3. CATSA'S Mandate
3.1 Screening
3.1.1 Pre-board screening (PBS)
3.1.2 Hold bag screening (HBS)
3.1.3 Non-passenger screening (NPS)
3.1.4 Other screening functions
3.2 Funding Role
3.2.1 The Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program (CACPP)
3.2.2 Airport police funding
3.3 The Restricted Area Identification Card (RAIC)
3.4 Additional Functions Assigned by the Minister
3.5 Criteria for CATSA'S Mandate
3. CATSA'S Mandate
The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) Act [ 1 ] and its links to the
Aeronautics Act provide CATSA’s fundamental mandate. Its current mandate consists of both statutory provisions – related to
screening and to funding management – and specific functions assigned separately by the Minister.
The statutory screening mandates are to provide screening of passengers and their on-board and checked baggage, known as pre-board screening (PBS) and hold bag screening (HBS). CATSA’s funding mandates are to manage funding for the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program (CACPP), and certain costs related to police response at airports.
The Minister assigned two further functions to CATSA in November 2002: the responsibility for developing and implementing “an enhanced restricted area pass system" – referred to as the Restricted Area Identification Card (RAIC) – and “a system for the random screening of non-passengers accessing airport restricted areas, along with items carried,” which is referred to as non-passenger screening (NPS), both functions “at the 29 major Canadian airports,” that is, the Class 1 and 2 airports only. [ 2 ]
It is clear from the analysis of both the CATSA and Aeronautics Acts that, as it is currently established, CATSA is a security screening organization and not a policing organization. CATSA executes screening functions to implement national transportation security policies according to security regulations, security measures and orders issued by the Minister.
Taken together, CATSA’s current mandate has six elements – three related to screening, two to funding policing programs and one involving the special project for the restricted area card. The Panel’s recommendations with respect to each element are discussed below. The manner in which CATSA’s screening services are delivered is the subject of Chapter 5.
3.1 Screening
CATSA’s statutory screening responsibilities to provide screening of passengers and their on-board and checked baggage (PBS and HBS) are set out in the
CATSA Act as follows:
6 (1) The mandate of the Authority is to take actions … for the effective and efficient screening of persons who access aircraft or restricted areas through screening points, the property in their possession or control and the belongings or baggage that they give to an air carrier for transport. Restricted areas are those established under the
Aeronautics Act at an aerodrome designated by the regulations or at any other place that the Minister may designate.
CATSA is an “Agent of Her Majesty in right of Canada” (s. #5.2), and performs a “governmental function” (s. 6.3). Definitions are provided in the
Act for key terms:
“Screening” means screening, including a search, performed in the manner and under the circumstances prescribed in aviation security regulations, security measures, emergency directions or interim orders made under the Aeronautics Act.
“Screening point” means a point where screening is delivered, either directly or through a screening contractor, by the Authority or by an authorized aerodrome operator acting on behalf of the Authority, in order to meet the requirements of aviation security regulations, security measures, emergency directions or interim orders made under the
Aeronautics Act.
3.1.1 Pre-board screening (PBS)
The CATSA Act provides the mandate for CATSA to screen persons and their carry-on items at screening points, as required under ICAO Annex 17, [ 3 ] and the manner in which this screening is to be performed is set out in aviation security regulations, security measures, emergency directions or interim orders made under the
Aeronautics Act. [ 4 ] That is, the CATSA Act sets out CATSA’s responsibilities in broad terms, and the regulatory framework defines and focuses how these responsibilities shall be carried out. Currently, the regulatory instruments provide CATSA with authority to search only for prohibited items that might cause a threat to aviation security on persons, or inside their carry-on baggage. [ 5 ]
At the 89 designated Canadian airports, screening points for PBS are set up as outlined in illustration 3.1
3.1 Multi-stage process for pre-board screening
All departing passengers are required to be screened before they may enter the airport departure lounge. They are first greeted by a screening officer who checks that they have a boarding pass, and they must then place their carry-on items, outer clothing and any objects in their pockets on a roller-belt for scanning. They then pass through a walk-through metal detector archway (WTMD in illustration 3.1). A screening officer will search them with a hand-held metal detector (HHMD) if the walk-through detector sounds an alarm or if they are selected at random. Depending on the results, a passenger may be further physically searched at the screening point or, if he or she prefers, in an enclosed private area. All carry-on possessions are initially screened through X-ray equipment. Again, items (including electronic articles) will be further searched if the screening officer observes a possible suspect item, or if it is selected at random. Further searching may be performed through physically opening the carry-on luggage, or with explosives-detecting trace equipment (EDT), often in the form of swabs that can pick up traces of dangerous chemicals. If a screening officer suspects that an item dangerous to aviation has been detected at any stage, he or she will call for emergency response. In some airports, doors or barriers are installed at screening points that can be closed automatically when an alarm is
triggered to isolate a zone where a security breach may have occurred and to prevent passengers who have not been cleared from leaving the area. Pre-board screening is a fundamental component of overall aviation security, and the current mandate should be retained by CATSA.
