster cushion will include an internal harness system. The internal harness system must be installed and all labelling requirements for child restraint systems must be met to be acceptable for use in an aircraft. When used as a booster cushion, the internal harness system is removed, and the device is therefore not approved for use in an aircraft. Combination systems are certified to CMVSS213 and1`213.2.

The CARES device
Child restraint systems are typically sold in the form of a car seat. However, Transport Canada recently accepted an alternative child restraint device called the Child Aviation Restraint System(CARES). Developed by AmSafe, CARES is a harness-type device that utilizes an aircraft passenger seat belt to secure a child's upper torso against the aircraft seatback.

CARES has been certified by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) and is intended for children ages one to four, weighing between 22 and 44lbs and measuring 40in. or less in height. The CARES device was examined by Transport Canada, and the test criteria was found to be acceptable for use on Canadian aircraft. This new restraint device weighs one pound, can be easily transported, and offers an alternative method of child restraint to passengers travelling with small children.

(Images printed with permission from www.kidsflysafe.com/.)

Currently, Transport Canada permits the use of the CARES device for infants on Canadian aircraft through a global exemption and recommends that the CARES device be used within the limitations specified by the manufacturer on the device.

For more information on the CARES device, visit www.kidsflysafe.com/.

Child restraints and carry-on baggage requirements
It is important to note that Transport Canada does not consider a child restraint system, such as a car seat or the CARES device, to be carry-on baggage when it is carried on the aircraft as a means of restraining an occupant. However, if the device is not being used on board the aircraft, it is then considered carry-on baggage and must be stowed accordingly.

Additional information on child restraint systems can be found by visiting Transport Canada's Aviation Advisory Circular Web site at http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/standards/commerce-circulars-ac0177-1724.htm.

A look ahead...
As Transport Canada continues to respond to questions and concerns about the use of child restraints on aircraft, the message remains the same: a child restraint system provides the greatest degree of protection for an infant or child during all phases of flight.

The Society of Automotive Engineers International(SAE) Aerospace Division has been working hard in the area of aviation child restraint design, taking into account the challenges posed by the particular design and construction of aircraft seats. Likewise, manufacturers have developed various prototypes of aviation child restraints. At the present time, the accepted standard continues to be the CMVSS213 and 213.1, although ongoing research indicates that this standard may not continue to be appropriate for aviation use in the future.

TCCA is encouraged by emerging technology in aviation child restraints and is hopeful that new aviation child restraint systems will soon be approved for use on all flights in Canada and abroad.

Flying the Wrong SID: Why Does It Happen?

by Gerard W.H. van Es, Senior Consultant, NLR-Air Transport Safety Institute, Amsterdam, the Netherlands

On April 29, 2001, an MD-83 was on a flight from Vancouver, B.C., to Seattle, Wash., taking off from Runway08R of Vancouver International Airport. When the clearance delivery controller issued the clearance, he incorrectly gave a RICHMOND6 standard instrument departure(SID). However, he wrote down the correct SID, VANCOUVER2, on both the digital and paper strip. The tower controller, seeing VANCOUVER2 on his strip, assumed that the MD-83 would follow that SID. After takeoff, the MD-83 turned right to a heading of 140° as called for by the RICHMOND6 SID. The MD-83 now conflicted with a DASH-8 that had taken off ahead, also on a RICHMOND6SID. The tower controller noticed the conflict and instructed the MD-83 to turn left. The separation had reduced to 2 NM, whereas 3 NM is required.
Source: NLR-ATSI Air Safety Database.

A standard instrument departure(SID) is an instrument flight rule(IFR) departure procedure that provides a transition from the runway end to the en-route airway structure. There are many operational advantages in using SIDs, both for the pilot and the air traffic controller. For the pilot, a relatively complicated route segment may be loaded from a database and flown using the flight management system(FMS), thus assuring him of proper clearance from obstacles, ground, or other traffic. Air traffic control(ATC) may clear the aircraft for the SID, thereby reducing the need for further instructions during the initial climb phase of the aircraft. This in turn greatly reduces the controller/pilot workload and frequency congestion.

SIDs are primarily designed to comply with obstacle clearance requirements, but are often optimized to satisfy ATC requirements; they may also serve as minimum noise routings. Small deviations from the assigned SID occur on almost every SID flown. Small deviations are quite normal and pose no immediate threat to flight safety. However, large deviations from the assigned SID or flying the wrong SID can be hazardous. Such deviations may lead to(and have led to):

• Close proximity to terrain or obstacles;
• Close proximity to other aircraft; and
• Airspace violations.

There are many reasons for which an aircraft significantly deviates from an assigned SID. A recent study conducted by the NLR-Air Transport Safety Institute revealed 38different causal factors associated with significant SID deviations. According to the study, the most important causal factor involved pilots using the wrong SID.(This factor accounted for 20percent of the analyzed occurrences). Flying the wrong SID can be a very hazardous situation, especially when there are multiple take-off operations in place(e.g. parallel departures).

