Notices and Orders

Notices and Orders Issued Pursuant to Section 31 of the Railway Safety Act
to Mitigate Identified Threats to Rail Safety

Date Region Subdivision
Or Yard
Railway Company or Person Hazard or Condition Notice and Order/Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action Date of Revocation

2016-12-21

Quebec Region

St-Hyacinthe Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CN)

Condition or Hazard observed:

TC identified an immediate threat to safety caused by a dual control switch, which failed the obstruction test.

This situation could have potentially allowed the signal system to allow trains to proceed through the switch at normal track speed, which is 95MPH for passenger trains at that specific location, with the switch point not in a position to ensure the safe passage.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Measures immediately taken by CN:

  • Immediate readjustement of the switch

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to remove the immediate threat to safety.

2016-12-21

2016-11-17

Quebec Region

Belleville Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CP)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The railway crossing at grade located at Mile 115.64, Belleville Subdivision and Hunt Club Road is equipped with standard railway crossing signs. Stop signs are also located at the crossing.

Sightlines for road users approaching the crossing were restricted by brush which could affect their ability to safely use of the railway crossing.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Measures immediately taken by CP:

  • Upon being notified by telephone of the observed conditions, CP dispatched work crews to clear the sight lines.

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to remove the immediate threat to safety.

2016-11-17

2016-11-04

Quebec Region

Kingston Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The non-compliant conditions found were as follows:

  • A combination of conditions requiring remedial action on mainline switch 7b Coteau East
  • Fasteners not intact or maintained in switch point area at the same location.
  • Heel of switch insecure or heel bolts not tight at the same location.

These non-compliant conditions and concerns combined with the speed at which trains were operating on this track, could have reasonably been expected to cause a derailment.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Measures immediately taken by CN:

  • Reduced the speed of all trains to class 1 (10 mph) on track switch 7b Coteau East.
  • Sent a crew to immediately repair the non-compliant conditions observed.

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to remove the immediate threat to safety.

2016-11-04

2016-10-28

Prairie and Northern Region

Brazeau Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

In areas where insufficient or ineffective longitudinal restrain exists, broken bolts or pull-apart conditions may occur and create bolt hole cracks that leads to broken rails which may result in derailments.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Measures immediately taken by CN:

  • Following the identification of the missing bolt condition by Transport Canada, the CN assistant track supervisor immediately installed bolts where they were missing.

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to remove the immediate threat to safety.

2016-10-28

2016-10-04

Quebec Region

Northernland Subdivision

Iron Ore and Quebec North Shore & Labrador

Condition or Hazard observed:

In the course of this crossing inspection on the Northernland Subdivision in Labrador at Mile 31.36, TC identified immediate threats to rail safety where vegetation was obstructing sightlines

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Measures immediately taken by Iron Ore and QNS&L:

  • A temporary slow order was applied on approaching trains.

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to remove the immediate threat to safety.

2016-10-04

2016-09-06

Quebec Region

Matagami Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

TC identified an immediate threat to safety caused by a location with crossties not effectively distributed to support a 39 foot section of track at Mile 22.72

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Measures immediately taken by CN:

In the interim of permanent repairs being completed, CN’s supervisor accompanying me on this inspection did apply a temporary slow order (TSO) of 10 mph for freight trains at the identified location.

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to mitigate the immediate threat to safety.

2016-09-06

2016-09-02

Quebec Region

Lacolle Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

TC identified immediate threats to rail safety where vegetation was obstructing sighlines:

  • Mile 24,17 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines
  • Mile 20,16 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines
  • Mile 20,09 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines
  • Mile 19,99 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines
  • Mile 19,80 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines
  • Mile 18,28 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines
  • Mile 18,15 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Measures immediately taken by CP:

CP applied temporary slow orders as a mitigation measure.

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to mitigate the immediate threat to safety.

2016-09-02

2016-08-29

Quebec Region

Sherbrooke Subdivision

St. Laurent & Atlantic Railway (SL&A)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Non-compliant conditions:

  • Failure to bring track into compliance or halt operations over non-compliant track.
  • In the case of four-hole jointed rails, fewer than two bolts per rail on a Class 2 track at 99 locations.
  • Difference in cross level at points less than 62 feet apart exceeding the allowable limit for a Class 2 track (Warp 62 of 2 3⁄8") at mile 56.97.
  • No effective support ties within the prescribed distance from a rail joint at mile 56.26. 
  • Joint bar broken at centre at mile 58.74.
  • 100-lb rail wear exceeding allowable limit for a Class 2 track at the following locations:
    Mile 16 to mile 16.30
    Mile 16.58
    Mile 18.55
    Mile 32.98
    Mile 55.05

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Measures immediately taken by St. Laurent & Atlantic:

  • Reduced the allowable speed of trains operating on a Class 1 track at the appropriate locations;
  • Sent a crew to make the necessary repairs before cancelling track protection (TOP). 

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to mitigate the immediate threat to safety.

2016-08-29

2016-08-26

Quebec Region

Mont-Joli Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Sightlines at the grade crossings were inadequate, creating a risk that road users might not be able to respond safely to the approach of a train.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Measures immediately taken by CN:

  • Ungated grade crossing equipped with a warning system, mile point 69.17; train speed reduced to 10m/h to match the cleared sightlines;
  • Ungated grade crossing equipped with a warning system, mile point 74.05; corrective measures have been implemented. Sightlines have been cleared to provide visibility along the track corresponding to the train speed shown on the indicator.

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to mitigate the immediate threat to safety.

2016-08-26

2016-08-23

Quebec Region

St-Luc Yard

Canadian Pacific Railway

Condition or Hazard observed:

CP’s current practices associated with the use of skates in kicking cars create an immediate threat to safe railway operations, as the risk of cars rolling uncontrolled is high and could, as a result, cause harm to employees or members of the public and cause damage to the environment or property.

The Canadian Pacific Railway is ordered to:

In CP St-Luc yard:

  • Not use track skates as a means to stop the motion of cars that have been kicked.
  • Secure with handbrakes any cars intended to receive cars cut in motion.
  • Ensure that the crew or qualified employee, involved in the switching operations, visually verify the presence of equipment before cars are cut in motion.

CP filed a request for review at the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada (TATC) on September 23, 2016.

Hearing was held on December 15, 2016 and continued on January 18 and 19, 2017.

Awaiting decision from TATC

 


2016-07-25

Quebec Region

Drummondville Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

M.P. 20.60 – cluster of defective ties on class 5 track, requiring a slow order for class 3 track

M.P. 46.42 – Cluster of defective ties on class 5 track, requiring a slow order for class 3 track

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action

In the interim of permanent repairs being completed, CN’s supervisor accompanying the Railway Safety Inspector on this inspection did apply a temporary slow order (TSO) of 60 mph for passenger train and 40 mph for freight train at each of the above noted locations. As such, in my opinion, as a result of the speed restriction applied, the immediate threat has been protected. Prior to removing the speed restrictions applied on the above conditions, it is expected that CN notify me in order that I may assess the remedial measures and ensure that the immediate threat has been eliminated to my satisfaction.

2016-07-25

2016-07-15

Quebec Region

Taschereau Yard

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Two accidents, between June 30th and July 13th that are directly attributed to the practice of kicking cars indicate that current measures are insufficient to ensure equipment will not move foul of another track.

The procedures currently in place related to switching in CN Taschereau yard are not sufficient to prevent uncontrolled movements.

The Canadian National Railway Company is ordered to:

  1. Clearly identify locations on each track where the 2 "anchor" cars are to be secured prior to having cars kicked onto them;
  2. Monitor and document the travel of the secured "anchor" cars from the identified location prior to the lifting of the cars;
  3. Report to Transport Canada, via email, any instance where equipment has moved foul of another track in an uncontrolled fashion; and
  4. Not allow kicking of cars in the classification yard if a crew is present at the opposite end, unless positive communications between the crews is established that includes the work to be done and that employees and equipment at the opposite end are in a position that they would not be affected by equipment that would become foul of the lead.

2016-11-30


2016-07-12

Quebec Region

Kingston Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

  • Kingston Sub. Mile 37.08 Vegetation obstructing the sightlines;
  • Kingston Sub. Mile 37.19: Vegetation obstructing the sightlines

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action

Measures immediately taken by CN:

  • Flagging of both crossings until the brush was cut
  • Cutting of the brush

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to mitigate the immediate threat to safety.

2016-07-12

2016-07-12

Quebec Region

Cran Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Non-compliant conditions:

  • Fewer than minimum allowable number of non-defective ties per 39 feet for jointed rail in class 2 at Mile 2.
  • Fewer than minimum allowable number of non-defective ties per 39 feet for jointed rail in class 2 at Mile 7.2.
  • Crossties not effectively distributed to support a 39 foot segment of track for jointed rail in class 2 at Mile 54.4.
  • Crossties not effectively distributed to support a 39 foot segment of track for jointed rail in class 2 and no effective support ties within the prescribed distance from a joint at Mile 61.5.
  • Crossties not effectively distributed to support a 39 foot segment of track for jointed rail in class 2 at Mile 127.95.

These conditions, combined with the speed at which trains were operating on this track, could have reasonably been expected to cause a derailment resulting in persons being injured, or property and the environment being damaged.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

CN took the following immediate actions after Transport Canada identified the immediate threat to safety:

  • Speed restriction 10 mph applied to all trains at miles 2, 7.2, 54.4, 61.5, 118.75 and 127.95.

The measures immediately taken by CN have been deemed satisfactory to the Railway Safety Inspector to mitigate the immediate threat to safety until more permanent solutions are applied.

2016-07-12

2016-07-11

Quebec Region

Bécancour Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Non-compliant conditions:

  1. Mile 6.92 – Each rail not bolted with at least two bolts at each joint.
  2. Mile 14.36 – Guard check gauge less than allowable.
  3. Mile 15.97 – Each rail not bolted with at least two bolts at each joint.
  4. Mile 16.91 – Each rail not bolted with at least two bolts at each joint.
  5. Mile 19.47 – Center cracked bar at joint.
  6. Mile 19.77 – Each rail not bolted with at least two bolts at each joint.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Measures immediately taken by CN:

  • Immediately sent a crew to repair these conditions

These measures have been deemed satisfactory to mitigate the immediate threat to safety.

2016-07-11

2016-07-04

Quebec Region

Pelletier Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Defective Ties:

  • Mile 36.56 – Cluster of 5-6 defective ties;
  • Mile 42.15 – Cluster of 6-7 defective ties;
  • Mile 43.87 – Cluster of 5-6 and cluster of 8-9 defective ties;
  • Mile 48.24 – Cluster of 6-7 defective ties.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Canadian National Railway’s immediate corrective measures following the identification of the immediate threat to safety:

In the interim of permanent repairs being completed, CN has applied a temporary slow order (TSO) of 10 mph at each of the unsafe locations.

The measures immediately taken by CN have been deemed satisfactory to the Railway Safety Inspector to mitigate the immediate threat until more permanent solutions are applied.

2016-07-04

2016-07-04

Quebec Region

Taschereau Yard

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Unintended movement of railway equipment related to the practice of “kicking” cars.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

CN’s immediate corrective measures taken following the identification of the immediate threat by Transport Canada:

CN Circular No: 2016-0005 was issued to all CN employees required to perform switching at Taschereau yard between tracks MC01 to MC29. These employees must communicate with the on duty trainmaster in regards to any such maneuver.

The Trainmaster will impose the following restrictions;

  • A maximum of 5 cars can be “kicked” or shoved to rest on the track.
  • If more than 5 cars must be placed on the track at a time, cars must be coupled and shoved to a rest to the south end of the track.

These measures immediately taken by CN were deemed satisfactory by the Railway Safety Inspector to mitigate the immediate threat.

2016-07-04

2016-06-28

Quebec Region

Joliette Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

TC identified immediate threat to safety caused by reduced sightlines.

  • Joliette Subdivision at Mile 104.59 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

CN’s immediate corrective measures taken following the identification of the immediate threat to safety by Transport Canada:

  • 10 MPH slow order applied and vegetation was cleared

These measures immediately taken by CN were deemed satisfactory by the Railway Safety Inspector to remove the immediate threat to safety.

2016-06-28

2016-06-22

Quebec Region

Roberval Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

TC identified immediate threats to safety caused by reduced sightlines at passive crossings. The conditions found were as follows:

  • Mile 2.05 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines;
  • Mile 5.72 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines;
  • Mile 6.22 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines;
  • Mile 26.68 : Vegetation obstructing the sightlines.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

CN’s Corrective Measures Following the: reduced sightlines

  • M.P. 2.05 - 10 MPH slow order applied
  • M.P. 5.72 - 10 MPH slow order applied
  • M.P. 6.22 - 10 MPH slow order applied
  • M.P. 26.68 - 15MPH slow order applied

It was also noted that a directive was sent by the senior manager engineering to CN supervisors explicitly stating that crossings where the sightlines were non-compliant to CN’s standards, the situation had to be immediately mitigated with a temporary slow order until permanently resolved.