The current regulatory framework does not allow CATSA to screen individuals on the basis of behaviour or identity, though the
CATSA Act is broad enough for CATSA to be given this role if required in the future. In jurisdictions such as the United States and some European countries, the PBS functions may include screening of people in other ways – by checking boarding cards and other flight documents, and by identifying atypical behaviour patterns. Some stakeholders commented that new technologies for issuing boarding passes via the Internet or from automated self-serve kiosks might increase the risk of dangerous persons accessing restricted areas and aircraft. Others have suggested that confirmation of boarding passes or air travel documents should be integrated with other functions under CATSA’s mandate, to ensure that it takes place before passengers enter the departure area. This role is now conducted by air carrier personnel at baggage check-in (if the passenger checks a bag) and at the departure gate. [ 6 ]
Considering the views submitted to us, as well as potential infringement of individual rights guaranteed by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the level of resources available, and space requirements at airports, the Panel has reservations concerning the introduction of behavioural analysis as a method of screening at this time. We are aware that this technique is being adopted in some other countries, and may be viable in Canada in the future; we discuss this issue further in Chapter 8. Adding confirmation of boarding passes or passenger identity to CATSA’s pre-board screening responsibilities might become necessary in the future, but would require more resources (more personnel and equipment) and, to be conducted effectively, new training programs for screening officers. Introduction of analysis of atypical behaviour, or further checking of documents or identity, would be policy decisions requiring consultation with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada.
3.1.2 Hold bag screening (HBS)
Screening of checked baggage using explosives-detecting equipment, as required under ICAO Annex 17, [ 7 ] has been in place for scheduled flights departing from all of Canada’s designated airports since January 1, 2006. At the time of the Panel’s Review, regulations covering HBS operations have not yet been finalized and brought into effect, so CATSA is delivering its HBS responsibilities, in part, under an exemption to the regulatory framework of
the Aeronautics Act, as described more fully in Chapter 4.
Transport Canada specified various configurations of equipment and screening processes for HBS, depending upon the volume of checked baggage passing through the airport and the space limitations in which the equipment was deployed. In some cases equipment is in full view of passengers, while in other cases it is behind or below the check-in area out of sight. CATSA and airport authorities had to enter into agreements within a very tight timeframe to install appropriate HBS screening equipment, in order to ensure that 100 per cent of checked baggage could be screened effectively in each of the 89 designated airports by January 1, 2006.
3.2 Multi-level process for hold bag screening
The implementation of HBS has made the processing of checked baggage more complex. The roles and responsibilities of the various participants are no less complex. Luggage becomes the air carrier’s responsibility after it is accepted from the passenger at check-in. It is then processed through the airport’s baggage handling system to CATSA’s HBS, which has up to five levels of in-line equipment and screening officers who review X-ray images from explosives-detection equipment and make decisions about possible suspicious bags (as shown in illustration 3.2). If a suspicious item in a piece of luggage cannot be resolved, the bag is removed from the baggage handling system to be opened and hand-checked. In Canada, the passenger must be paged and brought to a private room to witness the search. [ 8 ] If a screening officer suspects that an item dangerous to aviation has been detected at any stage, he or she must call for emergency response. Once cleared at any stage in the system, a piece of luggage continues on the airport’s baggage handling system to be delivered to the baggage make-up area where the baggage handlers record the check-in number of each piece, sort it according to the flight for which it is intended, and transfer the luggage to the aircraft. Air carriers must reconcile baggage and passenger information to ensure that no bag is placed on the aircraft if the passenger does not board. Baggage reconciliation can be done manually, or through an automated system that links directly to the air carrier’s departure control system.
