2.5.1 Risk-based security
2.5.2 Layered security

2.6.1 The intelligence function in the Government of Canada
2.6.2 CATSA’s need for intelligence
2.6.3 Widening the links

2.7.1 Security Watch Program
2.7.2 Airport Security Advisory Group
2.7.3 Airport Security Committee

2.8.1 Air cargo
2.8.2 General Aviation / Fixed Base Operations
2.8.3 Difficult-to-detect substances
2.8.4 Gaps and vulnerabilities at airports

Our vision is to have a border strategy that results in the fast, efficient and secure movement of low-risk trade and travelers to and within North America, while protecting us from threats including terrorism. In implementing this strategy, we will encourage innovative risk-based approaches to improving security and facilitating trade and travel. These include close coordination on infrastructure investments and vulnerability assessments, screening and processing of travelers, baggage and cargo, a single integrated North American trusted traveler program, and swift law enforcement responses to threats posed by criminals or terrorists. ^{[ 23 ]}

2.5.1 Risk-based security

Risk is a function of the likelihood and feasibility of the threat, plus the vulnerability of and the impact on the target. Resources, financial and human, are not unlimited and should be allocated according to assessed risk. In some cases, administrative and political measures may lack sufficient legitimacy to be accepted. ^{[ 30 ]} Security measures taken should be proportionate to the risk.

As indicated earlier, ICAO prescribes a risk-based approach for member states in applying international security measures to their domestic situation. Domestic application of the measures “to the extent practicable” should be “based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authority.” ^{[ 31 ]} The Auditor General is equally insistent that a risk-based approach is required, and has indicated her disappointment that Transport Canada “has not fully implemented formal risk management.” ^{[ 32 ]} In presentations to the Panel, CATSA referred to its concept of security screening as risk-based. It is widely understood that absolute security is an illusory goal; priorities must be established, and these should be based on assessments of the relative level of risk.

In our consultations, many stakeholders spoke favourably of risk assessment as the most appropriate method of applying security measures, often in the context of recommending a more risk-based approach for the screening operations managed by CATSA. For instance, many of our interveners advocated an approach to screening that would focus on higher-risk passengers, rather than on the objects carried by all passengers. It was argued that the vast majority of travellers do not present a security threat and, with appropriate personal information and background vetting, could be processed through a more streamlined screening process, such as a Registered Traveller Program.

To the extent that quantitative risk assessments ^{[ 33 ]} are feasible, they must be based on data that inspire confidence. But we have to ask: to what extent is such confidence justified? Risk assessments must come with very high standards of accuracy when the margin for error is so small.

Transport Canada and CATSA both speak of moving toward adoption of a Security Management Systems (SeMS) approach, ^{[ 34 ]} analogous to the Safety Management System (SMS) being put in place for aviation, marine and rail safety. ^{[ 35 ]} SMS is based on a less prescriptive, more results-based regulatory framework for safety purposes; proponents of SeMS similarly point towards a more results-based regulatory framework for security. SeMS is certainly a valid management objective, and we will examine it further in this report.

It must be noted, however, that the degree of certainty and confidence about what is required to maintain safety is greater than that regarding threats to aviation security. Paraphrasing the often-quoted words of former U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, threats to safety are “known unknowns,” but threats to security are “unknown unknowns.” Threats to safety are malignant, the result of such measurable matters as design flaws, environmental stress, human error, etc. Threats to security are malevolent, by human design, and are calculated to evade detection and prevention.

In responding to malevolent threats, those responsible for maintaining security are often vulnerable to human error. Underestimating the threat before it actually materializes is a common reaction. The magnitude of the mistakes by both organizations and individuals that led to the fatal Air India Flight 182 bombing was revealed only in hindsight.