Transport Canada appreciates these proactive measures taken by CN in order to quickly restore the safety of its railway operations on the Roberval Subdivision.

Transport Canada will be monitoring the implementation of CN’s mitigating actions, as required, and should safety issues be identified, action will be taken accordingly.

2016-06-22

2016-06-13

Quebec Region

Roberval Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Non-compliant conditions and concerns combined with the speed at which trains were operating on this track, could have reasonably expected to cause a derailment.

Notice acknowledging immediate action

CN took the following immediate actions:

  • Reduced the speed of all trains to class 1 at miles 14.18 and 19.44; will add missing bolts before cancelling track protection.
  • Reduced the speed of all trains to 10 mph at mile 19.8; sent a crew to add joints before cancelling track protection.

2016-06-13

2016-06-13

Quebec Region

St. Luc Yard

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The practice of releasing cars under their own momentum, commonly referred to as “kicking” under the conditions observed during recent operations inspections can lead to uncontrolled and unprotected movements of equipment.

Order that Canadian Pacific Railway Company:

In S-Luc yard, not allow the practice of “kicking” cars until such time that control measures are put in place to my the Railway Safety Inspector’s satisfaction so that the activity practice is performed to the highest level of safety safely.

2016-06-16

2016-06-07

Quebec Region

Lac St. Jean Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The conditions found were as follows;

  • M.P. 158.90 – cracked or broken (center break) compromise joint bar in front of switch FJ01 south
  • M.P. 162.95 – crossties not effectively distributed to support a 39 foot segment of track, 8 to 9 defective in a row.
  • M.P. 170.77 – No effective support ties within the prescribed distance of a joint, 5 defective ties in a row.
  • M.P. 198.92 – cracked or broken (center break) joint bar.
  • M.P. 200.15 – No effective support ties within the prescribed distance of a joint

Notice acknowledging immediate action

As a result of these conditions found, CN recognized that an immediate threat to safety, as per subsection 4(4.1), existed and took the immediate action required to remediate the situation pursuant to subsection 4(4.1) of the Railway Safety Act. In the interim of permanent repairs being completed, CN’s supervisor accompanying the Railway Safety Inspector on this inspection did apply a temporary slow order (TSO) of 10 mph at each of the above noted locations.

As a result of the speed restriction applied, the immediate threat has been protected. Prior to removing cancelling the speed restrictions applied on the above conditions, it is expected that CN will notify the Railway Safety Inspector in order that he may assess implementation of the remedial measures and ensure that the immediate threat has been eliminated removed to my his satisfaction.

2016-06-07

2016-05-26

Ontario Region

Canal, Thorold and Cayuga Spurs

Trillium Railway (TR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Freight cars held in captive service with mechanical defects were traveling an undetermined distance prior to being inspected.

Order that Trillium Railway Company:

  1. Visually inspect all track and provide a copy of the track inspection report to the undersigned by May 30, 2016.
  2. Until (a) is completed to the satisfaction of the undersigned, not operate any equipment at a speed greater than the maximum allowable operating speed for Class 1 track;

2016-08-12

2016-04-15

Quebec Region

Senneterre

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Freight cars held in captive service with mechanical defects were traveling an undetermined distance prior to being inspected.

The Railway Safety Inspector ordered that Canadian National Railway Company:

Perform a certified car inspection on freight trains departing Senneterre, Québec in the direction of travel going East and that defects found on these trains be reported to the Railway Safety Inspector.

The Order will apply until such time as the Railway Safety Inspector is satisfied that the risk associated with these cars is removed.

2016-06-10

2016-02-19

Ontario Region

Halton Subdivision

Canadian National Railway Company (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Trains blocking the public crossing at Mi.8.8 of the CN Halton Subdivision at Goreway Drive in Brampton Ontario, for an extended period of time, and the railway’s unwillingness to immediately rectify the issue will create uncertainty for pedestrians and vehicular traffic. This situation is resulting in dangerous driver behaviour being taken at the crossing and could also delay the passage of emergency vehicles through the crossing in an emergency situation which could reasonably be expected to lead to a person being injured or made to be ill.

Order that Canadian National Railway Company shall:

  1. Ensure that all trains arriving at Brampton Intermodal Terminal are provided a clear route with all switches directly lined into their yard track, allowing for trains to pull continuously until the crossing is clear.

CN Rail to provide to the undersigned on a weekly basis, copies of Event Recorder downloads from the Grade Crossing Warning System at Mi. 8.8, Halton Subdivision (Goreway Drive, Brampton, ON)

CN filed for review at TATC on March 9, 2016

Hearing held June 23, 2016

Decision received December 1, 2016

Currently undergoing a Ministerial Review.


2016-01-14

Pacific Region

Locations within British Columbia including but not limited to Roberts Bank, Coquitlam, and Kamloops

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

  • CP operations, specific to Extended Service Run (ESR), are creating conditions which are causing fatigue to accumulate in operating crews, thereby reducing their alertness, while in care and control of trains. The operational conditions contributing to this are:
    • Not including transit time, to and from the away-from-home rest facility, and the away-from-home terminal as time on duty;
    • Not allowing crews to book rest at the away-from-home terminal after being cancelled for duty;
Not listing ESR trains on the train lineup for a sufficient amount of time. This does not allow crew members sufficient planning time for a sleep cycle prior to being on duty.

Order that Canadian Pacific Railway Company:

At home, and away-from-home terminal of Kamloops, Roberts Bank, and Port Coquitlam (Greater Vancouver Area Terminals inclusive):

  • Shall include all transit time to and from the rest facility at the away-from-home terminal as operating crews on-duty time;
  • Shall allow ESR crews the ability to book up to eight hours undisturbed rest when cancelled;
  • Shall have all ESR trains posted on the ESR specific train lineup or a general lineup if utilized, for a minimum of eight hours prior to call time, and up to a maximum call time of twelve hours.
2016-10-19

2015-12-11

Ontario Region

Windsor Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

  • The inadequate sightlines for the current road and rail speed due to the angle of the intersection of the road and rail at this crossing could be expected to lead to a collision where a vehicle driver, passenger or railway employee is seriously injured or killed or cause damage to property or the environment;

  • The horizontal alignment poses a risk to safe passage of vehicles that have a restricted view (e.g gravel trucks, tractor trailers, pickup trucks, cube vans or vehicles used for transporting farming goods and supplies). All of these types of vehicles have one thing in common: they restrict the driver to viewing an approaching train out the passenger front window only. The signs installed on Fansher road to prohibit heavy trucks and farm machinery exempt some vehicles that could have a restricted view as mentioned above; and

  • On November 16, 2015, a fatality occurred at Mile 41.31(Euphemia Line) which had a similar level of safety as Mile 39.19 (Fansher Road). A lack of immediate action could result in a similar crossing incident which could reasonably be expected to lead to a person being injured or made ill or could cause damage to property or the environment.

Order that Canadian Pacific Railway Company:

Not allow railway equipment or movements to occupy the crossing at mile 39.19, Windsor Subdivision (Fansher Road, Dawn-Euphemia, ON) unless:

  • The train speed is limited to 10MPH until the crossing is fully occupied

OR, if operationally more feasible at current track speeds;

  • The crossing is manually protected by a flag person

2015-12-18

2015-11-27

Quebec Region

CN's LaTuque Subdivision

Individual

Condition or Hazard observed:

Obstacles placed on the individual’s property restrict the movement of vehicles, including trucks and emergency vehicles. This means that vehicles on the property could block the grade crossing and might not be able to clear the grade crossing when a train is approaching. This could cause an accident in which a person could be injured or killed and constitutes an immediate threat to safe railway operations.

Order to an individual

The person shall ensure that no obstacle placed on the property restricts the movement of vehicles in such way that a vehicle blocks the grade crossing or is unable to clear the grade crossing when a train is approaching.

 


2015-11-24

Ontario Region

Windsor Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

At the following locations on the Windsor Subdivision:

  • Bilton Line – mile 38.63
  • Fansher Road – mile 39.19
  • Euphemia line – mile 41.31
  • Fairfield Line – mile 46.77

Sightlines are inadequate for road and rail speeds. Sightlines are restricted due to the angle of the intersection of the road and rail. The horizontal alignment of the crossings are inadequate for the safe passage of vehicles, as they are all in a rural farming area and are used to great extent by and not limited to pickup trucks, cube vans, large straight trucks (used for transporting milk, seed crops, fertilizer), gravel trucks, tractor trailers. All of these types of vehicles have one thing in common: they restrict the driver to viewing an approaching train out the passenger front window only.

This situation results in sightlines of approximately 150 ft. (from the road stop position of 8 meters) even through the railway right-of-way is clear of brush. Using the guidelines G4-A, this would require a train speed of 10 mph in order to obtain the minimum of 10 seconds of warning for an approaching train.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action:

Transport Canada has reviewed the mitigating actions implemented by CP and deems the mitigating actions to be satisfactory.

CP also committed to notifying Transport Canada prior to making any changes to the mitigating measures. Transport Canada will continue to monitor the on-going implementation of these mitigating measures and should additional safety issues be identified or if the safety measures are not maintained, the department will not hesitate to take immediate action(s).

2015-11-24

2015-11-19

Pacific Region

Thompson Subdivision
AND
City of Kamloops

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The location of the Grade Crossing is an area where there is a high density of pedestrian traffic due to the presence of an arena, restaurants, bars and hotels. The high density of pedestrian traffic at that location results in an increased risk of pedestrians going through the Grade Crossing, despite deployed, and of pedestrians running in front of a train while trains are approaching or crawling under railway equipment blocking the Grade Crossing. As this Grade Crossing is located on a double track main line, the risk associated with pedestrians going through the Grade Crossing, despite deployed, is increased as pedestrians could be unaware of potential railway equipment approaching on the second track.

The current operating practice at this Grade Crossing, while changing crews, results in the Grade Crossing being blocked or in the warning system device being activated on a prolonged basis. The train stopping on and past the crossing island circuit contributes to hazards or conditions described above.

Order to Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and the City of Kamloops:

  • CPR must ensure that no Eastbound railway equipment stop on or past the Grade Crossing (3rd Avenue – CPR Mile 0.10) if such stoppage would result in the Grade Crossing being occupied, except for an emergency.
  • CPR must ensure that crew changes will be at 2nd Avenue – CPR Mile 0.21 Thompson Subdivision. This location must be marked to prevent the railway crossing from being continuously activated.
  • CPR must ensure that no Eastbound railway equipment is operated after stopping at Mile 0.21, until there is a DTMF crossing gate activation for 2nd Avenue and until the crew has waited for 20 seconds after the crossing gates are parallel to the ground for at least 5 seconds.
  • CPR and the City of Kamloops must ensure that at least two flag persons (each) with stop signs, will be posted on each side of the track of the Grade Crossing at 3rd Avenue each time the crossing warning devices are activated for through trains.
  • CPR and the City of Kamloops must ensure that the flag persons will prevent any pedestrian from walking through the Grade Crossing while crossing warning devices are activated.
  • For greater clarity, this Order applies to any railway operator on the CP Thompson Subdivision.

2015-12-03

2015-11-19

Quebec Region

Hochelaga Yard

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The fact that equipment may still be left on track HT4T in Hochelaga Yard in proximity of residences, with the cause of the derailment of October 29, 2015 still to be determined, and the need for remedial measures still to be examined, could lead to another similar derailment, which could lead to a person being injured or damage being caused to the environment or to property.

Order Canadian Pacific Railway:

  • CPR shall not leave equipment on track HT4T in CPR Hochelaga Yard until an update of the risk assessment that was previously done on April 30th, 2015, is conducted to mitigate any potential risk on the Outremont Spur, Mile 49.1 of the Adirondack Subdivision.

 


2015-11-18

Quebec Region

Taschereau Yard

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Non-compliant conditions combined with the speed at which trains were operating on these tracks could have reasonably been expected to cause a derailment resulting in persons being injured, or property and the environment being damaged.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action

After the Railway Safety Inspector pointed out these defects to the CN Track Supervisor, CN took the following immediate actions:

  • Replaced the defective rail.
  • Added the missing bolts.

CN’s Track Inspection System did not indicate the proper classification of tracks in Taschereau Yard, resulting in a failure to assign the proper remedial action to address defects and bring the tracks to an appropriate level of safety for the speed of trains. As a result, non-compliant conditions on a Class 2 track could have still existed within Taschereau Yard which could have reasonably been expected to cause a derailment.