HBS is and will remain a very important component of aviation security. This mandate is and should remain a core component of CATSA’s mandate.
3.1.3 Non-passenger screening (NPS)
CATSA is also mandated to screen non-passengers entering restricted areas. Non-passengers are employees of airports, of airlines, of CATSA, of Canadian government agencies, of retailers and restaurants, or of service providers under contract to any of these. Although CATSA has the
screening responsibility, airport operators are responsible for
controlling access to the restricted area, and issue Restricted Area Passes (RAPs) to airport workers. All such personnel, whether they are mainly based at a specific airport, or are air crew or maintenance personnel who travel from one airport to another and must pass through the restricted area, are required under the
Aeronautics Act and related regulations, measures and orders, to hold a Restricted Area Pass, which cannot be granted without valid transportation security clearance issued by Transport Canada. In some circumstances, new or short-term employees may work inside the restricted area before their security clearance has been processed and RAP issued, in which case they are given a temporary pass and must be escorted at all times by a RAP holder. However, under current regulations, a screening officer may not perform CATSA screening functions with a temporary pass, and must wait until his or her RAP is issued.
Current aviation security regulations require CATSA to screen non-passengers and their possessions on a random basis. They may be processed at temporary or permanent locations at entry points to restricted areas. Various configurations are used, including walk-through and hand-held metal detectors for workers, as at pre-board screening points, and bags and tools may be checked with X-ray and/or explosives-detection trace equipment. Secondary searches may be used to check possible suspect items. A non-passenger who refuses to be searched is denied entry to the restricted area. At present, vehicles are not searched
by CATSA screening officers when entering a restricted area through any access point.
As at any screening point, if a screening officer suspects that an item dangerous to aviation has been detected at any stage, he or she must immediately call for emergency response. In some airports, doors or barriers are installed at permanent screening points that can be closed automatically when an alarm is
triggered to isolate a zone where a security breach may have occurred.
In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, all non-passengers at major airports must submit to screening whenever they enter a restricted area. Vehicles entering the restricted area are also screened. Some other countries, including the United States, are considering extending their current partial non-passenger screening function at large airports to screen all non-passengers. We have described in Chapter 2 how non-passenger and vehicle screening should be used together with much more rigorous access control at Canada’s major airports and, in particular, how it should be extended to the outer boundaries of Class 1 airports. On the other hand smaller airports, including some Class 2s where non-passenger workers are generally well known to each other, should rely on active security awareness, rather than non-passenger screening, to achieve the same level of security.
This part of CATSA’s mandate is of the greatest importance as part of the multi-layered approach to air transportation security, and should be retained and expanded.
3.1.4 Other screening functions
We have outlined in Chapter 2 several areas that we consider to be gaps in the present framework for aviation security, some of which require screening solutions.
Screening of cargo is not currently part of CATSA’s mandate, and many industry stakeholders see cargo as a major gap within the air transportation security system, especially cargo carried on passenger flights. Transport Canada is considering how best to address cargo security, and funding was announced for this project in Budget 2006. [ 9 ] In the Panel’s view, CATSA should be the organization to conduct screening-related operations as required under any new program.
Transport Canada is also considering how best to establish security screening for passengers and their belongings at fixed base charter and general aviation operations away from air terminal buildings. Again, in our view, CATSA is the appropriate organization to conduct and/or manage any third-party screening that may be required.
Recommendation 3.1
CATSA should retain its current screening mandates in the broadest sense of screening, that is, screening of people and things, and CATSA should be considered as the first option for all future aviation screening functions.