Once a malevolent threat has materialized, human error comes into play in different ways. There is a natural tendency in security planning to focus on past, and thus known, threats - to be reactive rather than proactive. Although the actions taken after the Air India bombing, the events of 9/11 and the recent alleged plot at Heathrow were appropriate responses to specific threats, we must expect that terrorists will be looking for new methods of attack calculated to evade the existing security controls. In short, the next terrorist threat will quite likely be the ‘unknown unknown.’ This puts pressure on the intelligence capacity for threat assessment.

We are also aware of criticism of the risk-based approach to security policy as providing a cover or excuse for inaction. Members of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence have expressed doubt that a risk-based approach is an adequate solution for what the Committee believes to be serious security shortcomings. ^{[ 36 ]} We do not entirely agree with this argument. The Senate Committee does have a valid point if risk assessment is superficially conducted or is used as an ex-post facto rationalization for inaction. However, government resources are not unlimited; security is not the only policy priority that the Canadian public expects; and all threats to security are not of equal magnitude and urgency. It is therefore imperative that careful risk assessments be made and resources deployed accordingly.

The Panel is of the opinion that a risk-based approach, such as the SeMS, is the necessary basis for any effective aviation security system, and we make a recommendation to this effect later on in the report. It is imperative, however, that risk assessments be based on solid data and on the appropriate level of intelligence. We are encouraged by the commitment of the Canadian government to a risk-based approach, but we would like to see more substantial evidence that this commitment is supported by effective and timely follow-through by CATSA and, in particular, by Transport Canada.

2.5.2 Layered security

The other phrase we heard most frequently describing the Canadian aviation security system is ‘layered.’ This is a relatively simple concept: security around airports and aircraft is multi-layered, so that if one layer is penetrated by a would-be terrorist, other layers will remain as barriers. An example of layered security is the hold bag screening (HBS) process, in which bags may pass through five levels of searching, each more intrusive, ending with Level 5, where a passenger is summoned to witness their bag being opened for direct physical inspection. Another way of describing layering is to delineate the various authorities, each with specific security responsibilities, through which passengers and their luggage may proceed: advance intelligence; special security operations; airport operators; air carriers; CATSA; police with airport jurisdiction; and RCMP Aircraft Protective Officers. Another aspect of layering involves security checkpoints or barriers: airline ticket counters; pre-board and hold bag screening lines; non-passenger screening checks; departure gates; reinforced cockpit doors, etc.

Some observed that the layered model simply makes a virtue of necessity. The Canadian system has evolved in a series of reactions to attacks or threats. First there was the era of aircraft hijackings, followed by the bombing of Air India Flight 182, the commandeering of aircraft as weapons on September 11, 2001, and more recently, the August 2006 alleged terrorist plot at Heathrow. Each threat has brought forth a specific set of remedies, which remain as part of a cumulative system. These constitute ‘layers’ of security, but do not appear to add up to a coherent system by design. Again, the Canadian government has been reactive rather than proactive. There is also a danger of a lack of accountability arising from many layers of security.

Proponents of layering point to Israel as the model. Ben Gurion International Airport outside Tel Aviv features concentric circles of security, beginning with vehicle inspection and sniffer dogs at road-entry checkpoints to the airport; two circles of perimeter security with high-tech surveillance; behavioural profiling of passengers at airport entry and triage into three streams according to risk assessment; armed surveillance of the entire concourse; and so on.

The Israeli model – a kind of gold standard in aviation security – is not perhaps translatable into the very different Canadian environment. Israeli society has lived for many years with a threat environment that is almost unimaginably high by Canadian standards. As a result, Israelis have accepted levels of everyday security controls that would not be acceptable in Canada.

Boston Logan Airport was the starting point for the two flights that struck the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, and has since adopted some elements of Israeli-style layered security. Logan has gone to considerable lengths to respond to the grave flaws in its previous security regime revealed on that day. The authorities have developed a layered defence of their facility, instituting informal passenger interviews and even deputizing clam diggers who work in the surrounding shore area as additional eyes and ears of airport security.