After discussion between the Railway Safety Inspector and CN, the Inspector reviewed the documents provided on November 20th, 2015, which show that CN’s TIS reporting program was updated in Taschereau Yard to evaluate track conditions for Class 2 thresholds. In addition it has been acknowledged that all outstanding conditions exceeding Class 2 thresholds were repaired or protected at Class 1 speed restrictions.

2015-11-24

2015-11-10

Quebec Region

St-Luc Yard

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Controlled locations with dual control switch point derails in service while the integrity of routes is compromised poses an imminent risk of derailment.

Order Canadian Pacific Railway:

  • CPR shall instruct all movements approaching dual control switch point derails at Wentworth and Ballantyne, to be prepared to stop, until the crew visually confirms that the route is correctly lined.
  • CPR shall not permit the practice of allowing cars to roll under their own momentum (commonly referred to as kicking cars) at St-Luc yard unless dual control switch point derails (when applicable) on the affected tracks are visually confirmed to be lined for the derailing route.

2015-11-12

2015-10-27

Pacific Region

Mountain Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Track conditions including fouled ballast (mud) in combination with significant track profile and gauge deviations exist on a bridge approach at mile 31.8 Mountain subdivision which have not been remediated by CP. Failure to initiate remedial actions for non-compliant track conditions could result in a derailment in which a person could be injured or made to be ill or damage could be caused to the environment or property.

Order that Canadian Pacific Railway Company:

Not operate train, transfer or engine movements on the Mountain subdivision unless under the following terms and conditions:

  • Movements must not exceed 10 MPH at mile 31.8 Mountain subdivision.

2015-10-29

2015-10-26

Pacific Region

Multiple locations across CN within B.C., including but not limited to Prince George, Smithers, Terrace, Williams Lake and Kamloops

Canadian National (CN) Railway

Condition or Hazard observed:

CN is not including deadhead and/or transit time to and from the rest facility at the away from home terminal which is causing cumulative fatigue in operating crews due to increased time on-duty and reduced rest availability. As a result, operating crews have exceeded and are at risk of exceeding their maximum continuous time on-duty. As well, requiring crews to use this transit time towards resetting their clock under the Work/Rest Rules for Rail Operating Employees creates incorrect calculation for mandatory time off-duty (MTOD) reset times and reduces rest availability. These conditions are creating excessive fatigue to accumulate in operating crews, reducing necessary alertness while in care and control of trains.

Order Canadian National Railway:

  • CN shall include all deadheading and transit time to and from the rest facility at the away-from-home terminal into operating crews’ on-duty time.

 


2015-09-23

Quebec Region

St-Hyacinthe Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The condition of the track between mile 64 and mile 68 and between mile 60.1 and mile 60.3, combined with the speed at which trains were operating on these tracks could have reasonably expected to cause a derailment resulting in persons being injured, or property and the environment being damaged.

Notice Acknowledging Immediate Action

After the Railway Safety Inspector shared his opinion with the CN supervisor, CN took immediate action as follows:

Between mile 64 and mile 68:

  • Passenger train 95 mph speed restriction applied to 60 mph
  • Freight train 65 mph speed restriction applied to 40 mph

Between mile 60.1 and mile 60.3:

  • Passenger train 95 mph speed restriction applied to 60 mph
  • Freight train 65 mph speed restriction applied to 40 mph

As such, the Railway Safety Inspector determined that, as a result of the speed restrictions applied, the immediate threat was mitigated.

On the longer term, prior to removing the speed restrictions above, it is understood that CN will notify the Railway Safety Inspector in order that he may assess the remedial measures and ensure that the immediate threat has been eliminated to his satisfaction.

2015-12-07

2015-09-17

Pacific Region

Port Coquitlam Yard

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The use of point protection zones at CP Rail Coquitlam yard places railway operations, employees, and the public in unnecessary danger due to the configuration of the point protection zones and accessibility to the main track. As well, a lack of clear instructions addressing multiple operating crews and protection of engineering employees, while performing track maintenance, contributes to the risks associated with these operations.

Order Canadian Pacific Railway:

  • CPR shall not use Point Protection Zones within the Port Coquitlam yard until or unless this inspector is satisfied with the operating instructions pertaining to Point Protection Zones.

2015-09-29

2015-09-09

Pacific Region

Mountain Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Undue delays in flag placement (fixed signals) are attributed to incremental changes being made in existing and unflagged slow order limits and/or with minor speed restriction adjustments, circumventing flag placement requirements through over-reliance upon Rule 43, para 3, and Rule 44(g) Exceeding the limits of a temporary slow order has the serious potential to cause track damage, derailment of a train, injury or death.

Small changes coinciding with Rule 43 issuances, and small changes to say it is a new Rule 43—and the 24 hours is restarted for flag placement purposes—is contrary to the intent of Canadian Rail Operating Rules Rule 43 and 44(g); the activity of changing small parameters of a Rule 43, and calling it a new Rule 43 is unacceptable and has caused, and may cause, an immediate threat.

Order Canadian Pacific Railway:

[Order is restricted to the CPR for the Province of British Columbia]

  • When issuing Rule 43 (temporary slow orders) CPR shall ensure that: any new Rule 43, as per rule 44(g) placing fixed signal flags within 24 hours for (temporary slow orders); and, where the limits or the speeds are changed, or any other parameter for an existing Rule 43 are changed, the placing of the fixed signal flags from the time starting for the original Rule 43 will be required to be deployed reflecting the new limits, such that within 24 hours of any Rule 43, fixed signal flags will be deployed to show the correct limits. regardless of any changes to that Rule 43;

    and
  • Shall consolidate any existing or future initially unflagged Rule 43 slow orders that are applicable within one mile or less of another Rule 43 (temporary slow order)

    and
  • Shall give absolute priority to issuing main track occupancy to employees for the purpose of enabling placement of fixed signal flags upon issuance of any Rule 43 (temporary slow order) to comply with this Order, ensuring the 24 hour timeline of this Order is not violated.

    and
  • Shall ensure that bulletins reflective of this Order are posted in all places where employees whose duties are affected can see them.

2015-09-24

2015-07-24

Ontario Region

Cartier Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

In the last three (3) months, TC, pursuant to s31 of the Railway Safety Act, has taken two (2) regulatory actions against CP to address the management of defective tie conditions on the CP Belleville and CP Winchester Subdivisions. Despite these other regulatory actions, for similar concerns related to the management of defective tie conditions, CP did not identify and apply remedial action for unsafe tie condition on the Cartier Subdivision.

CP has identified the Cartier Subdivision as a key route. The failure by CP to identify and apply remedial actions for unsafe tie conditions and the operation of the Cartier Subdivision at an operational speed higher than Class 3 track in circumstances where portions of the Cartier Subdivision do not meet the standard for Class 4 track results in unsafe railway operations.

Order Canadian Pacific (CP) Railway:

  1. CP shall not operate trains at a speed greater than the maximum allowable operating speed for Class 3 track between mile 108 and mile 83.6 on the Cartier Subdivision until such time as CP provides satisfactory evidence that the track can be safely operated at an operational speed higher than Class 3 track and this item of this Order is rescinded; and
  2. Within 15 days from this Order, CP shall develop and provide TC with an action plan addressing the safety conditions related to the management of defective ties on the entire Cartier Subdivision and, within 30 days of this Order, implement and put in place all measure(s) provided for in the action plan developed.

2015-10-30

2015-07-17

Ontario Region

Mainline Subdivision

Essex Terminal Railway (ETR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The failure by Essex Terminal Railway (ETR) (ETR) to identify and apply remedial actions for unsafe crossing conditions may result in unsafe railway operations. Operating over unsafe railway crossings could cause a crossing collision, which could lead to a person being injured or damage could be caused to the environment or to property.

Order Essex Terminal Railway (ETR):

  • ETR shall provide to Transport Canada, within 15 days of this Order, an action plan addressing the safety conditions at all its public railway grade crossings and that all measures provided for in the action plan be implemented at all of ETR’s public railway grade crossings within 30 days from receipt of this Order.

2015-11-10

2015-07-02

Quebec Region

Longue-Pointe Spur

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

A large number of intruders cross the track, through the 12 holes in the fencing in the Souligny area of the Longue-Pointe Spur, and they could be injured or killed by a train.

Order Canadian National Railway:

  • CN shall reintroduce the use of whistles, as stipulated in Rule 14 (L) of the Canadian Rail Operating Rules at the following six grade crossings in the Rue Souligny area of the Longue Pointe Spur:
    • Avenue Georges V (4.98)
    • Avenue Hector (5.08)
    • Boulevard Pierre Bernard (5.58)
    • Rue Des Ormeaux (5.78)
    • Avenue Lebrun (5.94)
    • Rue Honoré Beaugrand (6.39)

2015-08-28

2015-06-11

Quebec Region

Limoilou Yard

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

In light of the operations carried out, the large number of people who use this bike path and their behaviour around trains stopped on this grade crossing, an immediate threat to safety exists.

Order Canadian National Railway:

  • CN shall, at the grade crossing at mile 0.29 of track CL 77 at the Limoilou Yard, prohibit any movement that stops on the grade crossing from starting up again unless the grade crossing is protected on both sides by employees to ensure that the public is protected. These employees must be able to communicate with the train team to prevent the train from moving in case of intrusion.

CN filed for review at the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada on June 18, 2015

TATC hearing held March 23, 2016

TATC decision released on July 12, 2016

 


2014-12-15

Quebec Region

St-Luc Yard

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

When CP Rail closed down its classification yard at St-Luc yard, it moved most of its switching operations southward to what are commonly known as the "Diamond" and "Departure yard" areas.

Switching at the classification yard was protected by derails, which would prevent uncontrolled movement's from occurring. However, when switching operations were moved to the south end of the yard, no derails were installed to protect against uncontrolled movements that could not only foul the main line, but collide with oncoming trains.

Order that Canadian Pacific Railway Company:

Shall cease, the practice of releasing cars on their own momentum a St-Luc Yard where as a result an uncontrolled movement of railway equipment risks occupying the main track, unless such locations are protected by a secondary physical defense.

2014-12-18

2014-11-01

Pacific Region

Kettle Falls Subdivision

Kettle Falls International Railway Company (KFIR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

KFIR employees are failing to properly secure equipment left unattended. Numerous switches and derails are being left unsecured without an adequate locking device. In addition, derails in place intended to protect KFIR track from uncontrolled movement of equipment may not be adequate.

Order to Kettle Falls International Railway:

Shall not operate train, transfer or engine movements on the San Poil or Kettle Falls subdivisions in Canada unless under the following terms and conditions:

  • On or before November 5, 2014, KFIR provide TC's Pacific Region office copies of the railway's Operating Instructions issued to employees regarding the Emergency Directive on Securement of Railway Equipment issued October 29, 2014.
  • From the date this Notice & Order is received, a KFIR company officer conduct a personal contact job briefing with all operating employees prior to their next tour of duty in Canada. Such briefing must include a review of Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR) Rule 112 Leaving Equipment Unattended and the Emergency Directive on Securement of Railway Equipment issued October 29, 2014. Records of such briefings must be provided to TC's Pacific Region office at intervals not exceeding 14 days.
  • KFIR company officers perform proficiency testing of operating employees in Canada to include proper securement of railway equipment. Records of all proficiency tests must be provided to a TC Railway Safety Inspector upon request.
  • Within ninety (90) days of the date of this Notice & Order, KFIR provide refresher training in all CROR Rules applicable to KFIR's Canadian operations to all operating employees required to work in Canada. Records of such training including employee name and date of training must be provided to TC's Pacific Region office on or before February 15, 2015.
  • Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Notice & Order, KFIR conducts a comprehensive assessment of all existing derails on KFIR and customer tracks in Canada. Such assessment must at minimum, assess the type, installation and maintenance of the derail to ensure they are adequate to prevent uncontrolled movement of equipment. Additionally, as part of this assessment, KFlR evaluate the potential need for the installation of additional derails on KFIR tracks to protect against uncontrolled movement of equipment. This assessment must be reviewed by a Professional Engineer and a report of the findings, including remedial actions taken or planned to address any deficiencies provided to TC's Pacific Region office on or before December 15, 2014.
  • Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Notice & Order, KFIR hold customer orientation sessions with all KFIR customer facility operators in Canada to provide information on safe work practices and procedures related to railway operations and equipment including securement of railway equipment. Records of these sessions must be provided to Transport Canada on or before December 15, 2014.

2016-01-26

2014-08-22

Quebec Region

Sorel Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Substandard crosstie conditions exist with no effective support ties within the prescribed distance from a joint at numerous locations.