Let us consider SID blunders more closely. Why would a pilot use the wrong SID? Again, there is no single causal factor. However, some factors are more significant than others because they occur far more frequently. The NLR-Air Transport Safety Institute safety study showed that similar-sounding SID names were often a factor in cases where the pilots used the wrong SID. This should come as no surprise when there are other SIDs available with similar-sounding names. Often, the difference is only a single letter or number. For instance, ELBA5B sounds and looks very much the same as ELBA5C. The similarity can easily lead to mistakes when selecting either SID. When using the FMS NAV mode for flying the SID, the pilot selects the SID from the FMS database. Depending on the type of FMS, a list of runways is presented first. The pilot selects the runway, and a list of corresponding SIDs is given. Sometimes a list of SIDs-where the SIDs are automatically linked to a corresponding runway-is provided first. It is often impossible for the pilots to recognize that they are flying a wrong SID: in the cockpit, all instruments indicate that the aircraft is exactly on the pre-defined route! Usually, ATC notices such errors much earlier than pilots. The following example clearly illustrates the problem:

Before departure, the crew received ATC clearance from Runway 12, PEPOT1FSID. It was read back to ATC as IPLOT1F without any correction from the controller. After departure, ATC monitored the departure well and took corrective action without delay when the controller noticed that the aircraft was flying the wrong SID. The SID should have been PEPOT 1F. Because of their prompt action, ATC prevented conflict with other traffic. IPLOT and PEPOT sound very similar when heard by radio.

This example also illustrates another important factor identified in many occurrences where the wrong SID is flown: the readback/hearback error situation in which the pilot reads back the incorrect SID, and the controller fails to notice. This is a classic air-to-ground communication error. In the example above, the pilots were cleared for the PEPOT1FSID, but read back the IPLOT1FSID, which went unnoticed by the controller.

Another typical error related to flying the wrong SID is crew expectation, as shown in the next example:

The planned SID for the flight was a DAKE departure as had been used for years for this runway. After departure, ATC informed the crew that they were supposed to fly ELBA SID as this had been the cleared departure. The crew stated that their minds had been set for a DAKE departure, and that they did not change the SID in the FMS.

Clearly, the crew expected to fly a particular SID as they always had for this runway. When the controller instructs a completely different SID, the crew fails to notice and often reads back the correct SID. Only after they have taken off will the controller notice that the crew are flying the wrong SID.

Finally, another important factor is illustrated by the following example:

An ELBO 1A SID for Runway 25R was inserted into the flight management computer(FMC) according to the operational flight plan. This was also passed by the clearance delivery. However, when the aircraft was taxiing to Runway25R, the departure runway was changed into 25L with a BEKO1FSID. The pilot not flying forgot to change the ELBO1ASID that was originally programmed into the FMC. The aircraft flew the SID of Runway 25R after takeoff.

Last-minute changes to the SID or departure runway are yet another important factor related to flying the wrong SID. In the example above, the pilot should not only change the runway/SID in the FMS, but should also conduct new take-off performance calculations for the new runway. Often, the SID is completely forgotten in this process, and the FMS uses the originally programmed SID.

As shown in this brief article, there are several reasons pilots use the wrong SID. In many cases, pilots play a crucial role. However, controllers can also be part of the chain of events that lead to flying the wrong SID.

(NOTE: In some examples, the names of the SIDs and runways have been changed due to the confidentiality of the original data. However, all examples are based on real cases.)

The complete study on SID deviations, An Investigation Into Standard Instrument Departure(SID) Deviations,(NLRTP-2008-068), can be downloaded from the following Website:www.nlr.nl/smartsite.dws?id=8744.

The Importance of the Underwater-Egress Pre-Flight Briefing for Passengers

by Jackie Heiler, Pro Aviation Safety Training

In recent years, Transport Canada and the specialized underwater-egress training industry have made considerable efforts in educating pilots and operators on the importance of underwater-egress procedures and training. Through pamphlets, newsletter articles, posters, videos and brochures, the aviation industry has received the bulk of the information and awareness materials. However, those education efforts have succeeded only partially; while our crews and operators are aware and ready, a very important segment of our industry-the passengers-has not benefited to the same extent from this awareness drive.

The reality is that the majority of passengers will not seek specialized underwater-egress training, and therein lies the challenge. How best to reach them? The aforementioned awareness materials are indeed available on-line for most of us who know how to find them. But then again, how many passengers will seek that specialized information? It is therefore the commercial operators-and their flight crews-who are in the best position to transfer this knowledge to the paying passengers. Other than the formal underwater‎egress training program, the most effective and traditional way of accomplishing this knowledge transfer is to provide the best, most comprehensive pre-flight briefing possible-supported by a pre-flight video and reading material, such as a brochure or pamphlet.