Recommendation 3.2
(a) In Class 1 airports, CATSA should be continuously present at all entry points to the restricted areas of the airport to perform non-passenger screening on a random basis.
(b) Non-passenger screening should be extended to include searches of vehicles entering restricted areas in Class 1 airports, and should be performed by CATSA, or under CATSA’s oversight using CATSA’s standards and procedures.
(c) Non-passenger screening should be discontinued in Class 2 airports once the RAIC, with biometric identifiers, is in place; CATSA should be prepared to implement NPS on an as-needed basis in Class 2 and Class Other airports, when threat analysis indicates a need.
3.2 Funding Role
3.2.1 The Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program (CACPP)
The CATSA Act gives CATSA responsibility for working with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to provide on-board security services under the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program:
28 (2) The Authority may enter into agreements with Her Majesty represented by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness or by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for the provision of services, including services on aircraft, and may make payments in respect of those services.
The RCMP provides specialized Aircraft Protective Officers (APOs, sometimes called air marshals) on all aircraft destined for Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, as well as on other selected Canadian commercial aircraft. Agreements have been concluded between CATSA and the RCMP and between CATSA, the RCMP and Transport Canada to fund the CACPP. According to those agreements, CATSA has no authority to direct or plan this program.
CATSA receives dedicated appropriations for the CACPP, and has the sole authority to authorize reviews of the expenditure of these funds. Reviews of the program are carried out periodically by an expert consultant. The arrangement is satisfactory so far as it goes, but CATSA’s role in the process is relatively limited. A separate audit of the CACPP by the Auditor General, or by an external auditor, could serve as well or better than the present arrangement.
We note that the RCMP officials in charge of the CACPP program are satisfied with the current arrangements. Air carriers complain about the lost revenue and the problems involved with displacing passengers when seats are required for APOs, but otherwise recognize that armed on-board security officers are required for certain flights, as the CACPP provides. Since value added by CATSA to the substance of the program appears to be limited, and it does not fit well with the rest of CATSA’s mandate, the Panel considers that it would be preferable for the government to provide funding directly to the RCMP, or for funding of the CACPP to be managed through Transport Canada. We would suggest that if an alternative funding arrangement is adopted, any monies intended for the CACPP should be designated exclusively to that program.
Recommendation 3.3
(a) CATSA’s mandate should be amended to remove responsibility for managing funding for the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program. In the future, funding for the CACPP should be provided via appropriations directly to the RCMP or through Transport Canada.
(b) An independent external audit of the CACPP should be conducted regularly by the Auditor General of Canada or an independent auditor, on a confidential basis.
3.2.2 Airport police funding
Transport Canada regulates the Class 1 airport authorities to have protective policing and security arrangements covering four key areas: armed presence at U.S. pre-clearance inspection and at the departure gates for flights bound for Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport; response to Canada Border Services inspection points; response to alarms at airport pre-board screening points; and response to suspect bags at hold bag screening. There has been a significant increase in the number of law enforcement officers required to respond to alarms and threats at airports in the context of heightened security levels and awareness since September 2001. While no additional requirements were imposed under aviation security regulations, the sheer number of responses resulted in a significant increase in workload and resources.
Because of these workload increases, the federal government decided to contribute to the cost of aviation security-related policing, that is, to provide part of the cost of the increased policing services. The
CATSA Act gives CATSA the responsibility for managing the government’s airport policing contributions:
29 The Authority may, with the approval of the Treasury Board, enter into agreements with the operator of any aerodrome designated by regulation for the purposes of contributing to the costs of policing incurred by that operator in carrying out their responsibilities.
CATSA’s appropriations include the budget for this program.
The Panel has examined CATSA’s role in this program. Transport Canada regulations require the airports to have the policing arrangements, and the airport operators enter into agreements with the police of local jurisdiction to provide the service. CATSA’s role is limited to providing funding to the airports to help pay for these services, based on arrangements specified by Transport Canada. Because CATSA has neither a policing nor a regulatory mandate, the Panel considers that there is little CATSA can add to airport policing through funding. Furthermore, since this program is not directly related to screening, CATSA’s focus could be diverted from its core mandate. We did hear that this role has contributed to creating good relationships between CATSA and the local police forces. The Panel is convinced that these good relationships can be maintained by working together as integral components of the overall aviation security system.