Order to Canadian National Railway:

Shall not use the line of track between mile 40.8 and mile 44.6 of the Sorel Subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • All train or engine movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.

2014-08-26

2014-07-31

Pacific Region

New Westminster Subdivision

Burlington Northern and Santé Fe Railway (BNSF)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people wanting to get to the beach or back from the beach; insufficient barrier protection and no crossing warning systems, presents an immediate threat to rail safety at these railway crossings and along the White Rock promenade and before and after the White Rock Promenade. Also the existing pedestrian crossings [except for the pier] have about a 15% walking grade to the top of the railway tracks and down the other side. Without crossing warning systems and 1.8 meter barrier protection and pedestrian crossings that are flat; these conditions could reasonably be expected to develop into a situation in which a person could be injured or made to be ill or damage could be caused to the environment or property.

Order to Burlington Northern and Santé Fe Railway (BNSF)

  • The BNSF mount their standard Whistling signage at the BNSF Mile post 121.00 and Mile 123.00 such that train whistling will occur in both directions at and between both mile posts. And those whistling posts will be visited by track forces at least once per week to ensure placement.

AND

  • Between the hours of 0600 and 2000, all movements will sound a repetitive succession of short engine whistles (rule 14(f)) between MP 121.0 and MP 123.0 regardless of whether or not there are people or animals on or near the track. Rule 14(l) does not apply on public crossings at grade between MP 121.0 and MP 123.0 between the hours of 0600 and 2000.

2014-12-12

2014-07-09

Pacific Region

New Westminster Subdivision

Burlington Northern and Santé Fe Railway (BNSF)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people wanting to get to the beach or back from the beach; insufficient barrier protection /fencing and no crossing warning systems, presents an immediate threat to rail safety at these railway crossings and along the White Rock promenade and before and after the White Rock Promenade. Also the existing pedestrian crossings [except for the pier] have about a 15% walking grade to the top of the railway tracks and down the other side.

Order to Burlington Northern and Santé Fe Railway (BNSF)

  • The BNSF mount their standard Whistling signage at the BNSF Mile post 121.00 and Mile 123.00 such that train whistling will occur in both directions at and between both mile posts. And those whistling posts will be visited by track forces at least once per week to ensure placement.

AND

  • Any train movement will issue repetitive succession of short horn blasts CROR (14f) regardless of persons or animals on the track.

AND

  • Audible train horns will be presented by all train movements [including all other track users in either direction] from 07:00 to 22:00 hours every day of the year.

AND

  • Where this Order conflicts with an existing time table or special instructions or GBO's or TBGO respecting train horns, at and between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 on this Subdivision, this Order will take precedence.

AND

  • Normal BNSF whistling protocol as per their current timetable and bulletins remains in effect outside the hours (0700 -2200) of this Order.

2014-07-31

2014-07-09

Quebec Region

Drummondville Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Poor crossing sightlines are preventing road users to safely proceed through crossing without in curing the risk of being struck by approaching trains.

Order to Canadian National Railway :

  • not allow any train traffic to use the crossings at mile 53.37 of the Drummondville subdivision and at mile 28.19 and 37.19 ofthe Kingston subdivision unless the train speed is limited to 10MPH.

2014-07-28

2014-07-03

Quebec Region

Sherbrooke Subdivision

Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada Inc.(CMQR) and Municipality of Eastman

Condition or Hazard observed:

Several of the timber curbs, several timber posts, and some timber horizontal handrails are severely rotted, affecting the integrity of the guardrail to withstand lateral impact forces and thereby its ability to keep both pedestrians and vehicles safe from falling onto the track below.

Central Maine and Quebec Railway Canada Inc. (hereinafter CMQR) and Municipality of Eastman shall not allow any vehicular traffic to access the Chemin d'Orford-sur-le-Lac overhead bridge located in the Municipality of Eastman and crossing the CMQR Sherbrooke Subdivision at Mile 94.5 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • Maintain the stop signs on both approaches of the bridge until such time as the guardrails on the bridge itself have been repaired and that repairs have been approved by the appropriate road authority, and
  • That all roadway signage associated with this structure be approved by the appropriate road authority.

2014-03-16

2014-07-03

Quebec Region

Moosehead Subdivision

Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada Inc. (CMQR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The fact that equipment are left unattended on the CMQR territory, without being properly secured could lead or be a contributing factor into an event where equipment could roll uncontrolled and possibly:

  • Collide with passenger trains
  • Collide with freight trains handling or not dangerous goods
  • Collide with vehicles carrying or not dangerous goods at a private or publiccrossing at grade
  • Hit pedestrians at a private or public crossing at grade
  • Cause injury to employees or the public and / or damage to the environment or property.

Order to Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada inc.:

  • Allow CMQR employees to leave unattended equipment in sidings or main tracks on CMQR property without having been properly secured. This information mustbe confirmed to the Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) from the location of theequipment. This information must include the date, the time, the number of handbrakes applied, their location, the result of the hand brake efficiency test and thename of the employee.
2017-03-08

2014-07-03

Quebec Region

Sherbrooke Subdivision

Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada Inc. (CMQR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Numerous locations over the line of track between mile 62.0 and mile 125.5 Sherbrooke Subdivision where the standard of maintenance poses a threat to safe railway operations due to track conditions that are not in compliance to the Track Safety Rules, such as:

  • insufficient crossties to meet the minimum requirements for a 39 foot rail segment and insufficient ties under rail joints,
  • insufficient number of track bolts,
  • insufficient number of tie plates for the class of track,
  • insufficient longitudinal restraint of the track resulting m significant rail movement,
  • rail worn beyond limits,
  • defective rails that have been detected by the rail flaw detector are still in track without appropriate remedial action,
  • severely battered joints and rails with crushed heads remain in track without protection and with no plan to be changed out,
  • insufficient ballast at many locations (no shoulders, empty cribs, low joints),
  • deviations in track geometry.

Order to Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada Inc.:

Not use the tracks or allow the use of the tracks between mile 62 and mile 125.5 Sherbrooke Subdivision unless the speed of all trains is restricted to a maximum of ten (10) miles per hour between mile 62.0 and mile 125.5 of the Sherbrooke Subdivision, including the Cautionary Limits at Sherbrooke.

2014-12-05

2014-07-02

Quebec Region

Sherbrooke Subdivision

Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada Inc. (CMQR)

The following conditions were observed during the course of our inspection of the Sherbrooke Subdivision;

  • Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
  • Rails worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.
  • Numerous Rail Flaw Detected (RFD) rail defects which, if not replaced, will require visual or ultrasonic re-inspection after 30 days from initial detection. With 94% of those rail defects in joints with extensive rail end batter, marginal track tie and surface support combined with additional thermal stresses exerted with the colder temperatures, it can reasonably be expected that the progression of these defects will continue to the point of failure if not adequately protected and monitored.

Central Maine and Quebec Railway Canada Inc (CMQR), shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Sherbrooke Subdivision between Lennoxville (M. 65.5) and Brookport (M.125.6) otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  1. That the following curves encompassing mile posts 65.95, 66.05, 68.32, 75.73, 77.86, 86.16, 88.65, 88.93, 89.95, 91.58, 93.0, 93.4, 95.05, 96.4, 97.4, 98.49, 99.22, 100.92, 102.27, 102.52, 103.61, 103.97, and 113.4 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as they are replaced. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first of each month.
  2. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as the excessively worn rails referred to in item 1 above are replaced.
  3. That train speeds are reduced to 10 mph at locations of visually observed rail defects at mile 93.48, 100.27, 102.58 (field side VSH I shear break) and mile 100.92 (gauge side lip cracking out), or that CMQR comply with the conditions outlined in item 1 at these locations: or the rails at these locations are replaced.
  4. RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 1 above are replaced. In addition, that all current RFD detected rail joint defects be removed and that the speed of all trains not exceed 10 mph until these defects are removed or re-inspected as per the Track Safety Rules (within 30 days of each inspection).
  5. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and it's rules and regulations be complied with.

2014-12-05

2014-07-02

Quebec Region

Sherbrooke Subdivision

Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada Inc. (CMQR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of the inspection on October l0th 2013 and supplemented with RFD testing completed between October 17th and 23rd 2013 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision;

  • Public and private crossings with flangeways obstructed with mud and gravel.
  • Sightlines of several private and farm crossings obstructed as previou-sly noted in defect report 248-T.
  • Rust on rail surface that may compromise the integrity of the circuits of grade crossing warning systems.
  • Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
  • Rail worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.
  • Numerous Rail Flaw Detected (RFD) rail defects which, if not replaced, will require visual or ultrasonic re-inspection after 30 days from initial detection. With 94% of those rail defects within rail joints having extensive rail end batter, marginal track tie and surface support combined with additional thermal stresses exerted with the colder temperatures, it can be reasonably be expected that the progression of these defects will continue to the point of failure if not adequately protected and monitored.

Central Maine and Quebec Railway Canada Inc (CMQR), shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Sherbrooke Subdivision between mileages 1.0 and 66.0 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  1. That all flangeways of public and private crossings be inspected and cleared of any obstructions that may interfere with the safe passage of trains.
  2. That the first 2 trains (1 engine with a minimum of 3 cars) to travel over the above noted track, after the issuance of this order, operate under the restriction of a "stop and protect" order at all crossings protected with grade crossing warning systems due to "rusty rail" conditions. Further to this condition, CMQR is to ensure that each crossing warning system is operating as intended.
  3. That sightlines be cleared at private and farm crossings obstructed by vegetation as noted in defect report 264-T and previously submitted defect report 248-T or protected with a "stop and protect" order.
  4. That the curves encompassing mile posts 10.49, 19.05, 22.17, 22.38, 22.83, 27.58, 34.60 and 35.35 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first day of each month.
  5. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as excessively worn rails referred to in item 4 above are replaced.
  6. That RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 4 above are replaced. In addition, that all current RFD detected rail joint defects be removed and that the speed of all trains not exceed 10 mph until these defects are removed or re-inspected as per the Track Safety Rules (within 30 days of each inspection).
  7. That visually observed rail defects referred to in report 264-T at mile 56.14 (2 defects) and mile 59.55 (2 defects) have the speed reduced to 10 mph for all trains until such time as they are replaced.
  8. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and its rules and regulations be complied with.

2014-12-05

2014-07-02

Quebec Region

Moosehead Subdivision

Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada Inc. (CMQR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of Transport Canada's inspection of the Moosehead Subdivision;

  • Public and private crossings with flangeways obstructed with mud and gravel.
  • Sightlines of several private and farm crossings obstructed as previously noted in defect report 245-T.
  • Rust on rail surface that may compromise the integrity of the circuits of grade crossing warning systems.
  • Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
  • Rails worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.

Central Maine and Quebec Railway Canada Inc. (CMQR) shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Moosehead Subdivision between mileages 101.8 and 117.0 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  1. That all flangeways of public and private crossings be inspected and cleared of any obstructions that may interfere with the safe passage of trains.
  2. That the first 2 trains (engine with a minimum of 3 cars) to travel over the above noted track after the issuance of this order, operate under the restriction of a "stop and protect" order at all crossings protected with grade crossing warning systems due to "rusty rail" conditions.
  3. After item 2 has been satisfied, CMQR is to ensure that each crossing warning system is operating as intended.
  4. That sightlines be cleared at private and farm crossings obstructed by vegetation as noted in previously submitted defect report 245-T or protected with a "stop and protect" order.
  5. That the curves encompassing mile posts 104.14, 106.11, 107.44, 110.27, 116.12 and 116.97 on the Moosehead Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first day of each month.
  6. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as excessively worn rails referred to in item 5 above are replaced.
  7. That RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 5 above have been replaced.
  8. That visually observed rail defects at mile 106.5 (field side VSH I shear break) and mile 110.6 (broken base I field weld on tie plate) have the speed reduced to 10 mph for all trains until such time as they are replaced.
  9. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and it's rules and regulations be complied with.

2014-10-31

2014-07-02

Quebec Region

Stanbridge Subdivision

Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada Inc. (CMQR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of the inspection of the Stanbridge Subdivision:

  • Verified locations, as indicated on Track Inspection Report 246-T, where cross level and surface conditions, in excess of 7 inches in combination with numerous defective or non-existent track ties, allow track to move excessively under load.
  • Cross level of 6 1/8 inches on tangent track combined with clusters of 9 and 12 consecutive defective ties within a 30 foot proximity of a propane storage facility at mile 11.44 in the town of Bedford.
  • Vegetation and other existent conditions in the ballast section that interfere with the track inspector's ability to adequately perform track inspection duties.
  • There is a threat that these observed conditions on the Stanbridge Subdivision, which may have contributed to recent derailments on this line, can reasonably be expected to cause additional derailments.