For passengers, the most difficult part of surviving a ditching accident is the underwater egress. Accident reports indicate that many people survive the initial impact, but needlessly drown because they were unable to extricate themselves from the aircraft. A study on survivability in seaplane accidents conducted by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada(TSB) suggested that fatalities in seaplane accidents terminating in water are frequently the result of post-impact drowning. Most drownings occurred inside the cabin of the aircraft, and occupants who survived often found exiting the aircraft quite difficult. In fact, over two-thirds of the deaths occurred to occupants who were not incapacitated during the impact, but drowned trying to escape the aircraft.

Why do passengers encounter difficulties when trying to get out of an aircraft that has submerged? Panic, disorientation, unfamiliarity with escape hatches, and lack of proper training are some of the major factors that contribute to passenger drowning. During an emergency situation, rather than pause to think, most will react on instinct and as a result of learned behaviours; if people never acquired a learned behaviour that is appropriate for this type of situation-such as the steps to follow in an underwater-egress scenario-then the odds of reacting appropriately are much smaller. For example, when getting out of a car, most of us release our seat belt before opening the door. We do this without even thinking: it is a learned behaviour. If we are strapped into an aircraft that is sinking, a common reaction is to release our seat belt first, then try to get out. We have reverted to the learned behaviour we have acquired every time we get out of a car.

In many accidents, people have hastily and prematurely removed their seat belts and, as a result, have been moved around the inside of the aircraft due to the in-rushing water. With the lack of gravitational reference, disorientation can rapidly overwhelm a person. The end result is panic and the inability to carry out a simple procedure to find a way out of the aircraft.

Typical underwater-egress training exercise, professionally supervised and done with portable equipment in local pools.

Before releasing our seat belt, we need to stay strapped in our seat until the in-rush of water has stopped, our exit is identified, and we have grabbed a reference point. As long as we are strapped in our seated position, we have a reference point relative to our exit, which will combat disorientation. Also, pushing or pulling open our exit will be much easier if we are still strapped in our seat.

All on board must be familiar with the exits and door handles, and know how to use them with their eyes closed. This advice may seem simple, but think about the car example. Opening the door from the inside is not considered a difficult task. However, think back to a time when you were in a friend's car, and you couldn't locate or operate the door handle immediately.

An unfamiliar task, to be executed submerged, quite possibly upside down, in the dark, and in very cold water: what could seem like a simple undertaking suddenly becomes monumental. To help prevent panic and disorientation, we recommend that you brief passengers thoroughly before each flight on the seven steps of underwater egress described below and taken from the brochure entitled Seaplanes: A Passenger's Guide(TP12365) (http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/publications/tp12365-tp12365-1377.htm).

Underwater Egress
In water accidents, seaplanes tend to come to rest inverted. The key to your survival is to retain your situational awareness and to expeditiously exit the aircraft. The following actions are recommended once the seaplane momentum subsides:

1. Stay calm-Think about what you are going to do next. Wait for the significant accident motion to stop.

2. Grab your life preserver/PFD-If time permits, put on, or at least, grab your life preserver or PFD. DO NOT INFLATE IT until after exiting. It is impossible to swim underwater with an inflated life preserver. You may get trapped.

3. Open the exit and grab hold-If sitting next to an exit, find and grab the exit handle in relation to your left or right knee as previously established. Open the exit. The exit may not open until the cabin is sufficiently flooded and the inside water pressure has equalized. DO NOT release your seat belt and shoulder harness until you are ready to exit. It is easy to become disoriented if you release your seat belt too early. The body's natural buoyancy will cause you to float upwards, making it more difficult to get to the exit.

4. Release your seat belt/harness-Once the exit is open, and you know your exit path, keep a hold of a fixed part of the seaplane and release your belt with the other hand.

5. Exit-Proceed in the direction of your nearest exit. If this exit is blocked or jammed, immediately go to the nearest alternate exit. Always exit by placing one hand on a fixed part of the aircraft, and not letting go before grabbing another fixed part(hand over hand). Pull yourself through the exit. Do not let go until you are out. Resist the urge to kick, as you may become entangled in loose wires or debris, or you might kick a person exiting right behind you. If you become stuck, back up to disengage, twist your body 90 degrees, and then exit.

6. Get to the surface-Once you have exited the seaplane, follow the bubbles to the surface. If you cannot do so, as a last resort inflate your life preserver. Exhale slowly as you rise.

7. Inflate your life preserver-Only inflate it when you are clear of the wreckage, since life preservers can easily get caught on wreckage, block an exit, or prevent another passenger from exiting.

Remember that a thorough pre-flight briefing can make the difference between life and death for your passengers. Better yet, encourage your regular passengers to enroll in a specialized underwater-egress training program. By practicing the skills for ditching and underwater egress in a pool with professional staff, passengers, too, can acquire the learned behaviour we discussed above and avoid becoming victims of this unforgiving situation.

The author and her husband run an established underwater-egress training program for flight crews and passengers in Surrey,B.C. For additional information, visit http://www.proaviation.ca/.

Date modified:

2011-04-20

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