Despite the Air India Flight 182 bombing over 20 years ago, and in the absence of a post-9/11 terrorist attack on Canadian aviation, we doubt that the Canadian public would be prepared to expend the resources, or give up the degree of privacy and civil liberties that would be involved in enacting a full Israeli-style layered security regime. An objective risk assessment of the threat to Canadian airports and Canadian flights is unlikely to conclude that an Israeli approach can be justified at this time, especially given the costs involved. ^{[ 37 ]}

That being said, there is a lesson for Canada: wherever possible, multiple layers of security are desirable. The concept of layered security certainly presents significant advantages. Layering builds in redundancy, so that if one level fails, others may still come into play, and encourages resiliency and recovery in the face of threats and challenges. As well, layering answers to the ‘unknown unknown’ factor in threats to aviation, to the extent that different layers respond to different potential threats.

From time to time in our public consultations, we heard the suggestion that certain layers of security at Canadian airports were unnecessary, or not justified by risk analysis, and might be dispensed with in favour of concentrating resources on higher-risk threats. There are instances where such suggestions are justified, and later we make specific recommendations for dealing with them. But in the broader picture, we are reluctant to recommend removal of existing layers of security, unless the case is clearly demonstrable. The principle of layering, of building in redundancy, is a good one, and should be retained along with risk-based decision making. Both are required to maintain an acceptable level of security.

but does not include lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunction with any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d).

Intelligence as used by governments is best understood in terms of an intelligence cycle: the process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policy makers and decision-making authorities. This comprises five distinct, though interrelated, steps: direction from the government; planning; collection; analysis; and dissemination. Depending on how they relate to this cycle, government departments and agencies may be seen mainly as producers or consumers of intelligence. Although the distinction is not hard and fast – producers are also consumers of other agencies’ and governments’ intelligence, and consumers may occasionally feed relevant information back to producers – it is important. When we examine the role of security intelligence in the aviation sector, the distinction between producers and consumers is key, especially when it is a matter of establishing the appropriate lines for the communication and dissemination of intelligence and defining the ‘need to know.’

In the post-9/11 environment, the Government of Canada has laid stress on the integration of intelligence operations and the wider sharing of timely intelligence. Integration is both horizontal and vertical, among producers and consumers.

Horizontal integration is exemplified in the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), mentioned earlier in this chapter. ITAC is based at CSIS but draws on a range of sources and serves the wider intelligence community with its security threat assessments, especially regarding terrorism. Transport Canada’s Security and Emergency Preparedness Directorate is represented on ITAC and disseminates ITAC assessments to other players and stakeholders in the transportation community, including CATSA, as it considers appropriate.

Vertical integration is shown in the institutionalized channels through which intelligence is received by the many consumers of intelligence within government – for example, the channels through which CATSA receives security threat assessments via Transport Canada, which in turn are based on ITAC and CSIS reports.

It is characteristic of this integrated vertical chain that intelligence is filtered. Information regarding sources stays with the originating agency that is best situated to verify the reliability and protect the identity of the source. Information regarding methods of operation is usually filtered out. Individual officials are not given access to classified information for which they lack appropriate security clearance. There is a potential problem here: a decision not to disclose intelligence to a recipient is, in effect, also a decision defining the recipient’s intelligence needs. The latter, however, is unable to assess the degree to which needs are or are not being fulfilled. ITAC is attempting to address this problem by making classified intelligence available in a usable form to public officials who may lack appropriate security clearance but need actionable intelligence to fulfill their obligations.

Intelligence shared between national or international agencies often comes with caveats, indicating that it should not be shared further, or only shared under carefully specified conditions. Honouring these caveats is essential for ensuring the continuing flow of intelligence. For instance, if a Canadian agency receives intelligence from a foreign source with caveats and restrictions on its further distribution, failure to comply could lead to the Canadian agency losing future access to valuable foreign intelligence.