Central Maine and Quebec Railway Canada Inc. shall not operate any train or engine on the Stanbridge Subdivision between mileages 0.0 and 12.4 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  1. No train shall be operated on that portion ofthe Stanbridge Subdivision until such time as CMQR ensures that a professional Engineer, qualified in the Track Safety Rules personally inspects the Stanbridge Subdivision and reports to this office:
    • a) That the inspection has been completed;
    • b) The directions under which the train can be safely operated.
  2. All rail movements subsequent to item #1 will be in accordance with the directions provided in the report referred to in item #1.
  3. Within 14 days of the inspection referred to in item #1, CMQR will ensure that the professional Engineer who has inspected the track provides Transport Canada with a report that lists all conditions observed that could compromise safe railway operations and the remedial action taken to appropriately address each of those conditions.
  4. Within 30 days of the inspection referred to in item #1, CMQR will provide Transport Canada with CMQR's action plan to correct the supervision and support of track maintenance activities, in accordance with sound engineering principals, to ensure safe railway operations.

2014-06-06

Pacific Region

New Westminster Subdivision

City of White Rock

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people travelling to and from the beach, and a lack of a crossing warning system the public is at risk of being struck by a train.

Order to the City of White Rock :

  • The City shall close this public crossing on the city side (north of the track). This will be done at a location of 13 feet from the first rail (northern rail). The barrier presented will be one that is 6 feet (1.8 meters) in height; not allow the ability to crawl through, and adjoin existent fencing. It must be removable in whole or in part to facilitate access for safety and emergency services at any time.

OR

  • Install a swing gate or similar mechanism that can be opened at the discretion of the City. However, the opening will only occur as long as it is required to move a vehicle over and clear of the Railway and shall not be parked any closer than 13 feet from the closest rail. The gate may not swing open in whole or in part to obstruct the railway track. Safety and emergency services must be able to access this location at any time.

OR

  • The City of White Rock will post a flag person from dawn until dusk 365 days of the year to ensure vehicles, motorcycles and pedestrians are not stopping or parking within 13 feet of any rail.

2014-06-18

2014-06-06

Pacific Region

New Westminster Subdivision

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway (BNSF)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people wanting to get to the beach or back from the beach; insufficient barrier protection and no crossing warning systems, presents an immediate threat to rail safety at these railway crossings and along the White Rock promenade and before and after the White Rock Promenade. Also the existing pedestrian crossings [except for the pier] have about a 15% walking grade to the top of the railway tracks and down the other side.

Order to BNSF:

  • The BNSF shall mount their standard whistling signage at the BNSF Mile post 121.00 and Mile 123.00 such that train whistling will occur in both directions at and between both mile posts. And those whistling posts will be visited by track forces at least once per week to ensure placement.

AND

  • Any train movement within these mileposts will issue repetitive succession of short horn blasts at and between the mile posts 121.00 to mile post 123.00. Where a locomotive only has "automatic horn sequencing" the train horn will be depressed immediately after each sequence and repetitively at and between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 in both directions.

AND

  • Where a locomotive has only "automatic horn sequencing" the train horn will be depressed immediately after each sequence, repetatively between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 in both directions. Audible train horns cited above will be presented by all train movements [including all other track users in either direction] from dawn until dusk 365 days of the year, between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 in both directions.

AND

  • Where this Order conflicts with an existing time table or special instructions or GBO's or TBGO respecting train horns, at and between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 on this Subdivision, this Order takes precedence. Normal whistling protocol as per the current timetable and bulletins remains in effect outside the hours (Dawn to Dusk) of this Order.

2014-07-09

2014-05-28

Ontario Region

Fort Frances Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Numerous locations where trains are exceeding the maximum allowable speed limits in areas where there are fewer than the minimum allowable number of non-defective cross-ties per 39 feet.

Order to CN:

  • Canadian National Railway shall ensure that the Fort Frances Subdivision between mile 90.1 and mile 142.8 not be used unless:
  •  

    1. Trains are operated at a speed not greater than the maximum allowable operating speed for Class 2 track
    2. The track is inspected within 15 calendar days, and subsequently with no more than 30 calendar days between inspections, by a Professional Engineer taking responsibility in accordance with Section 11 of the RSA.
    3. Transport Canada is provided with copies of these track inspection reports, including all mitigating actions taken, resulting from these inspections within 14 calendar days from completion of each inspection.

2014-07-24

2014-04-23

Ontario Region

Smith Falls Subdivision

VIA Rail

Condition or Hazard observed:

A combination of numerous public complaints and verified crossing malfunctions has led to the questioning of the reliability of the crossing warning systems and to a loss of road user confidence. The reliability of the crossing warning systems has not demonstrated to operate in a consistently safe manner.

VIA Rail shall not:

Allow any passenger or freight trains to operate over the following grade crossings on the Smiths Falls Subdivision:

  • Woodroffe Road and Mile 3.28;
  • OC Transpo Transit Way and Mile 3.30;

Unless the following conditions are met:

  • A flag person must be at each crossing location prior to a train's arrival.
  • A train must not occupy the crossing until 2 flag persons, one on each side of the train, are in place to manually protect it from vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
  • The flag persons must remain in place until the train has completely cleared the crossing.

2014-05-09

2014-04-10

Ontario Region

Smith Falls Subdivision

VIA Rail

Condition or Hazard observed:

A combination of numerous public complaints and verified crossing malfunctions has led to the questioning of the reliability of the crossing warning systems and to a loss of road user confidence. The reliability of the crossing warning systems has not demonstrated to operate in a consistently safe manner.

VIA Rail shall not:

Allow any passenger or freight trains to operate over the following grade crossings on the Smiths Falls Subdivision:

  • Woodroffe Road and Mile 3.28;
  • OC Transpo Transit Way and Mile 3.30;
  • Fallowfield Road and Mile 3.88;
  • Greenbank Road and Mile 5.10;
  • Jockville Road and Mile 5.73; and
  • Strandherd Drive and Mile 6.81.

Unless the following conditions are met:

  • A flag person must be at each crossing location prior to a train's arrival.
  • A train must not occupy the crossing until 2 flag persons, one on each side of the train, are in place to manually protect it from vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
  • The flag persons must remain in place until the train has completely cleared the crossing.

2014-04-23

2014-01-28

Quebec Region

Sherbrooke Subdivision

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA) and Municipality of Eastman

Condition or Hazard observed:

Several of the timber curbs, several timber posts, and some timber horizontal handrails are severely rotted, affecting the integrity of the guardrail to withstand lateral impact forces and thereby its ability to keep both pedestrians and vehicles safe from falling onto the track below. This poses a threat to the safety and well being of the public and to safe railway operations.

MMAC and Municipality of Eastman shall not allow any vehicular traffic to access the Chemin d'Orford-sur-le-Lac overhead bridge located in the Municipality of Eastman and crossing the MMAC Sherbrooke Subdivision at Mile 94.5 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • Maintain the stop signs on both approaches of the bridge until such time as the guardrails on the bridge itself have been repaired and that repairs have been approved by the appropriate road authority. and
  • That all roadway signage associated with this structure be approved by the appropriate road authority.
Closed and re-issued to Central Maine & Quebec Railway Canada (CMQR) on July 3, 2014

2013-12-23

Quebec Region

Sherbrooke Subdivision

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA) and Municipality of Eastman

Condition or Hazard observed:

  • Several of the timber curbs, several timber posts, and some timber horizontal handrails are severely rotted, affecting the integrity of the guardrail to withstand lateral impact forces and thereby its ability to keep both pedestrians and vehicles safe from falling onto the track below. This poses a threat to the safety and well being of the public and to safe railway operations.
  • The timber guardrails on the bridge approaches on the south side (me Principale end) have been damaged and appear to be substandard, thereby putting in question their ability to function as intended should there be an impact from a vehicle. This poses a threat to the safety and well being of the public and to safe railway operations.
  • Winter conditions increase the risk of vehicular impact to the timber guard rail and this poses a threat to the safety and well being of the public and to safe railway operations.
MMAC and Municipality of Eastman shall not allow any vehicular traffic to access the Chemin d'Orford-sur-le-Lac overhead bridge located in the Municipality of Eastman and crossing the MMAC Sherbrooke Subdivision at Mile 95.4 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:
  • Until such time as the guardrails on the approaches to the bridge and on the bridge itself have been repaired and that repairs hare been approved by the appropriate road authority and
  • That all roadway signage associated with this structure have been approved by the appropriate road authority.

2013-01-28

2013-10-31

Quebec Region

Moosehead Subdivision

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of Transport Canada's inspection of the Moosehead Subdivision;

  • Public and private crossings with flangeways obstructed with mud and gravel.
  • Sightlines of several private and farm crossings obstructed as previously noted in defect report 245-T.
  • Rust on rail surface that may compromise the integrity of the circuits of grade crossing warning systems.
  • Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
  • Rails worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.
Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Company (MM&A) shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Moosehead Subdivision between mileages 101.8 and 117.0 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:
  1. That all flangeways of public and private crossings be inspected and cleared of any obstructions that may interferewith the safe passage of trains.
  2. That the first 2 trains (engine with a minimum of 3 cars) to travel over the above noted track after the issuance of this order, operate under the restriction of a "stop and protect" order at all crossings protected with grade crossing warning systems due to "rusty rail" conditions.
  3. After item 2 has been satisfied, MM&A is to ensure that each crossing warning system is operating as intended.
  4. That sightlines be cleared at private and farm crossings obstructed by vegetation as noted in previously submitted defect report 245-T or protected with a "stop and protect" order.
  5. That the curves encompassing mile posts 104.14, 106.11, 107.44, 110.27, 116.12 and 116.97 on the Moosehead Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first day of each month.
  6. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as excessively worn rails referred to in item 5 above are replaced.
  7. That RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 5 above have been replaced.
  8. That visually observed rail defects at mile 106.5 (field side VSH I shear break) and mile 110.6 (broken base I field weld on tie plate) have the speed reduced to 10 mph for all trains until such time as they are replaced.
  9. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and it's rules and regulations be complied with.
Closed and re-issued to Central Maine & Quebec Railway Canada (CMQR) on July 2, 2014

2013-10-31

Quebec Region

Sherbrooke Subdivision

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of our inspection of the Sherbrooke Subdivision;

  • Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
  • Rails worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.
  • Numerous Rail Flaw Detected (RFD) rail defects which, if not replaced, will require visual or ultrasonic re-inspection after 30 days from initial detection. With 94% of those rail defects in joints with extensive rail end batter, marginal track tie and surface support combined with additional thermal stresses exerted with the colder temperatures, it can reasonably be expected that the progression of these defects will continue to the point of failure if not adequately protected and monitored.

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Company (MM&A) shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Sherbrooke Subdivision between Lennoxville (M. 65.5) and Brookport (M.125.6) otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  1. That the following curves encompassing mile posts 65.95, 66.05, 68.32, 75.73, 77.86, 86.16, 88.65, 88.93, 89.95, 91.58, 93.0, 93.4, 95.05, 96.4, 97.4, 98.49, 99.22, 100.92, 102.27, 102.52, 103.61, 103.97, and 113.4 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as they are replaced. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first of each month.
  2. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as the excessively worn rails referred to in item 1 above are replaced.
  3. That train speeds are reduced to 10 mph at locations of visually observed rail defects at mile 93.48, 100.27, 102.58 (field side VSH I shear break) and mile 100.92 (gauge side lip cracking out), or that MM&A comply with the conditions outlined in item 1 at these locations: or the rails at these locations are replaced.
  4. RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 1 above are replaced. In addition, that all current RFD detected rail joint defects be removed and that the speed of all trains not exceed 10 mph until these defects are removed or re-inspected as per the Track Safety Rules (within 30 days of each inspection).
  5. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and it's rules and regulations be complied with.
Closed and re-issued to Central Maine & Quebec Railway Canada (CMQR) on July 2, 2014

2013-10-31

Quebec Region

Sherbrooke Subdivision

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of the inspection on October 10th 2013 and supplemented with RFD testing completed between October 17th and 23rd 2013 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision;

  • Public and private crossings with flangeways obstructed with mud and gravel.
  • Sightlines of several private and farm crossings obstructed as previously noted in defect report 248-T.
  • Rust on rail surfaces that may compromise the integrity of the circuits of grade crossing warning systems.
  • Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
  • Rail worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.
  • Numerous Rail Flaw Detected (RFD) rail defects which, if not replaced, will require visual or ultrasonic re-inspection after 30 days from initial detection. With 94% of those rail defects within rail joints having extensive rail end batter, marginal track tie and surface support combined with additional thermal stresses exerted with the colder temperatures, it can be reasonably be expected that the progression of these defects will continue to the point of failure if not adequately protected and monitored.

