This past summer, I was returning to the Victoria, B.C., airport after doing air work in a small Cessna. The air was very choppy, and I was being tossed around quite a bit. I was grateful when I flew over the water of Cowichan Bay where the air was smooth. At 2 500 ft, I reported my position and altitude to the outer tower. The male controller came back immediately, informing me that I had entered the control zone without authorization, and the boundary of the zone was three miles behind me. Using a militaristic tone, he told me to read the Victoria entry in the current Canada Flight Supplement(CFS) and to familiarize myself with it. In fact, he talked down to me.
Oops! I'd made a mistake that could have had a serious safety outcome. I should have known better and so offered an apology. The information the controller gave me was informative and invaluable, and I thanked him for it. I was glad he offered it, but he did it on the air. Everyone who was tuned to the outer tower heard him berate me. Perhaps he wanted to teach his lesson to everyone flying at the time. It was like being talked down to by an insensitive teacher in elementary school in front of the class.
My first rule of aviation is to fly the aircraft, a rule carved into my mind for the past 28 years. That is what I did. Since then, I wondered if that controller understood what it is like to approach a busy airport through turbulence. I believe there is a difference between being safely on the ground, talking to pilots, and trying to control an aircraft in turbulence, talking to a controller. I called the tower manager after the incident, and he was sympathetic and said he would speak to the controller involved. Incidentally, several times I had to ask for "say again." I wish controllers would learn to speak more slowly.
Name withheld on request
Interesting discussion, and I want to address this because it deserves to be looked at from both a pilot's and a controller's perspective. I, too, have experienced a "talk-down" from a controller after I had made a mistake, and I understand how unpleasant it is for them and for us. I believe it is appropriate for a controller to point out a mistake right away. On correcting a pilot immediately on the air, controllers rarely have any other option. It is an effective and direct mitigation, despite the fluttered ego. They may occasionally ask a pilot to call the tower after landing, but this is not always practical because of time, because it is too late after the fact, or because the pilot is a transient and just passing through. I will accept a little attitude from an irritated controller if I made a procedural error, and I won't take it personally. If a controller gives me a drubbing on the air, I will learn right away. Even though the Aviation Safety Letter(ASL) is mailed mostly to pilots and Aircraft maintenance engineers(AME), I know that air traffic controllers and flight service specialists read it. I am sure they will relate to your story, too. Finally, I will circulate your letter to the Air Traffic Services-Pilot Communications Working Group as a case study. Thank you again for sharing. -Ed.
I would like to introduce myself to you as a regular reader of the Aviation Safety Letter (ASL). I have read this publication and its previous incarnations since I began flying at Central Airways in 1967.
Over the years, the manner in which the aviation industry looks beyond the obvious for cause and effect of misadventure has been very impressive. Because of this introspection and subsequent innovation, aviation has become quite a predictable event. Simple protocols such as confirmation, identification and crew resource management(CRM), for example, can be implemented into medical and even dental environments that enhance patient safety and improve outcomes. A number of hospitals are consulting with experts in aviation safety and applying that knowledge in their institutions. Physiological limitations are not an exclusive domain to any particular activity.
I can generally count on the ASL and the Transportation Safety Board of Canada(TSB) to delve into problems very thoroughly in order to understand human and mechanical systems, but I found this critical element missing in "Disruptive Passenger Behaviour-Creating a Safer Environment," published in ASL 2/2008.
I cannot agree more that incidents that might threaten the safe progress of a flight must be controlled, but I was quite surprised that no one has thought to analyze why these incidents are on the rise. The article to which I refer did not address the why of passenger disruptions, but rather how to contain inappropriate behaviour when it manifests itself.
Flying has changed, as we like to say, "since 9/11," and this date has been an excuse for some blatant lack of insight into the human condition. No longer is a critical analysis required; one only need repeat "9/11," and there will be little or no critical response.