Nevertheless, the new threat environment does require that front-line actors be provided with strategic, real-time, actionable intelligence capable of warning against and pre-empting attacks. There must be greater interactivity and information-sharing among the Transport Canada partners and stakeholders, certainly an intensification of existing sharing arrangements. This may imply a significant change to the current approaches to intelligence-sharing in Transport Canada. As some have put it, there is an urgency to move from the old ‘need-to-know’ principle to a new ‘need-to-share’ principle. The need for more information must be balanced with the requirements for protecting secret intelligence and honouring attached caveats.

2.6.2 CATSA’s need for intelligence

CATSA has made clear a degree of dissatisfaction with its access to intelligence that it considers essential to its operations. We carefully considered CATSA’s case. In discussions with the Panel, CATSA emphasized that intelligence is a necessary tool and a specific type of information that it requires to help it gain a more precise picture of what is on its radar screen. CATSA noted that intelligence facilitates time-sensitive, strategic and mission-critical decision-making, and increases its ability to respond effectively to terrorist threats and security concerns. By fully integrating intelligence into its risk management approach to security, CATSA maintained, it is better able to assess vulnerabilities and prioritize resource allocation with the overall result of enhancing effectiveness.

CATSA emphasized to the Panel that it is an intelligence consumer, not a covert intelligence gatherer. It depends on its security partners to provide it with the timely, accurate and service-oriented intelligence data it needs to manage day-to-day operations and plan long-term strategic policy. CATSA stated that it needs access to intelligence so that it can help its front-line screening officers to do a better and safer job.

CATSA is aware that there are often institutional limitations to sharing information and intelligence. However, it noted that it is a firm believer in the value of making intelligence accessible, stating that while there are risks to sharing intelligence, they are outweighed by the benefits.

The formal line of communication of intelligence to CATSA comes via Transport Canada’s Security and Emergency Preparedness (SEP) Directorate. Recently, under a reciprocal exchange arrangement, a CATSA employee worked in the intelligence area at Transport Canada for six months, and vice-versa. We support these initiatives, and encourage further exchanges as a means of improving communication on intelligence issues.

CATSA identified three types of intelligence that it requires: actionable, issue-specific or tactical, and strategic.

Actionable intelligence is threat information that requires immediate response. This might involve intelligence concerning a threat against a specific national airline or flight. Such a threat against Air India by Sikh extremists was known in 1985, for example, yet failed to trigger the kind of security measures at the passenger and baggage screening points that could have prevented the lethal attacks that did occur. Clearly, it is in the interests of the travelling public and national security for actionable intelligence to be provided to those who can Act upon it. In the case of actionable intelligence concerning the possible threat of an improvised explosive device planted in hold baggage on a specific flight, CATSA should know and would be in a position to take precautionary action. However, in the case of threats associated with particular individuals or organizations, it is not clear how intelligence could be ‘actionable’ for CATSA screening officers.

At present, front-line CATSA personnel do not check passenger identity documents, and screening officers have no means of identifying dangerous passengers, as opposed to dangerous objects they may carry on their persons or in their luggage. The Panel heard recommendations from some airline operators that CATSA should undertake this task.

The next type of intelligence CATSA identified is what it calls ‘issue-specific’ or tactical. This might involve intelligence on new types of improvised explosive devices or new methods of concealing weapons. Here, CATSA’s case for full access to the best available intelligence is very strong. CATSA requires such intelligence, in the most up-to-date form, to do its job of passenger and baggage screening. We found little evidence, however, that CATSA was not in receipt of just this kind of intelligence, and in as timely a form as required. Occasional issues have arisen from CATSA’s desire to access intelligence on threats to other transportation systems. However, on tactical intelligence on specific aviation threats, we believe that CATSA now receives what it requires to do its job. When the alleged terrorist plot to simultaneously bomb a series of aircraft was identified by U.K. authorities in August 2006, Canadian intelligence officials were quickly briefed, and CATSA was notified so that it could effect immediate new provisions to ban liquids and gels from carry-on luggage.