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Company (MM&A) shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Sherbrooke Subdivision between mileages 1.0 and 66.0 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  1. That all flangeways of public and private crossings be inspected and cleared of any obstructions that may interfere with the safe passage of trains.
  2. That the first 2 trains (1 engine with a minimum of 3 cars) to travel over the above noted track, after the issuance of this order, operate under the restriction of a "stop and protect" order at all crossings protected with grade crossing warning systems due to "rusty rail" conditions. Further to this condition, MM&A is to ensure that each crossing warning system is operating as intended.
  3. That sightlines be cleared at private and farm crossings obstructed by vegetation as noted in defect report 264-T and previously submitted defect report 248-T or protected with a "stop and protect" order.
  4. That the curves encompassing mile posts 10.49, 19.05, 22.17, 22.38, 22.83, 27 .58, 34.60 and 35.35 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first day of each month.
  5. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as excessively worn rails referred to in item 4 above are replaced.
  6. That RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 4 above are replaced. In addition, that all current RFD detected rail joint defects be removed and that the speed of all trains not exceed 10 mph until these defects are removed or re-inspected as per the Track Safety Rules (within 30 days of each inspection).
  7. That visually observed rail defects referred to in report 264-T at mile 56.14 (2 defects) and mile 59.55 (2 defects) have the speed reduced to 10 mph for all trains until such time as they are replaced.
  8. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and its rules and regulations be complied with.
Closed and re-issued to Central Maine & Quebec Railway Canada (CMQR) on July 2, 2014

2013-10-11

Quebec Region

Sherbrooke Subdivision

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of Transport Canada's inspection of the Sherbrooke Subdivision;

  • Public and private crossings with flangeways obstructed with mud and gravel.
  • Sightlines of several private and farm crossings obstructed as previously noted in defect report 248-T.
  • Rust on rail surface that may compromise the integrity of the circuits of grade crossing warning systems.
  • Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
  • Rail worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.
Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Company (MM&A) shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Sherbrooke Subdivision between mileages 1.0 and 66.0 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:
  1. That all flangeways of public and private crossings be inspected and cleared of any obstructions that may interfere with the safe passage of trains.
  2. That the first 2 trains (1 engine with a minimum of 3 cars) to travel over the above noted track, after the issuance of this order, operate under the restriction of a "stop and protect" order at all crossings protected with grade crossing warning systems due to "rusty rail" conditions. Further to this condition, MM&A is to ensure that each crossing warning system is operating as intended.
  3. That sightlines be cleared at private and farm crossings obstructed by vegetation as noted in defect report 264-T and previously submitted defect report 248-T or protected with a "stop and protect" order.
  4. That rail flaw (RFD) testing for internal rail defects be carried out prior to any train operating, including ultrasonic hand testing of locations that are not detectable by RFD testing equipment due to rail surface conditions such as corrugation, shelling, etc.
  5. That the following curves with rails excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected after the passage of each train: curves encompassing mile posts 10.49, 19.05, 22.17, 22.38, 22.83, 27.58, 34.60 and 35.35 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision.
  6. That visually observed rail defects referred to in report 264-T at mile 56.14 (2 defects) and mile 59.55 (2 defects) be replaced.
  7. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and it's rules and regulations be complied with.

2013-10-31

2013-07-26

Quebec Region

Stanbridge Subdivision

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were detected during an inspection on the Stanbridge Subdivision:

  • Verified locations, as indicated on Track Inspection Report 246-T, where cross level and surface conditions, in excess of 7 inches in combination with numerous defective or non-existent track ties, allow track to move excessively under load.
  • Cross level of 6 1/8 inches on tangent track combined with clusters of 9 and 12 consecutive defective ties within a 30 foot proximity of a propane storage facility at mile 11.44 in the town of Bedford.
  • Vegetation and other existent conditions in the ballast section that interfere with the track inspector's ability to adequately perform track inspection duties.
  • There is a threat that these observed conditions on the Stanbridge Subdivision, which may have contributed to recent derailments on this line, can reasonably be expected to cause additional derailments.

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Company shall not operate any train or engine on the Stanbridge Subdivision between mileages 0.0 and 12.4 otherwise than under the following terms and conditons:

  1. No train shall be operated on that portion of the Stanbridge Subdivision until such time as MM&A ensures that a professional Engineer, qualified in the Track Safety Rules personally inspects the Stanbridge Subdivision and reports to this office:
    1. That the inspection has been completed;
    2. The directions under which the train can be safely operated.
  2. All rail movements subsequent to item #1 will be in accordance with the directions provided in the report referred to in item #1.
  3. Within 14 days of the inspection referred to in item #1, MM&A will ensure that the professional Engineer who has inspected the track provides Transport Canada with a report that lists all conditions observed that could compromise safe railway operations and the remedial action taken to appropriately address each of those conditions.
  4. Within 30 days of the inspection referred to in item #1, MM&A will provide Transport Canada with MM&A's action plan to correct the supervision and support of track maintenance activities, in accordance with sound engineering principals, to ensure safe railway operations.
Closed and re-issued to Central Maine & Quebec Railway Canada (CMQR) on July 2, 2014

2013-07-10

Quebec Region

Moosehead at Mile 114.10

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMA)

Condition or Hazard observed:

The equipment left unattended on the MMA territory, without being properly secured could lead or be a contributing factor into an event where equipment could roll uncontrolled and possibly:

  • Collide with passenger trains
  • Collide with freight trains handling or not dangerous goods
  • Collide with vehicles carrying or not dangerous goods at a private or public crossing at grade
  • Hit pedestrians at a private or public crossing at grade
  • Cause injury to employees or the public and / or damage to the environment or property.

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway shall not:

  • Allow MMA employees to leave unattended equipment in sidings or main tracks on MMA property without having been properly secured. This information must be confirmed to the Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) from the location of the equipment. This information must include the date, the time, the number of hand brakes applied, their location, the result of the hand brake efficiency test and the name of the employee. MMA shall maintain a record of this information. This record shall be made available to a Railway Safety Inspector upon request.
Closed and re-issued to Central Maine & Quebec Railway Canada (CMQR) on July 3, 2014

2013-06-26

Pacific Region

Cascade Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

Due to a change in CP Rail's operation at North Bend, pedestrians have been observed climbing through the trains while they are stopped performing crew changes.

Canadian Pacific Railway Must Not;

  • Perform crew changes while the train is occupying the Chaumox Road Crossing at mile 0.40 Cascade sub.

2013-06-06

Pacific Region

Skeena Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or Hazard observed:

A condition exists on Frank Street in the City of Terrace, BC where vehicles up to 25 meters in length (including vehicles carrying dangerous goods) are authorized by the City to operate over the railway crossing with only 12 meters of safe storage capacity between the CN live rail and the traveled portion of provincial Highway 16.

CN restrict access to the crossing surface by any appropriate significant physical protective means, such that the crossing surface shall not be accessed by road vehicles from Frank Street or Highway 16.

  • CN will review the integrity of any physical protection on a weekly basis and communicate any tampering, compromise, or removal of the protection to 604-666-9922 and to the CN Police and the Terrace, BC R.C.M. Police.

2013-07-24

2013-05-30

Pacific Region

Mountain

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or hazard observed:

CPR Operating Bulletin CPSB015-13 contains an instruction that permits operation of trains on the mountain subdivision eastward without operative dynamic brake. The requirement of dynamic brake was the result of a number of employee fatalities and a number of minor to severe injuries in British Columbia resulting from uncontrolled movements.

Canadian Pacific Railway Must Not:

  • Permit the operation of trains on the Mountain Subdivision with a Dynamic Brake factor of 'nil' or any similar designation and must ensure that all trains are equipped with operative dynamic brake.

2013-07-02

2013-05-07

Pacific Region

Squamish Subdivision

Resort Municipality of Whistler

Condition or hazard observed:

A newly added 3-way stop is causing traffic queuing over the railway crossing significantly increasing rail safety concerns. There are no sight lines for traffic approaching this railway crossing travelling in a North Westerly direction. Opportunities for train / vehicle impact are now significant at this location. There is no pedestrian or cyclist provisions at either side of this railway crossing, on the roadway.

The Resort Municipality of Whistler, BC shall stop using the road crossing and shall not allow any road vehicles, pedestrians or cyclists to use the railway crossing, seven (7) days a week from 7:00 am until 6:30 pm except under the following conditions:

  • Provide a qualified flag person at the South vehicle stop bar at the railway crossing, the flagging person to be facing in a southerly direction.
  • Flagging in effect from 7:00 am until 6:30 PM seven(7) days per week (except for statutory holidays).
  • Provide instruction to the flagging person; such that upon the sound of the railway warning bell and flashing lights, the flagging person shall restrict vehicle traffic, cyclists and pedestrians from advancing from the South over the stop bar at the railway crossing and will do so until the railway operation has cleared the railway crossing.

2013-05-30

2012-10-31

Pacific Region

Armstrong, Kelowna and Lumby Subdivisions

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR)

Condition or hazard observed:

  • Track structure defects and combinations of defects including wide gauge, defective ties, defective rails, cracked and broken joint bars and track geometry conditions non-compliant to Class 1 requirements
  • Failure of Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) track inspectors to properly identify, evaluate and initiate appropriate remedial action for Track Safety Rule deviations
  • Failure of Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) to train, qualify and certify Track Supervisors and Track Inspectors as required by the Track Safety Rules

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

Use the line segments of track between mile 14.4 and mile 22, between mile 25 and mile 30.1, between mile 49 and mile 53.4, and between mile 62.0 and mile 71.0 on the Armstrong Subdivision, and the line segment of track between mile 87.6 and mile 116.0 on the Kelowna subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • A Professional Engineer licensed in British Columbia and familiar with Railway operations and the requirements of the Track Safety Rules conducts a track inspection of the above noted track segments by such a method as to ensure the track is compliant with the Track Safety Rules no later than November 16, 2012.
  • A detailed report of the findings of that inspection, including remedial actions taken to correct defects and written confirmation that the track is compliant to the Track Safety Rules and safe for movements at the authorized speed, be provided to Transport Canada on or before November 30, 2012.
  • Subsequent inspections by a Professional Engineer, including detailed reports provided to Transport Canada, be conducted at a frequency not exceeding 30 days from the date of the last inspection until such time as Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) has qualified and certified Track Supervisors and Track Inspectors as per the requirements of the Track Safety Rules and provided those qualification records to Transport Canada.

2012-01-23

2012-10-26

Pacific Region

Armstrong Subdivision

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR)

Condition or hazard observed:

  • Substandard crosstie conditions that do not effectively maintain gauge
  • Clusters of weak and defective crossties carrying through rail joints

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

  • Use the line of track between mile 70.5 and mile 71.0 Armstrong Subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

Train or engine movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.


2012-04-19

Pacific Region

Mission Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CNR) and City of Abbotsford

Condition or hazard observed:

  1. CP south bound consist headed by engine 3009 had a near miss (2 meters) with an east bound light/grey/brown pick up truck at 11:44 on Tuesday, April 03, 2012. Due to actions of the road vehicle.
  2. Nearly all road vehicles ignore both the west and east facing stop signs mounted with the railway "crossbucks" on either side of the railway crossings.
  3. Driver frustration during railway switching times and through trains is very apparent and has escalated safety concerns to an immediate threat level at this location; unsafe vehicle actions requires positive traffic control. Drivers are parking on one railway track when the other switches. Road Traffic stopped at the provincial railway crossing east bound backs up over the CPR crossing such that the road traffic is unaware or unconcerned about CPR train traffic.
  4. West bound road traffic on Vye Road (from south bound traffic on Highway 11) backs up from the CPR crossing and the provincially regulated railway crossing all the way to Highway 11, there are no storage occupancy lanes on the provincial Hwy 11.
  5. Note 25 meter (82 feet) B trains are operating on Vye Road on a regular basis (many carrying dangerous goods) these barely fit between the two (2) railway crossings, past the stop signs, often stopped in the danger zone of a live rail.
  6. There are no stop lines or stop lines that are so faded as not to delineate a stop location for the travelling road public at these railway crossings.
  7. The CPR usually operates through trains twice a day, weekdays and on a switching day may be 6 times more a day for a total of 8 crossings, on a switching day. The most current [AADT] Averaged Annual Daily Traffic count on Vye road provided by the Road Authority (City of Abbotsford) is 8500 vehicles.
  8. On non switching days the CPR has a cross product of 17,000, for days that include switching rail cars at this location the cross product is 68,000. Cross product is a factor using number of train crossings at a given location multiplied by the amount of road vehicle crossings per day. Transport Canada – Surface considers a cross product of 1200 as a threshold for the consideration of Flashing Lights, Bells and Gates. Railway activated crossing gates provide positive road traffic control.
  9. The second rail crossing offers additional risk factors (second train scenario for road vehicles) due to its close proximity of rail crossings. The potential for a catastrophic accident is high. ICBC traffic accident data and a CPR train vehicle accident (2009) shows collateral damage occurring at this location. During inclement weather and nightfall these concerns are further exacerbated.