Because of "enhanced security," passengers are now told to arrive hours prior to a flight. Once passengers get through the line of checks-security checks and document checks-they are often left to wait in airports that lack any kind of eating facility. And, in the interests of economy, many airlines no longer provide in-flight meal service. Maybe, just maybe, a number of passengers experience episodes of clinical or subclinical hypoglycemia that can lead to such behaviour. The effects of hypoglycemia are clearly documented in aviation medical circles, and it should not be lost on those who plan security measures that a passenger's body works just like that of a pilot.
I am one who has encouraged smoking cessation long before it was popular to do so. But, like it or not, tobacco products are still being consumed. Some think that tobacco creates a much higher addictive pattern than many narcotics. Several years ago, there was an anecdotal report from a drug addict who confided that kicking heroin was much easier than kicking tobacco. Given the fact that airlines sell tickets to smokers and insist they go smoke free for as long as 24hours, maybe, just maybe, nicotine withdrawal is affecting their behaviour. Have the airports or airlines considered freely dispensing nicotine patches or gum? It might be a reasonable consideration since we do have expectations of predictable human behaviour on board an aircraft.
As far as security, we have come to equate impudence and random acts of intimidation with enhanced security. Perhaps passengers have been pushed around so much before they even reach an aircraft that, by the time they are seated, they would readily volunteer to act as commandos. Has the industry really done an independent analysis of what constitutes good security? Is there a reason that customs, immigration, and security concerns allow bullies to enter their ranks? It really just takes one or two people with combative and anti-social attitudes to denigrate the security services and initiate a confrontation. A kind word or minor human consideration does not equate to lessened security.
I cannot at all fathom security that involves having your suitcase disassembled in front of one hundred fellow passengers amounting to anything but intimidation and humiliation. Those of us who worked on privacy legislation thought that acts of public humiliation might have been stopped by such law.
I am at a loss to understand why operational flight crews are subjected to shoe inspection-especially when a number of pilots south of the border now carry handguns. I was at a total loss to explain or understand why a security guard felt that hammering a shoe on the floor-after it had undergone visual and radiographic inspection-was a valid security measure.
I am very suspicious that the aviation industry has taken security at face value from consultants "selling security services," and each add-on increases billable services that may have little evidence of efficacy.
The airline industry must realize that passengers are its raison d'être and, along with airport operators, ensure that security is not an excuse to abuse the flying public. Until intelligent security and mutual respect are consistently demonstrated to the travelling public, I would suggest we need as much enforcement legislation as possible to ensure a safe flight. After all, if you keep poking any animal with a stick, there is a point at which a response will be generated.
Historically, we have come to expect so much more of the aviation industry in terms of insight, intelligence, and proactive application of knowledge. I would suggest we revisit the airport experience and realize that it may very well affect passenger behaviour.
Richard D. Speers, D.D.S.
Toronto, Ont.
As a global aviation safety advisor, a pilot, a private aircraft owner and an aircraft maintenance engineer(AME), I really enjoy the quality and variety of the information provided in the Aviation Safety Letter(ASL). Most recently, I have been consumed with the proposed changes to the Canadian Aviation Regulations(CARs) in relation to 406MHz emergency locator transmitters(ELT). I was a respondent to the Canada Gazette, Part I, and am opposed to the changes as they are published at this time. Although the comment period is now closed, and we are waiting for news on what changes will make it to the Canada Gazette, PartII,I still felt the need to write this morning.