The Panel noticed a certain disconnect between the general complaints we received concerning the lack of intelligence provided and the actual evidence of aviation security intelligence disseminated to front-line personnel. We were impressed with the comment made to us by a senior Transportation Security Administration official in Washington, whose job requires constant liaison with U.S. intelligence agencies. He reported receiving similar complaints of insufficient intelligence from screening officers and airports; however, when he examined the procedures being put in place in response to intelligence or information, it was clear the message was getting through, even though it may not have been flagged as ‘secret intelligence.’ We believe that the situation with regard to actionable and tactical intelligence making its way to the front lines may be similar in Canada.

Strategic intelligence is described by CATSA as the type of intelligence needed to enhance its understanding of all aspects of the terrorist threat, including motivating factors, ideological underpinnings, main objectives, financing, modus operandi and operational support base.

Strategic threat assessments regarding terrorism are, in the first instance, the job of CSIS, the RCMP and other intelligence producers, especially ITAC, which draws on all sources to analytically integrate intelligence on terrorism. To a limited extent, CATSA is a producer of tactical intelligence, but recognizes that it is mainly an intelligence consumer. CATSA has expressed a desire to be at the ITAC table along with Transport Canada and the other players. Given CATSA’s role as primarily a consumer rather than a producer of intelligence, we see no clear advantage to ITAC, or to the strategic intelligence community, that would accrue from CATSA’s participation at this time.

We note as well CATSA’s participation in international conferences on terrorism and aviation security, and the consultations the agency has held with experts on terrorism and counter-terrorism. While the desire to gain deeper knowledge of these matters is admirable, it must be borne in mind that Transport Canada is the designated Canadian national aviation security authority under ICAO, and that for purposes of disseminating strategic intelligence on terrorism, Transport Canada remains the appropriate channel from ITAC as the integrated analyst to CATSA as consumer.

Transport Canada is the key link in the aviation security intelligence chain. It is incumbent on the department to pass on to CATSA every type of intelligence that may be relevant to CATSA’s ability to perform its mandated tasks effectively. Transport Canada is also the appropriate recipient of any tactical intelligence collected by CATSA in the everyday performance of its duties. While we believe that CATSA does receive the intelligence it requires, we note its dissatisfaction in this regard, and urge closer cooperation between Transport Canada and CATSA in the sharing of intelligence relevant to CATSA’s mandate.

Recommendation 2.2

Transport Canada should ensure that CATSA continues to receive all the information and intelligence it requires at the national and local levels to perform its functions, including timely access to the best intelligence and actionable information from all sources on explosives, weapons and concealment techniques.

2.6.3 Widening the links

The sharing of intelligence beyond CATSA also needs to be addressed. In many cases, actionable intelligence on threats impinges directly on the responsibilities of airport authorities and air carriers. For instance, threats to specific aircraft or flights require immediate response from carriers. Threats to airport perimeters or facilities require immediate response from airports. Moreover, there is much to be said for keeping these players more broadly in the loop regarding changes to the threat environment, as opposed to leaving them in a reactive position at the last moment when a threat becomes imminent. In the course of our consultations, the Panel heard complaints from several airports that they had not been informed of critical incidents directly affecting their operations.

The availability of intelligence and threat warnings to all the front-line players is a key factor in promoting effective emergency response. We would stress the importance of integrating the roles of all the players in as seamless and cooperative a manner as possible.

There is an important need within the multi-layered approach to engage the entire airport community in an overall security culture in which all employees work together as the eyes and ears of aviation security. Even members of the community outside the airport should be encouraged to participate. An effective system would incorporate an integrated operational plan; timely and appropriate communication; operational cooperation; and accountability that would extend to all layers in the process. The Panel is of the opinion that airports of all sizes (and indeed all organizations involved in aviation security) should implement rigorous security awareness programs for all personnel working at the airport (essentially, airport-wide “Neighbourhood Watch” programs). These should be active programs, guided by airport security committees, which would allow the regular exchange of relevant intelligence information with front-line staff. The assessment of threats in such an environment would be proactive and methodical. The Panel was impressed by the iWatch Airport Security Action Program at Halifax International Airport, and notes that airports in several other Canadian cities, including Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver, have instituted similar airport watch programs. Security is indeed everyone’s business.