Since the federal government has imposed the airport policing requirements to meet federal aviation security standards, it should bear responsibility for how these requirements are funded. During our discussions with airports, we heard several comments concerning the insufficiency of the funding, the apparent inconsistency in the funding provided to one airport rather than another, and the lack of transparency of the funding formula. Some larger airports feel that they should receive a larger share of the available funds to offset the extra costs associated with being a higher threat level. Others feel the allocation does not adequately cover all policing activities that respond to aviation security needs at reasonable costs, such as provincially authorized special constables or explosive-sniffing dogs. Still others claimed they were unaware of how the funds were allocated.
In our view, the federal funding for airport policing needs to be rationalized. The allocation of funds to the airports must be based on sound and transparent criteria, which should be established so that they do not deter airports from making cost-effective decisions in carrying out their policing requirements. On the other hand, airports should be free to make decisions to increase the level of service beyond the basic requirements that are funded automatically.
At airports which receive funding, the service is provided by the police force of local jurisdiction (at Vancouver, Edmonton, Halifax and Kelowna, this is the RCMP). The Panel observed a wide variation in how policing services are delivered, partly because several different organizations provide the service. In particular, we noted differences in aspects of emergency response, including evacuation procedures, and standard protocols for response to PBS and HBS alarms. For example, we heard at one international airport that if the local police are called to respond to a suspect bag at Level 5, the entire terminal building is evacuated, while at other airports different intermediate procedures are in place, including examination of the bag by a sniffer dog, or moving the bag to a compression chamber in an isolated area.
The Panel recognizes that airports present a wide variety of situations in terms of traffic volume, architectural design and levels of risk. We are also aware that airport operators have the responsibility and authority to arrange for policing services according to their specific requirements, as long as they meet the minimum standards of the regulatory framework. While this flexibility to adjust to local conditions is important and should be maintained, we consider that there would be a benefit to having common standards for the delivery of the regulated requirements, particularly for PBS and HBS response.
Recommendation 3.4
(a) Responsibility for the airport policing contribution program should be transferred to Transport Canada.
(b) Transport Canada should review the existing standards for police response to all types of screening points to rationalize the program, and should fund all reasonable costs associated with meeting the new standards.
3.3 The Restricted Area Identification Card (RAIC)
In November 2002, the Minister assigned the responsibility to CATSA to develop and implement enhancements to the existing Restricted Area Pass (RAP) system, incorporating biometric identifiers by way of a new Restricted Area Identification Card (RAIC) program. The new program is to be implemented at the 29 Class 1 and 2 airports in Canada, and will eventually allow for validation of a RAIC-holder’s identity at any of the participating airports – that is, it will have multi-airport capabilities. RAICs will be issued by individual airport operators, as is now the case for RAPs. As currently planned under the program, they will only be valid and usable once they are activated by CATSA, which will operate a Canada-wide near real-time updated identity verification system that includes confirmation of security clearance from Transport Canada. A card would, conversely, be de-activated if CATSA is notified of a restricted area violation, or security-clearance infraction, again in near-real time, and the card would no longer function.
A valid RAIC can be used by the holder to confirm credentials while entering the restricted area of an airport, by inserting that card into a reader and providing the biometric called for – an iris or fingerprint scan. Individual airport operators may also choose to include an access key on RAICs issued for use at their airport, in which case the RAIC card reader will be linked to an access point that is opened if the holder’s identity and permission to enter are confirmed. Such an entry point can be monitored by airport personnel present during service hours, or by automatic double barriers that isolate the RAIC-holder while the confirmation is in progress – sometimes known as “man-trap” doors. In any event, whether access points are supervised by staff, or controlled mechanically, RAIC-holders will also be subject to non-passenger screening by CATSA screening officers. As we recommended in section 3.1.3, in Canada’s eight active Class 1 airports, screening should be performed wherever non-passengers enter restricted areas. On the other hand, once the RAIC is fully operational and automatic isolating barriers are in place, non-passenger screening could be discontinued in Class 2 airports. However, CATSA should be prepared to implement NPS on an as-needed basis in Class 2 and Class Other airports, when threat analysis indicates a need.