City of Abbotsford shall not:

  • allow any road vehicle traffic of any kind, including pedestrians, cyclists and persons using handicapped devices to cross onto railway right-of-way, past the posted road stop signs at the railway crossing on Vye Road, Abbottsford BC; during Monday through Friday ( except statutory holidays) from 08:00 to 1600 hours daily; or

City of Abbotsford shall:

  1. provide road qualified flagging persons to locate at either stop sign east facing and west facing on Vye Road at the railway crossing concerned. This deployment shall occur Monday through Friday, every week between 08:00 hours to 16:00 hours inclusive, excluding statutory holidays; and
  2. flagging persons will stop the road traffic at the location identified with a handheld stop sign and remain stopping traffic when any rail equipment including trains, or switched cars are either occupying and or approaching the railway crossing. Approaching is defined as any rail equipment within 500 meters, if observed coming towards the railway crossing. Flagging persons will stop any road traffic crossing past the posted stop signs until the rail crossing is clear of any rail equipment and or any approaching rail equipment. When the above conditions of both (a) and (b) have been met and there are no trains or equipment; traffic flagging personnel may release the vehicle traffic flow.

2012-08-01

2012-04-07

Pacific Region

Mission Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and City of Abbotsford

Condition or hazard observed:

  1. CP south bound consist headed by engine 3009 had a near miss (2 meters) with an east bound light/grey/brown pick up truck at 11:44 on Tuesday, April 03, 2012. Due to actions of the road vehicle.
  2. Nearly all road vehicles ignore both the west and east facing stop signs mounted with the railway "crossbucks" on either side of the railway crossings.
  3. Driver frustration during railway switching times and through trains is very apparent and has escalated safety concerns to an immediate threat level at this location; unsafe vehicle actions requires positive traffic control. Drivers are parking on one railway track when the other switches. Road Traffic stopped at the provincial railway crossing east bound backs up over the CPR crossing such that the road traffic is unaware or unconcerned about CPR train traffic.
  4. West bound road traffic on Vye Road (from south bound traffic on Highway 11) backs up from the CPR crossing and the provincially regulated railway crossing all the way to Highway 11, there are no storage occupancy lanes on the provincial Hwy 11.
  5. Note 25 meter (82 feet) B trains are operating on Vye Road on a regular basis (many carrying dangerous goods) these barely fit between the two (2) railway crossings, past the stop signs, often stopped in the danger zone of a live rail.
  6. There are no stop lines or stop lines that are so faded as not to delineate a stop location for the travelling road public at these railway crossings.
  7. The CPR usually operates through trains twice a day, weekdays and on a switching day may be 6 times more a day for a total of 8 crossings, on a switching day. With the most current [AADT] Averaged Annual Daily Traffic count on Vye road provided by the Road Authority (City of Abbotsford) is 8500 vehicles.
  8. On non switching days the CPR has a cross product of 17,000, for days that include switching rail cars at this location the cross product is 68,000. Cross product is a factor using number of train crossings at a given location multiplied by the amount of road vehicle crossings per day. Transport Canada – Surface considers a cross product of 1200 as a threshold for the consideration of Flashing Lights, Bells and Gates. Railway activated crossing gates provide positive road traffic control.
  9. The second rail crossing offers additional risk factors (second train scenario for road vehicles) due to its close proximity of rail crossings. The potential for a catastrophic accident is high. ICBC traffic accident data and a CPR train vehicle accident (2009) shows collateral damage occurring at this location. During inclement weather and nightfall these concerns are further exacerbated.

City of Abbotsford shall not:

  • allow any road vehicle traffic of any kind, including pedestrians, cyclists and persons using handicapped devices to cross onto railway right-of-way, past the posted road stop signs at the railway crossing on Vye Road, Abbottsford BC; during Monday through Friday ( except statutory holidays) from 08:00 to 1600 hours daily; or

City of Abbotsford shall:

  1. provide road qualified flagging persons to locate at either stop sign east facing and west facing on Vye Road at the railway crossing concerned. This deployment shall occur Monday through Friday, every week between 08:00 hours to 16:00 hours inclusive, excluding statutory holidays; and
  2. flagging persons will stop the road traffic at the location identified with a handheld stop sign and remain stopping traffic when any rail equipment including trains, or switched cars are either occupying and or approaching the railway crossing. Approaching is defined as any rail equipment within 500 meters, if observed coming towards the railway crossing. Flagging persons will stop any road traffic crossing past the posted stop signs until the rail crossing is clear of any rail equipment and or any approaching rail equipment. When the above conditions of both (a) and (b) have been met and there are no trains or equipment; traffic flagging personnel may release the vehicle traffic flow.

2012-04-19

2012-04-07

Pacific Region

Page Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and City of Langley

Condition or hazard observed:

  1. The pre-emption to the traffic lights at Production Way and Fraser Hwy is not connected, a CN through train east bound @ 1344 hours passed over the crossing without the benefit of any pre-emption cycle, the traffic lights were cycling normally, causing confusion to the motorists. Two (2) vehicles had to jam on the brakes and two (2) vehicles barely made it through without getting hit with the railway crossing arm. The intersection was blocked with vehicles that were not cleared out and there was imminent danger to a senior person at the pedestrian crosswalk closest to the railway crossing.
  2. Gate drop delay at this railway crossing is only 8 seconds, this is inappropriate for road vehicles that are 25 meters in length (many truck and trailer units at this location.) There has been significant gate strikes at this location. The current design vehicle needs to be identified by the Road Authority and gate delay time submitted to the rail authority.
  3. ICBC Data identifies a large number of vehicle on vehicle accidents at or near this railway crossing location. History shows in the past a high CPR trouble ticket count. Complaints from trucking companies (hitting gates and getting traffic tickets) caused an inordinate inspection at this location. The TSB data base shows a number of train vehicle accidents at this location in the past 10 years although no fatalities.
  4. Advanced pre-emption should always use a timer to delay crossing activation [weekly checks] to ensure a constant pre-emption time to mirror a train called pre-emption; this minimizes danger to the road public.
  5. Pre-emption should always be activated by the test switch or other means (DTMF) and crossing activation delayed as per the pre-emption timing sequence.
  6. Pre-emption should be deactivated when the test switch is raised (to pick up gates) to allow traffic to move normally when the Railway crossing is in trouble (providing proper protection).
  7. Pre-emption checks are required on an annual basis by the road authority and the rail authority jointly; this ensures that nothing has changed on this critical interface that provides optimum safety for both the railway and the road public at traffic pre-empted railway crossings locations.

Canadian Pacific Railway shall not:

  • allow any train movement from either direction at this railway crossing to exceed the maximum speed of 10 M.P.H. until the railway crossing is fully occupied at which time normal track speed may be resumed; and

Canadian Pacific Railway shall:

  1. ensure that weekly crossing checks are done only after ascertaining there are no pedestrians in possible danger attempting to use a pedestrian crosswalk and traffic signal system that is not synchronized with the traffic lights at the Fraser Highway and Production Way; and
  2. ensure that a crossing check under the current configuration is only commenced when there are no immediate 25 meter vehicles approaching the railway crossing that may be impacted by only an 8 second gate drop delay; and
  3. only commence a railway crossing check when the RED traffic light ball first illuminates to stop road traffic on the Fraser Hwy, at the intersection of Fraser Hwy and Production way.

2012-04-27

2012-03-20

Prairie and Northern Region

Symington yard

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or hazard observed:

The continued failure to adequately control movements within Symington yard has resulted in an unacceptable rate of collisions over the past year.

CN shall not operate any yard movement within Symington yard unless such movements are operated under the following conditions:

  • Restricted to a maximum speed of 10 mph;
  • Operate at a speed that will allow stopping within one-third the range of vision of equipment.

2012-06-25

2011-11-23

Ontario Region

Kingston Subdivision

City of Belleville

Condition or hazard observed:

The stopping or queuing of vehicles on the Michell Road crossing in the City of Belleville, Ontario, at mile 216.24 Kingston Subdivision CN Rail.

City of Belleville shall:

  • Ensure that the Mitchell Road crossing not be used until such time as mitigating measures are put in place to curtail the stopping or queuing of vehicles on the crossing.

2011-12-19

2011-11-04

Prairie and Northern Region

Carberry Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or hazard observed:

28 cracked or broken 85 lb. splice bars were observed in 2.25 miles of walking inspections of random portions of the Carberry Subdivision between the miles of 13.0 and 39.7.

Trains are operating on these portions of the Carberry Subdivision in excess of the allowable speed limits for the conditions of the track.

Canadian National Railway Company not operate any train or engine on the Carberry Subdivision between mileages 13.0 and 39.70 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • Designate the identified segments of track as "Excepted Track", or
  • Trains and engines shall not operate at speeds greater than 10 miles per hour on areas of track with less than 100 lb rail between the mileages stated until an inspection of all joint bars has been performed and defects repaired, and
  • Prior to removing the 10 mile per hour speed restriction, CNR shall provide a report of any condition not meeting the TSR found during the above inspections and provide a plan which indicates car loading limits, maximum train speeds and the inspection regime which will be implemented to ensure continuing compliance.

2011-11-09

2011-05-27

Prairie and Northern Region

Coronado and Lac la Biche Subdivisions

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or hazard observed:

The following were observed in 7.8 miles of inspection on the Coronado Subdivision:

  • 40 cracked or broken 85 lb. splice bars
  • one broken rail
  • 26 loose or missing bolts

The following were observed in 7.4 miles of inspection on the Lac la Biche Subdivision:

  • 6 cracked or broken 85 lb. splice bars
  • one broken rail
  • 31 loose or missing bolts.

These conditions are violations of the Canadian Rules Respecting Track Safety.

The above noted hazards and conditions indicate that CN is not undertaking track inspections at such frequency and by such methods as to ensure that the line of track is safe and compliant for operation of trains at the authorized speeds. As a result, trains are operating on portions of the Coronado and Lac La Biche Subdivisions in excess of the allowable speed limits for the conditions of the track.

Canadian National Railway Company shall not operate any train or engine on the Carberry Subdivision between mileages 13.0 and 39.70 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • Designate the identified segments of track as "Excepted Track", or
  • Trains and engines shall not operate at speeds greater than 10 miles per hour on areas of track with less than 100 lb rail between the mileages stated until an inspection of all joint bars has been performed and defects repaired, and
  • Car loadings shall not exceed 268,000 lbs, and
  • Prior to removing the 10 mile per hour speed restriction, CNR shall provide a report of any condition not meeting the TSR found during the above inspections and provide a plan which indicates car loading limits, maximum train speeds and the inspection regime which will be implemented to ensure continuing compliance.

2011-05-30

2010-12-23 (Altered)

Prairie and Northern Region

Quappelle Subdivision

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Runaway or uncontrolled movement with significant momentum over a relatively long distance down a grade

The factors involved are

  1. CN's intent to continue this operation into the foreseeable future,
  2. the fact railway equipment movements are subject to pull-aparts and blockage of the trainline at a time and place that is unpredictable,
  3. the fact that when these occur without a fully functioning TIBS, a runaway or uncontrolled movement is likely to occur,
  4. the fact that an uncontrolled movement occurring on a significant grade builds up momentum so that it is likely to result in severe consequences, such as high speed derailment or collision with equipment or motor vehicle and
  5. the fact that these movements sometimes carry dangerous goods, a further factor increasing the severity of the consequences likely to ensure from a high speed collision or derailment.

Order Canadian National Railway:

CN shall not operate an engine with cars between Fort Quappelle Mileage 46.4 and Balcarres Mileage 32.7 on the Quappelle Subdivision without a fully functioning TIBS

2011-03-23

2010-09-02

Pacific Region

Train Yard in Squamish, BC

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Unidentified defective plug doors are not being reported to the CN Mechanical Department therefore they are not being repaired prior to returning them in service

CN must ensure that the customer reports all defective plug doors that require wedges, are open, are unsecured or inoperable.

CN Transportation personnel must identify and report any defective plug doors and not remove those cars from the customer site.

CN Transportation personnel must identify and report any defective plug doors and not move those cars from Squamish yard.