Recommendation 2.3

Airports of all sizes should implement rigorous security awareness programs (a type of airport security watch program) for all personnel working at the airport.

2.7.2 Airport Security Advisory Group

ICAO’s Annex 17 requires contracting states to “establish a national aviation security committee or similar arrangements for the purpose of coordinating security activities….” ^{[ 39 ]} Transport Canada, as the national aviation security authority, serves the similar purpose of coordinating the national aviation security activities of the various entities involved. The Advisory Group on Aviation Security (AGAS), established by Transport Canada in 2005, plays an important consultative role at the national level. AGAS brings together government and aviation industry participants to exchange views on issues related to aviation security policy, strategy, regulatory and program priorities. ^{[ 40 ]}

As outlined earlier, at the airport level, the responsibility for aviation security is divided among several organizations. The primary organizations are the airport operator, Transport Canada, air carriers, CATSA and the police of local jurisdiction. At the eight active designated Class 1 airports that have heightened security requirements, there is also a greater presence of RCMP officers dealing with non-aviation security matters. In addition, CSIS has offices on site at some international airports.

Under the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations, airports are required to have a security committee; however, existing committees vary in size, level of representation and effectiveness. The Panel concluded that a consistent approach is needed to ensure the systematic sharing of information and to provide a solid foundation for establishing common goals and procedures for the prevention of and response to aviation security incidents.

Our objective is to ensure that all those concerned with security in its widest sense have a good understanding of how they fit into the airport security regime and their role as part of the team. The importance of communication and information-sharing cannot be overstated.

The Panel is therefore recommending that an Airport Security Advisory Group be established at each designated airport. This advisory committee would be chaired by the airport security manager or equivalent and would have representation from Transport Canada, CATSA, the local police force, CBSA, the air carriers, major ground handlers and airport tenants as a minimum. At Class 2 and Class Other airports, the group could consist of fewer members. The advisory group would be responsible for coordinating and consulting on the development and implementation of the airport’s security plan, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

The Airport Security Advisory Group would also coordinate regular security operations and would plan and coordinate the airport security watch program. It would be expected to meet quarterly as a minimum, but more frequently if the situation demanded.

Recommendation 2.4

We recommend that each designated airport establish an Airport Security Advisory Group, to coordinate and consult on the development and implementation of the airport’s security plan, to resolve general security issues, to promote security awareness and to encourage a collaborative approach to security issues.

2.7.3 Airport Security Committee

The Australian and U.K. governments, on the advice of the Right Honourable Sir John Wheeler, ^{[ 41 ]} directed the establishment of a dedicated joint airport intelligence group at each major airport (equivalent to the Canadian Class 1 airports). The Airport Security Advisory Group recommended above would not have the ability to share secret and sensitive information because of its size and composition. In the Canadian context, it is therefore proposed that a high-level Airport Security Committee be established at each Class 1 airport (and some Class 2 airports, based on a risk assessment). The committee would comprise representatives of the key security and policing organizations and intelligence users in each airport (including Transport Canada, CATSA, local police, CBSA and, where present, the RCMP and CSIS). The airport’s Chief Executive Officer or most senior security or operations official would chair the committee and each member would be security-cleared to allow for the sharing of classified information.

The Airport Security Committee would, among other things, facilitate better sharing of security/policing issues and intelligence information among the key airport security players, assessment of security threats and risks, and dissemination of appropriate information to front-line personnel. The Committee would also lead emergency response to security incidents at the airport. Smaller and more focused than the Airport Security Advisory Group, the Airport Security Committee would be responsible for gathering, interpreting, managing and disseminating to front-line personnel any important intelligence information relating to policing activities and security at each airport. This committee would be expected to have regular briefings and meetings.