It is also possible to incorporate access keys to multiple airports on a single RAIC for use, for example, by air crew who must pass through restricted areas of more than one airport to perform their duties. The Panel heard from representatives of air crew about the importance to them of easy, fast and reliable access. We also heard concerns from airport operators about their responsibilities for rigorous access control of restricted areas. We are convinced that the RAIC system, when fully implemented, can provide the necessary confidence and speed to confirm identities across Canada, and could therefore be the basis for an effective pass for access to several or all airports in Canada. The Panel encourages stakeholders to continue working together to implement a multiple airport access system in conjunction with RAIC. Transport Canada should take the lead to ensure that this happens.
Amendments to the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations to govern the implementation and operation of the RAIC system are in the process of consultation, but are not yet finalized. The system is now implemented in some Canadian airports on a trial basis, but uncertainties about start-up and longer-term costs, and about the regulatory framework, have delayed implementation of RAIC in many of the 29 airports.
The Panel considers that when completely implemented, RAIC should become a responsibility of Transport Canada. It will be part of an integrated national system that can confirm identity and security clearance, which is suitable for a multimodal transportation approach. Transport Canada is already responsible for issuing security clearances for people requiring access to restricted areas at airports, and is developing a policy for port workers. Because of the multi-airport aspects of the program, it is most appropriate for a federal agency to activate, track and de-activate cards via the national identification system for individual workers as set out in the regulations (when finalized), and to maintain the system across the country; in our view, this agency should be Transport Canada. We also consider that RAIC should be implemented in all designated airports across Canada, not just the 29 major ones. Holders of RAICs would continue to be subject to random non-passenger screening under CATSA’s mandate, with the changes recommended by the Panel.
Recommendation 3.5
(a) CATSA should complete the installation of the Restricted Area
Identification Card system on a priority basis; to facilitate this, Transport Canada must complete the regulatory framework for RAIC as soon as possible.
(b) Once CATSA has completed implementation of the Restricted Area
Identification Card, the RAIC national identity verification system should be operated and maintained by Transport Canada.
(c) The multiple-airport access system should be implemented in conjunction with RAIC as quickly as possible.
(d) RAIC should be expanded to all 89 designated airports.
3.4 Additional Functions Assigned by the Minister
The Minister may add other specific functions to CATSA’s mandate:
6 (2) The Authority … is also responsible for air transport security functions that the Minister may assign to it, subject to any terms and conditions that the Minister may establish.
This provision has already been used, as described above, to add responsibilities for non-passenger screening, and for developing and implementing the Restricted Area Identification Card, to CATSA’s mandate. Threats to aviation security can evolve suddenly and unexpectedly. The need to screen for particular purposes or to perform additional functions in relation to aviation security may be identified by the Minister to address new policy objectives in response to such threats. It is only prudent that the Minister should have the power to assign CATSA specific new responsibilities. Therefore the CATSA Act should retain the option for the Minister of Transport to assign new functions to CATSA, and to specify any associated terms and conditions.
3.5 Criteria for CATSA's Mandate
Another aspect of CATSA’s mandate is how it must be exercised. According to the
CATSA Act, CATSA must:
ensure “effective and efficient screening” (6.1);
ensure “consistency in the delivery of screening across Canada and for any other air transport security function” (6.2);
carry out “its responsibilities under this section in the public interest, having due regard to the interest of the travelling public” (6.3); and
perform screening in conformity with security regulations, security measures and orders (2 – “screening”).
Other criteria, duties and authorities are further defined for the conduct of these principal mandates. These will be discussed in Chapter 5, on delivery of screening services. Performance management and measurement for all these criteria will also be discussed in Chapter 5.
It is well established that the term effective means attaining the given objective(s). For CATSA, achieving security is the primary objective, and the criterion of effectiveness should remain in the
Act. In the French version of the Act effective is specified as efficace, which
is an appropriate expression.