2010-11-04

2010-08-20

Pacific Region

Lumby Subdivision

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Substandard track conditions on the Lumby subdivision between mile 2.0 and mile 13.4

  • Pockets of defective track ties carrying through rail joints
  • Excessive vegetation fouling track structure obstructing visual inspections
  • Failure to initiate appropriate corrective actions for defects identified on inspection reports

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

Use the line of track between mile 2.0 and mile 5.0 and the line of track between mile 11.0 and mile 13.4 Lumby Subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • Train or engine movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.

2010-06-06

2010-08-20

Pacific Region

Armstrong Subdivision

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Substandard track conditions on the Armstrong subdivision between mile 14.4 and mile 53.4 and between mile 62.0 and mile 70.5

  • Pockets of defective track ties carrying through rail joints
  • Failure to initiate appropriate corrective actions for defects identified on inspection reports

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

Use the line of track between mile 14.4 and mile 53.4 and the line of track between mile 62 and mile 70.5 Kelowna Subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • Train or engine movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.

2010-06-06

2010-08-20

Pacific Region

Kelowna Subdivision

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Substandard track conditions on the Kelowna subdivision between mile 87.6 and mile 95.9

  • Pockets of defective track ties carrying through rail joints
  • Failure to initiate appropriate corrective actions for defects identified on inspection reports

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

Use the line of track between mile 87.6 and mile 95.9 Kelowna Subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • Train or engine movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.

2013-12-06

2010-04-14

Ontario Region

Kingston Subdivision at Mile 296.22

VIA Rail and Canadian National Railway (CN)

Condition or hazard observed:

Failure of VIA locomotive engineers to execute instructions restricting the movement of their train, through multiple consecutive General Bulletins Orders, protecting track work and other conditions affecting the movement of trains on the CN Kingston Sub.

VIA Rail and CN shall not between Mile 123-315 of CN Kingston Sub:

  1. Allow passenger trains to exceed 65 miles per hour approaching the yellow over red signal of a Rule 42, and through the entire limits of a Rule 42, unless instructions to proceed through the entire limits have been received in writing from the foreman named in the GBO;
  2. Permit Rule 42 foremen names in the GBO to require passenger trains to report clear of the working limits of the Rule 42.
  3. Permit passenger trains to enter blocks affected by defective automatic warning devices at public crossings at grade until the CN Rail Traffic Controller has confirmed and verified the mileage of the defective crossing to be protected by the VIA locomotive engineers. The passenger train must be within the controlled block prior to the signal at the time of verification and confirmation before a permissive signal can be given to enter the affected block.

Also requested that VIA Rail and CN submit a joint action plan within 14 days to demonstrate how these conditions will be addressed in future to mitigate the circumstances affecting the movement of high speed passenger trains on the Kingston Sub.

2010-04-27

2010-04-12

Pacific Region

Mountain and Shuswap Subdivision

Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Operating movements of heavy tonnage and lengths on extreme grades under adverse conditions utilizing mandatory technological process and features, maintaining normal rules compliance all the while training a working member of the crew for a different occupational category without another qualified employee in a position in the lead locomotive to perform the duties of the occupational category that the trainee is supposed to be performing to ensure focus is retained on movement operation and other required tasks.

Canadian Pacific Railway shall not:

Operate movements on the Mountain or Shuswap Subdivisions under the guise of On the Job Training unless the crew of the movement consists of another rules qualified person who will be stationed in the lead locomotive and whose sole responsibility will be the duties normally performed by a crew member of the movement.

2010-05-13

2010-03-16

Prairie and Northern Region

Scotford Yard

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Excluding track VC 61, no required means of securement of railway equipment at Scotford yard. Railway equipment not being contained within the yard tracks at Scotford Yard. Railway equipment is running uncontrolled and contacting other railway equipment resulting in damage to equipment.

CN Rail shall not:

Leave railway equipment unsecured on tracks VC 62 to VC 75 inclusive, in CN Rail Scotford Yard until sufficient risk mitigation strategies have been put in place to prevent uncontrolled movements.

2010-03-22

2009-09-25

Pacific Region

Fort Nelson Subdivsion Between Mile 978 and Mile 864 and between Mile 767 and Mile 816.4

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Culverts not being maintained to an acceptable standard. Serious deficiencies regarding drainage.

Canadian National Railway not operate any train or engine movements on the Fort Nelson Subdivision otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • A qualified inspector(s) under the responsibility and direction of a Professional Engineer by October 9, 2009 conducts a detailed inspection of all culverts on the Fort Nelson subdivision
  • A report of the findings of the above mandated inspections signed by a Professional Engineer is provided to the undersigned on or before October 14, 2009. Such report must at a minimum include:
    • Subdivision mileage.
    • Type of culvert.
    • Size of culvert.
    • Condition of culvert including structural deficiencies, water flow irregularities, ditching requirements and grade or embankment problems.
    • Recommended remedial actions for deviations found.
    • Date by which corrective measures will be taken including any monitoring activities to be undertaken (re-inspection etc) until such as time as repairs are completed.
    • Confirmation from a Professional Engineer that the condition of culverts on the Fort Nelson subdivision allows for the safe passage of trains at the authorized speed.

2010-04-18

2009-09-23

Pacific Region

Fort Nelson Subdivision Mile 911.58

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Drainage facility (culvert) not maintained. Roof collapsing under the track and a section pulled apart allowing water infiltration to saturate the grade.

CN not operate over the culvert at Mile 911.58 Fort Nelson Subdivision otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

  • All movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.

2009-12-03

2009-09-23

Pacific Region

Vernon Yard and on the Lumby and Kelowna Subdivisions

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Engineering employees and contractors operating track units, performing track work and working as foremen or sub-foremen without prescribed rules training and rules qualifications.

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) not:

Allow any engineering services employee or contractor to operate any track unit or accept responsibility as a Foreman or Sub-Foreman on any track owned or operated by the Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) until all of the following conditions are met:

  • A complete list of all engineering employees and contractors employed by or working under contract to the Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) as of the date of this Order must be submitted to the undersigned Railway Safety Inspector within two (2) calendar days of the receipt of this Order
  • Copies of the current rules qualification card and latest rules training and qualification record for each is submitted to the undersigned Railway Safety Inspector within two (2) calendar days of the receipt of this Order
  • Any and all engineering employees or contractors who are not, as of the date of this Order, in possession of a Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) Certificate of Rules Qualification must attend a rules seminar to be trained and qualified in the rules applicable to the Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR)
  • Each employee or contractor must attain a pass mark of 85% on a written exam
  • A copy of the training seminar criteria must be submitted to the undersigned Railway Safety Inspector prior to the training taking place and must include the name and qualifications of the instructor(s) and examiner(s)
  • Seven (7) days advance notice of the training and examination seminar(s) must be forwarded to the undersigned Railway Safety Inspector with the date(s), time(s) and location(s) of said training and examination so that a Railway Safety Inspector may attend
  • A list of each employee or contractor attending the training must be provided to the undersigned Railway Safety Inspector outlining each one's qualification standard, whether they passed or failed, the date examined and the actual mark achieved.
  • Employees and contractors passing the required examinations must be issued a Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) Certificate of Rules Qualification which bears both the signature and printed name of the examiner
  • Those employees or contractors who fail to pass the required tests must not be permitted to operate any track unit or accept responsibility as a Foreman or Sub-Foreman until such time as they have achieved a passing mark described above and such is forwarded to the undersigned Railway Safety Inspector
  • A copy of this Notice and Order must be posted in a conspicuous location at all the workplaces where employees normally report for duty until this Order is complied with to the satisfaction of the undersigned Railway Safety Inspector.

2014-06-20

2009-09-10

Pacific Region

Vernon & Kelowna Yard and the Lumby & Okanagan Subdivisions

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Trains left unattended on descending grades without testing the means of securement and without supplementary protection.

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

  • Allow equipment to be stored on any track where there is a risk of an unintended movement without a sufficient number of handbrakes being applied and tested and another means of protection acceptable to the undersigned Railway Safety Inspector being utilized to ensure that there will be no uncontrollable movement of the equipment.

2014-06-26

2009-08-13

Pacific Region

Lynn Creek Yard - Neptune Terminals

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Trains left unattended at Lynn Creek on a descending grade with no acceptable means of securement.

CN shall not:

  • Allow equipment to be left unattended at Neptune Terminals between Mile 2.7 North Shore Industrial Line and the Neptune Coal Dumper in the Lynn Creek yard without a sufficient number of handbrakes being applied and tested or another means of securement acceptable to the undersigned Railway Safety Inspector to ensure that there will be no unintentional movement of the equipment.

2009-08-13

2009-08-18

Ontario Region

Kitchener Yard

Goderich Exeter Railway

Condition or hazard observed:

Despite the application of operational safety measures and the presence of a derailing device, unattended equipment was able to enter the main track at Kitchener into non-signaled territory over which passenger and freight trains operate.

Goderich Exeter Railway not use:Non-main tracks between Mile 60.3 to Mile 63.38 Guelph Subdivision (Kitchener) to store or leave unattended equipment unless:

  • A supervisor qualified in the Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR) inspects the non-main tracks between Mile 60.3 to Mile 63.38 guelph Subdivision to ensure compliance with CROR 112 "securing equipment" and 104.5 "derails": The supervisor must inspect these non-main tracks twice during each eight-hour period and subsequent to switching activities to ensure compliance with the CROR. These inspections are to be documented, providing a record of time, date, rules monitored, results of inspections and railway corrective actions taken to address violations noted, and be made available to the undersigned upon request.
  • GEXR is to provide a documented quality assurance program to ensure compliance with rules and company instructions with respect to storing and securing unattended equipment. The program shall include, but not limited to, supervisor/employee training, surveys, and efficiency testing. This documented quality assurance program and its results shall be made available to the undersigned upon request.

2009-09-19

2009-06-05

Prairies and Northern Region

Herchmer Subdivision

OmniTRAX - Hudson Bay Railroad (HBR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Many violations to the Track Safety Rules, substandard track inspection practices and numerous track geometry defects not meeting minimum requirements.

HBR not operate any train or engine on the Herchmer Subdivision between Mile 345 and Mile 480 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions: Designate the identified track as 'Excepted Track', or

  • Trains must operate under the authority of a Track Supervisor at speeds not exceeding Class I for not more than 30-days unless,
  • A Professional Engineer, licensed in Canada and qualified as a Track supervisor under the Track safety Rules, visually inspects the track and confirms that all track conditions not meeting prescribed required requirements are identified and brought into compliance. Subsequent inspections by the Professional Engineer at intervals not to exceed 30 days, or
  • Conduct a continuous electronic track geometry inspection to ensure that all track geometry deviations on the track are identified and brought into compliance. Subsequent continuous electronic track geometry inspections at intervals not to exceed 30 days.
  • Provide a report of any condition not meeting subdivision timetable speed found during the above mandated inspections and remedial actions taken to Transport Canada in an acceptable format within 10 days of each inspections.

2009-12-22

2009-05-22

Revised to acknowledge action taken by CN on portions of the Subdivision:

  • • May 28, 2009
  • • June 4, 2009
  • • June 19, 2009
  • • September 4, 2009

Ontario Region

Soo Subdivision Between Mile 149.0 and Mile 294.1

Canadian National Railway (CNR)

Condition or hazard observed:

Increase in urgent track geometry defects per mile, a substantial increase in bolt hole defects and surface defects.

CN ensure that the track of the Soo Subdivision between Mile 164.20 and Mile 294.10 not be used unless:

  • The track is operated at a speed not greater than the maximum allowable operating speed for Class 1 track, between mile 164.20 and 294.10
  • The track is inspected within 15 calendar days, and subsequently with no more than 30 calendar days between inspections, by a Professional Engineer taking responsibility in accordance with Section 11 of the RSA
  • Transport Canada is provided with copies of these track inspection reports, including all mitigating actions taken, resulting from these inspections within 14 calendar days from completion of each inspection

2009-11-27

2009-01-12

Pacific Region

Kettle Falls Subdivision Between Mile 145.0 and Mile 142.0

OmniTRAX, Inc.

Condition or hazard observed:

The lack of clear train handling instructions related to switching and descending the grades between Mile 145.0 and Mile 142.0 Kettle Falls Subdivision can lead to operating crews descending this grade with less than adequate air and operative brakes to properly control their movement, resulting in the risk of operating of an uncontrolled movement.

Omnitrax must not allow movements to descend the grade between Miles 145.0 and 142.0 on the Kettle Falls Subdivision unless the following conditions are met:

  • that all movements receive the equivalent of a number 1A air test prior to any descent;
  • that prior to any descent, a sufficient amount of time is permitted for charging of the equipment to be handled to ensure a safe descent:
  • that a calibrated air gauge or Sense and Braking Unit (SBU) is utilized to assist the operating crews; and
  • any other means that are available are utilized as required to ensure a safe descent.

2016-05-29

Date modified: