2.4MMEL Philosophy

This section provides an insight into the criteria that govern the determination of an acceptable MMEL item and the methods of justification to be used in the development of a MMEL.

2.4.1 Level of Safety

It should be noted that although the airworthiness standards, e.g., AWM 525, require that aircraft be designed with certain systems and components, the MMEL will permit the operation, for short periods, of that aircraft with such items of equipment inoperative if the required level of safety can be maintained. The MMEL identifies the equipment which may be inoperative while maintaining the level of safety of the aircraft type dictated by the type of operation for which the aircraft was certified and the minimum standards specified in the type certification basis.

To establish the equipment for any given operating condition, the MMEL Review Group must consider various factors relating to safe operation when such equipment is inoperative. These include the consequence to the aircraft and its occupants of further failures, change in crew workload and/or degradation in crew efficiency and degradation in crew capability to cope with adverse internal and external environmental conditions.

2.4.2 Maintaining the Level of Safety

  1. Ta) The MMEL Review Group will base its decision, as to whether a particular proposal for a MMEL is to be approved, on the criterion that the level of safety required by the standards specified for the design and operation of the aircraft type can be maintained. This finding will be based on the substantiated ability to maintain the required level of safety with an item of equipment inoperative.
  2. This substantiation will be achieved by one or more of the following means:

    • the adjustment of operating limitations;
    • transfer of the function to an operating component;
    • reference to other instruments or components performing the required function or providing the required information;
    • change in operating procedures;
    • change in maintenance procedures; and/or
    • similarity of design, function and aircraft operational role of a system or item for which relief has already been approved.

2.4.3 Example of Justification of a MMEL Item

  1. To illustrate this, consider a MMEL proposal requesting that an aircraft be permitted to dispatch with the differential pressure indicator on the cockpit pressurization control panel inoperative.
  2. AWM 525.841(b)(5) requires that pressurized cabins must have instruments at the pilot or flight engineer station to show the pressure differential between the cabin air pressure and atmospheric pressure.
  3. In order to meet the criteria, the MMEL proposal would have to stipulate that the following conditions be met:

    • the cabin altimeter must be operative; and
    • a chart showing the relationship between the aircraft and cabin altitude for the normal operating pressure differential (e.g. 8 PSI) must be available to the crew in flight.

  4. Consequently, the flight crew, with reference to the aircraft's altimeter, the cabin altimeter and the specified chart, would be able to determine that the appropriate cabin pressure differential was being maintained during flight.
  5. Providing that dispatching with the cabin pressure differential indicator inoperative did not seriously impact crew workload and/or efficiency and was acceptable in terms of further failures, this MMEL item would be acceptable.
  6. This acceptability is based on the evaluation of the foregoing factors showing that the level of safety dictated by the minimum standards specified for the design and operation of the aircraft type, would be maintained.
  7. The continued reliability of an aircraft system and the probability of total system failure, following the dispatch of an aircraft with inoperative equipment, must be considered for some MMEL items.

2.4.4Methods of Justification of MMEL Items

The assessment of an acceptable level of safety for a MMEL item often involves more than one of the following methods of justification:

  1. the equipment may be considered optional;
  2. the equipment may be considered redundant;
  3. a quantitative safety analysis; and/or
  4. a qualitative analysis.

2.4.5Optional Equipment

When aircraft are approved with optional equipment on board which is over and above the required equipment, there is no necessity for such equipment to be operative if it is in excess of that required for safe operations for a particular flight condition or route of flight. Inclusion in the MMEL can be accepted on this basis.

2.4.6Redundant Items

If the purpose or function of the considered component/system can be carried out by some other items of equipment, then it may be accepted on a redundancy basis with the provision that the alternative equipment can be confirmed to be operative. Redundancy cannot be claimed as justification for inclusion of an item if the two (or more) sources of the function or information are required by the aircraft type certification basis. In this case, another means of justification such as the safety analysis method must be used.

2.4.7Quantitative Safety Analysis

  1. The increasing dependency of modern aircraft on the safe operation of their complex systems has resulted in the development of structured techniques to achieve the necessary level of safety. This level of safety is based upon the principle that the hazard resulting from an event should be inversely proportional to the probability of its occurrence. Compliance is usually demonstrated by conducting a system safety assessment.
  2. The safety assessment establishes the major, hazardous or catastrophic situations or failure conditions which the system is capable of producing and the allowable probability of occurrence. For those systems whose failure is critical, i.e., results in hazardous or catastrophic situations, a numerical probability analysis is usually required to demonstrate compliance with the allowable probability of occurrence. For non-critical components/systems, the safety assessment may be greatly simplified. The risk of any specific failure condition is a function of failure rate, the number of such systems and the time of exposure to risk.
  3. When items of equipment from systems performing critical functions, are included in the MMEL, account shall be taken of their inoperability in the safety assessment. The additional risk resulting from occasional flights with such equipment inoperative should be established and should be compatible with the allowable probability of occurrence established during the certification process.
  4. If the item cannot be justified by the previous means or criteria, then a safety analysis must be carried out involving a quantitative analysis of the likely risk of the worst effects that can result from additional failures, events and/or environmental conditions occurring during a flight with the particular inoperative item in question. It must be shown that, bearing in mind the reduced exposure time when operating under a MMEL, the probability of a particular hazard has not been increased beyond the levels dictated by the minimum standards specified for the design and operation of the aircraft type.

2.4.8Qualitative Safety Analysis

If an item is to be acceptable for inclusion in a MMEL, a qualitative analysis must be used to consider the impact that the proposed inoperative item has on all other aspects of the aircraft's operation. The qualitative analysis must consider the impact on crew workload, the impact of multiple MMEL items, and the complexity of maintenance and/or operational procedures. It may reflect experience with previous MMEL approvals.

Note:A previous MMEL approval of the same item on another aircraft type does not in itself imply that the required level of safety has been met.

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