A key role of the Airport Security Committee would be to coordinate the development and implementation of a Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA) for the airport, based on the U.K. approach. The MATRA system is designed to produce an accurate assessment of the threats to individual airports from crime and terrorism; to identify any gaps and overlap in existing security regimes; and to develop plans for the management of risks. The aim is to arrive at a security plan which is jointly owned and which can be routinely revisited to take into account future developments. ^{[ 42 ]} The airport and CATSA would develop their security plans based on such MATRAs.

It should be mentioned here that there is also general concern about criminal activity at the major Canadian airports which, in the Panel’s view, requires vigilance from a threat and risk perspective. In Canada, the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has drawn attention, for a number of years, to the problem of inadequate criminal checks on airport employees and the possible infiltration of organized crime into airports. ^{[ 43 ]} In Australia, Wheeler noted: “Terrorism and crime are distinct, but potentially overlap. At its most basic, a culture of lax security or petty criminality can provide opportunities for terrorists to exploit weaknesses in airport security.” ^{[ 44 ]} The Airport Security Committee would provide a forum where a coordinated effort could help address this issue.

Recommendation 2.5

We recommend that an Airport Security Committee be created at each Class 1 airport to facilitate the sharing of intelligence information and to coordinate the development of airport-specific threat and risk assessments.

2.8 Gaps and Vulnerabilities in the Aviation Security System

Among the most important matters to come to our attention during this review were indications of gaps and vulnerabilities that exist in our aviation security system. While many of the risks associated with civil aviation have been reduced to generally acceptable levels, security gaps still remain, making certain points in the overall system more vulnerable to attack.

[1] Budget 2006, May 2, 2006.

[2] Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (April 2004).

[3] Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Chicago Convention”), Annex 17, Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference, Eighth Edition (April 2006).

[4] Annex 17 - Eighth Edition (April 2006) 2.1.2.

[5] Ibid., 3.1.3.

[6] Ibid., 3.1.5.

[7] Ibid., 3.2.

[8] Annex 14 – Aerodromes, Chapter 9.

[9] Annex 17 – Eighth Edition (April 2006) 4.4; 4.5.

[10] Ibid., 4.5.3; 4.5.5.

^[11] Ibid., 3.4.

^[12] Ibid., 4.6.1.

^[13] Ibid., 4.2.

^[14] Ibid., 4.3.1.

^[15] Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part 1; Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft.

^[16] Annex 9 – Facilitation.

^[17] Annex 14 – Aerodromes, 9.10 & 9.11

^[18] For example: Canadian Aviation Security Regulations (SOR/2000-111); Designated Provisions Regulations (SOR/2000-112; Airport Restricted Area Access Clearance Security Measures; Transportation Security Clearance (TSC) Program; Aerodrome Security Measures; Security Screening Order; other Orders and Interim Orders (as provided, inter alia, in the Public Safety Act, 2002 (S.C. 2004, c. 15));
Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Certificate Regulations (SOR/2004-130); CATSA Aerodrome Designation Regulations (SOR/2002-180).

^[19] Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada 2005: Annual Report.

^[20] Annex 17 – Eighth Edition (April 2006) 2.4.1.

^[21] The Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration: 30-point Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border, December 2001.

^[22] Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, Security Agenda, March 23, 2005.

^[23] Ibid.

^[24] CSIS, the RCMP, and members of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC).

^[25] CATSA’s Story: Submission to the Advisory Panel on the CATSA Act Review, CATSA: Our Vision for Aviation Security (SL-811/e-06), page 6.

^[26] Certain unaccompanied bags may be allowed on flights if they are identified as such and subjected to additional screening (Annex 17, 4.5.3).

^[27] ITAC partners include: CSIS, RCMP, National Defence, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), CBSA, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), the Privy Council Office, Transport Canada, the Financial Transaction and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Correctional Services Canada, the Ontario Provincial Police and the Sûreté du Quebec.

^[28] http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/travel/programs-e.html

^[29] Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Canadian Security and Military Preparedness, Fifth Report (February 2002), Recommendation #13; Canadian Security Guide Book, Third Report (December 2004), pages 165-166. See also ‘The holes that remain in our airline security,’ The Globe & Mail, August 12, 2006.

^[30] It is not unusual to find that while government has the legal capacity to take strong security measures, it may in practice be constrained by cultural and ethical considerations, or may lack the political resources to take action. For instance, sophisticated new screening equipment that produces a ‘nude’ image of passengers undoubtedly offers the promise of better security. But concerns over the invasion of privacy and expectations of public resistance have dampened official interest in purchasing such equipment.

 ^[31] Annex 17, Eighth Edition (April 2006) 2.2.2.

^[32] April 2005 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, National Security in Canada—The 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative — Air Transportation Security, Marine Security, and Emergency Preparedness.

^[33] We note with approval that Transport Canada has conducted at least one exercise in which aviation threats were assessed according to risk, measured quantitatively and ranked. We also note that this has yet to occasion further exercises along these lines.

^[34] CATSA defines SeMS as “a systematic approach to setting annual security targets, clarifying security roles and responsibilities in an organization, assessing and managing risks, developing contingency plans, conducting audits, and measuring and evaluating performance on an ongoing basis.”(2005 Annual Report).

^[35] Transport Canada refers to SMS as “a systematic, explicit and comprehensive process for managing safety risks,” providing for “goal-setting, planning and measuring performance.” (Transport Canada, Safety Management Systems (TP 13739)).

^[36] The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Fifth Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports (January 2003); Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Canadian Security Guide Book, 2005 Edition: An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions (December 2004).

^[37] The new Ben Gurion terminal is only two years old. Israeli authorities were able to insist that security considerations be ‘designed-in’ at every step of the planning and construction. The result is an extremely impressive security architecture. Comparability in Canada would require redesign and reconstruction of all major airports.

^[38] Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S., 1985, C-23, s. 2.

^[39] Annex 17 – Eighth Edition (April 2006) 3.1.5.

^[40] The AGAS mandate is to “provide stakeholders information on current and emerging aviation security policy, regulatory and program priorities and initiatives,” and to “receive high-level strategic advice from stakeholders related to aviation security policy, regulatory and program priorities.” Chaired by the Director General of Transport Canada SEP, AGAS includes senior representatives from Transport Canada, representatives from the Canadian aviation industry, CATSA, aviation labour groups and federal government departments and agencies.

^[41] Rt. Hon. Sir John Wheeler DL, An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australia, September 2005.

^[42] Ibid., page 124

^[43] Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Canadian Security Guide Book 2005 Edition, 145-7.

^[44] Wheeler, op.cit., page ix

^[45] We heard that in some smaller airports, CATSA has permitted its idle equipment to be used for screening some cargo at the request of the carriers. However reasonable, this is not according to policy, and does not take place at the larger airports.

^[46] Economic Analysis Unit, Transport Canada.

^[47] Federal Register (May 26, 2006). Part II, Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration, 49 CFR Parts 1520, 2540, 1542, et al., Air Cargo Security Requirements: Final Rule.

^[48] A recent article in the Globe and Mail (August 15, 2006) noted that about 25 per cent of all U.S. air cargo is transported by U.S. passenger aircraft.

^[49] http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/import/advance/menu-e.html

^[50] Budget 2006, Chapter 3 – Enhancing Cargo Security and Expediting Processing at the Border.

^[51] Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Fifth Report: The Myth of Security at Canada’s Airports (January 2003); Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Canadian Security Guide Book, 2005 Edition: An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions (December 2004).

^[52] Journal de Montréal reporting of September 10-11, 2006.

Back