It is also well established that efficient means the relationship of the level of resources applied to activities, outputs and results. It can be expressed in quantitative or qualitative terms, and addresses, for example, value-for-money concerns. The Panel heard many comments about whether both “effectiveness” and “efficiency” are given equal consideration in the context of CATSA’s and Transport Canada’s responsibilities. We note that the use of a single term in French may produce confusion since efficace is used to refer to both “effective” and “efficient.” It may also lead to overlooking value-for-money issues. The French version of the
Act should therefore be amended to provide a separate term equivalent to “efficient.” The criterion of efficiency should remain in the
Act, to retain an appropriate focus on achieving value for money in CATSA’s operations.
The Panel also heard varying interpretations of the term consistency in relation to delivery of screening. It could mean the “same,” “uniform,” “constant,” “in compliance with,” “according to rules,” “predictable” or “logical.” Some saw it as applying to customer service, while others limited its reach to security. The Panel considers that the current reading of consistency in the CATSA Act may be misleading, and open to different and possibly conflicting interpretations. But the purpose of the concept in terms of aviation security is obvious:
security should be at the same level across Canada. It need not be performed identically in every location because of differing local conditions and variations in the threat environment. Indeed, if screening were carried out in too uniform a manner at all times, it would be easier for a would-be intruder to find a way to break in. An element of unpredictability must be built into the aviation security system. There is a need for some operational flexibility in order to properly manage both threat assessment and value-for-money decisions. For instance, not all Canadian airports are, or should be, subject to the same specific security procedures at all times. As will be discussed in Chapters 4, on the regulatory framework, and 5, on service delivery, we found that the regulatory framework sometimes seeks consistency as an objective at the expense of efficiency, especially in small airports.
The Panel considers that “consistency” refers to a general level of security across Canada, which is clear from the overall purpose of the
Act. In fact, the French version of the provision uses the term “niveau de contrôle,” or “level of screening” in s. 6(2). There is no need to include the concept of consistency expressly within the CATSA Act, and therefore this criterion should be removed.
The public interest criterion refers to the concerns of the general population, which may encompass a wide variety of issues: preventing aircraft from falling on cities, killing citizens and destroying buildings and public facilities; securing aircraft that may transport hazardous materials; and supporting the sovereignty of Canada, whose government should not be intimidated by terrorists threatening the lives of its citizens. The criterion of public interest should remain in the
Act.
The interest of the travelling public is primarily to fly safely and feel secure while travelling. It is also to enjoy a reasonably pleasant travel experience that meets expectations, such as departing on time, being treated courteously, not standing in lines for long periods, not losing one’s luggage, etc. This criterion should remain in the
Act.
Recommendation 3.6
(a) The text of the CATSA Act should be amended to remove the consistency criterion.
(b) The text of the French version of the CATSA Act should be amended to add a separate term equivalent to efficient in section 6 (1).
Chapter Three: Footnotes
[1] S.C. 2002 c. 9.
[2] Letter from the Minister of Transport to Mr. Brian Flemming, Chair of CATSA, November 8, 2002.
[3] Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Chicago Convention”), Annex 17, Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference, as amended December 2001 (Amendment 10), section 4.4.
[4] Including any exemptions to this regulatory framework, as described in more detail in Chapter 4.
[5] Screening officers are searching for weapons, improvised explosive devices, incendiaries and dangerous articles that could be used to commit an act of unlawful interference related to civil aviation.
[6] Screening officers ask for and hold boarding passes at pre-board screening points only when a passenger’s carry-on item is undergoing secondary searching, to reduce the likelihood of the passenger leaving the screening point before the item has been cleared as safe. The screening officer does not verify any personal or flight-related information on the pass.
[7] Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Chicago Convention”), Annex 17, Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference, as amended December 2001 (Amendment 10), section 4.5.
[8] Usually remotely, via closed-circuit video link.
[9] Budget 2006, Chapter 3 – Enhancing Cargo Security and Expediting Processing at the Border, May 2006.
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