With the latest issue of the ASL came an Important Notice regarding these proposed ELT changes, and in the contents of the ASL, I read with interest the selection of aviation accidents published from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada(TSB). Quite ironically, in all five of the collision with terrain accidents involving aircraft that were required to have ELTs, the ELT signal was not detected because either the ELT disconnected from the antenna(three cases), or the ELT antenna broke(one case), or the ELT was destroyed by fire(one case). While I would love to have the time to review more of these accidents and provide detailed statistics of my own, it would be in vain. The fact remains that no matter how you manipulate the statistics, the failure rate of ELTs is greater than 85percent due to the design and installation of these units in aircraft. I support COSPAS-SARSAT and Transport Canada in the fact that the position accuracy and signal strength of the 406MHz ELT is much superior to the old 121.5/243MHz; however, all of that is moot if the ELT is not able to transmit. Most of the problems reported by these two groups(Transport Canada and COSPAS-SARSAT) were related to the first generation Technical Standard Order(TSO)-C91 series ELTs, and were improved upon in the second generation TSO-C91a seriesELTs. TransportCanada, or more accurately the search and rescue(SAR) industry, has made its decision on the path forward for Canadian aviation stakeholders. The private aircraft owner, which represents over 75percent of registered aircraft in Canada, has had the smallest voice in the process.
In my profession of advising global mining and petroleum companies on aviation safety, the best practice is to have solid flight-following procedures in place without reliance on ELTs. The most practical and accurate systems on the market at this time are satellite-based tracking units. They provide real-time tracking, with the ability to see a "bread crumb" trail. Even if the aircraft has had to stray from its intended flight path due to weather, its position is always known. For some reason, Transport Canada has drafted the proposed regulations to ensure that these systems cannot be used as an alternate means of compliance. The aviation industry, however, knows the benefits of these systems and continues to equip aircraft at an alarmingly high rate. Technology has come a long way in the last 10years, and I am sorry to say that ELT design and installations have not. Let's hope that input from the industry can impart changes to the regulation process.
Jeff Goyer
Ardrossan, Alta.
As part of its performance-based regulation, TransportCanada is in fact allowing alternate means of emergency location that would provide "tracking" of aircraft movements. This can actually be found in the proposed regulations as pre-published in the Canada Gazette, PartI.
Transport Canada is currently reviewing all comments received further to the Canada Gazette, Part I consultation and from the public and will consider whether that portion of the regulations needs to be clarified, and the requirements regarding alternate means amended to allow more flexibility for that type of system.
From the comments received, it was evident that the public did not recognize that the regulations permitted alternate means of emergency location, and that the perception was that only 406MHz ELTs were mandated.
It is Transport Canada's intention to permit alternate means of emergency location, which could include tracking devices should they meet the requirements set out in the regulations.
Policy and Regulatory Services Branch
Civil Aviation, Transport Canada
In Issue 1/2008 of the Aviation Safety Letter(ASL), the article "Direct VFR Flight in Mountains Results in Another CFIT Accident" does not address one possible critical factor in the accident: the use of a global positioning system(GPS). The reliance on a GPS unit to fly a direct track may have contributed significantly to this tragic controlled-flight-into-terrain(CFIT) event.
I speak from personal knowledge. As a chief flying instructor, I have met a number of pilots who are enamoured with the devices and who claim that a GPS can considerably shorten their trip in mountainous terrain by reducing the navigational workload and allowing them to fly "direct." I always remind them of the importance of not relying solely on the device, making sure to keep their eyes open, and keeping track of their positions along the route on a proper chart.
It is very important for pilots to realize that using a navigation aid as a primary source of navigational information can lead to disastrous consequences. A visual flight rules(VFR) flight must be flown with reference to surface, terrain, ceilings, traffic, and other potential hazards.
I have an ongoing concern that as more and more electronic navigational aids become available at low cost to VFR pilots, fewer and fewer pilots will remember that they have to keep looking outside, and fewer will bother to use maps, let alone current ones. For example, there is a big push by NAVCANADA to see us all install traffic warning systems in our training aircraft. In busy areas such as Toronto, St-Hubert, or the lower mainland of British Columbia, I would expect that these devices would be issuing constant warning alerts on some days and that pilots would simply habituate to warning mode and, thinking they were safe, reduce their vigilance.
I thank you for the efforts that you and your colleagues put forth in producing the ASL.
Name withheld on request