Appendix A
List of Recommendations
 Chapter One: Reviewing Canadian Aviation Security
No recommendations.
Chapter Two: Protecting Canadian Air Travellers
Chapter Three: CATSA'S Mandate
Chapter Four: Regulatory Framework
Chapter Five: Delivery of Screening Services
Chapter Six: Governance and Accountability
Chapter Seven: Future Aviation Security Implications
Chapter Eight: Other Observations
No recommendations
Chapter One: Reviewing Canadian Aviation Security
No recommendations
Chapter Two: Protecting Canadian Air Travellers
Chapter Two: Protecting Canadian Air Travellers
Recommendation 2.1
We recommend that responsibility for aviation security remain with the Minister of Transport.
Recommendation 2.2
Transport Canada should ensure that CATSA continues to receive all the information and intelligence it requires at the national and local levels to perform its functions, including timely access to the best intelligence and actionable information from all sources on explosives, weapons and concealment techniques.
Recommendation 2.3
Airports of all sizes should implement rigorous security awareness programs (a type of airport security watch program) for all personnel working at the airport.
Recommendation 2.4
We recommend that each designated airport establish an Airport Security Advisory Group, to coordinate and consult on the development and implementation of the airport’s security plan, to resolve general security issues, to promote security awareness, and to encourage a collaborative approach to security issues.
Recommendation 2.5
We recommend that an Airport Security Committee be created at each Class 1 airport to facilitate the sharing of intelligence information and to coordinate the development of airport-specific threat and risk assessments.
Recommendation 2.6
We recommend that Transport Canada accelerate its work to develop a program for
the security screening of aviation cargo.
Recommendation 2.7
We recommend that screening of passengers be extended to Fixed Base Operations where the size of the operation warrants.
Chapter Three: CATSA'S Mandate
Recommendation 3.1
Recommendation 3.2
Recommendation 3.3
Recommendation 3.4
Recommendation 3.5
Recommendation 3.6
Recommendation 3.1
CATSA should retain its current screening mandates in the broadest sense of screening, that is, screening of people and things, and CATSA should be considered as the first option for all future aviation screening functions.
Recommendation 3.2
(a) In Class 1 airports, CATSA should be continuously present at all entry points to the restricted areas of the airport to perform non-passenger screening on a random basis.
(b) Non-passenger screening should be extended to include searches of vehicles entering restricted areas in Class 1 airports, and should be performed by CATSA, or under CATSA’s oversight using CATSA’s standards and procedures.
(c) Non-passenger screening should be discontinued in Class 2 airports once the Restricted Area Identification Card, with biometric identifiers, is in place; CATSA should be prepared to implement NPS on an as-needed basis in Class 2 and Class Other airports, when threat analysis indicates a need.
Recommendation 3.3
(a) CATSA’s mandate should be amended to remove responsibility for managing funding for the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program. In the future, funding for the CACPP should be provided via appropriations directly to the RCMP or through Transport Canada.
(b) An independent external audit of the CACPP should be conducted regularly by the Auditor General of Canada or an independent auditor, on a confidential basis.
Recommendation 3.4
(a) Responsibility for the airport policing contribution program should be transferred to Transport Canada.
(b) Transport Canada should review the existing standards for police response to all types of screening points to rationalize the airport policing program, and should fund all reasonable costs associated with meeting the new standards.
Recommendation 3.5
(a) CATSA should complete the installation of the Restricted Area Identification Card system on a priority basis; to facilitate this, Transport Canada must complete the regulatory framework for RAIC as soon as possible.
(b) Once CATSA has completed implementation of the Restricted Area
Identification Card, the RAIC national identity verification system should be operated and maintained by Transport Canada.
(c) The multiple-airport access system should be implemented in conjunction with RAIC as quickly as possible.
(d) RAIC should be expanded to all 89 designated airports.
Recommendation 3.6
(a) The text of the CATSA Act should be amended to remove the consistency criterion.
(b) The text of the French version of the CATSA Act should be amended to add a separate term equivalent to
efficient in section 6 (1).
Chapter Four: Regulatory Framework
Recommendation 4.1
Recommendation 4.2
Recommendation 4.3
Recommendation 4.4
Recommendation 4.5
Recommendation 4.6
Recommendation 4.1
It is recommended that CATSA develop a more user-friendly format for its Standard Operating Procedures and for disseminating and integrating updates to ensure that its front-line screening personnel have ready access to them in order to carry out their responsibilities.
Recommendation 4.2
Transport Canada should not retain the power to de-designate screening officers. CATSA should be accountable for screening officer performance, including certification and designation.
Recommendation 4.3
We recommend that to the extent possible, Transport Canada standardize the terminology used in the Aeronautics Act, its attendant regulations, measures and orders, and in the CATSA Act.
Recommendation 4.4
It is recommended that, as a high priority, Transport Canada develop a more results-based regulatory framework for aviation security.
Recommendation 4.5
It is recommended that, in line with ICAO Annex 17, Transport Canada develop a National Civil Aviation Security Program and require CATSA, as well as airport operators, major tenants and air carriers, to develop security plans for their areas of responsibility, consistent with the National Program. Transport Canada should approve the plans and audit the organizations on a periodic basis for compliance with their plans.
Recommendation 4.6
In line with the results-based regulatory regime, it is recommended that CATSA assume full responsibility (and accountability) for operational policy, including operational design and screening solutions, qualifications of screening officers and service providers, equipment decisions and management of the list of prohibited items.
Chapter Five: Delivery of Screening Services
Recommendation 5.1
Recommendation 5.2
Recommendation 5.3
Recommendation 5.4
Recommendation 5.5
Recommendation 5.6
Recommendation 5.1
(a) All three options for CATSA to deliver screening services should remain in the CATSA Act.
(b) Airport operators should be eligible to bid on a screening contract for their own airport.
Recommendation 5.2
(a) CATSA should develop measurable performance standards, including peak hour throughput and wait-time standards for each airport that reflect, among other factors, the pre-board screening configuration at the various screening points.
(b) CATSA should establish space allocation standards for pre-board screening lines and a throughput standard for an optimum configuration.
(c) CATSA should develop workplace design standards to optimize screening effectiveness and employee working conditions and ensure best practices are shared with all airports.
Recommendation 5.3
We recommend that CATSA provide refresher courses to screening officers on new screening techniques, and changes to the CATSA
Standard Operating Procedures, to ensure that screening officers maintain an up-to-date knowledge of their complete content.
Recommendation 5.4
CATSA should consider options to improve supervision at all 89 airports. CATSA should deploy more management personnel in the field in order to provide closer supervision of security screening services.
Recommendation 5.5
As a high priority, Transport Canada, CATSA, airport operators, air carriers and police services must develop unambiguous guidelines on the handling of security breach incidents at all screening points. These guidelines should include clear and timely communications to the public.
Recommendation 5.6
We recommend that Transport Canada undertake a detailed audit of the security clearance process to determine the causes of delay, and take remedial action to correct these deficiencies, in order to speed up the process of issuing Transportation Security Clearances for persons requiring airport Restricted Area Passes.
Chapter Six: Governance and Accountability
Recommendation 6.1
Recommendation 6.2
Recommendation 6.3
Recommendation 6.4
Recommendation 6.5
Recommendation 6.6
Recommendation 6.7
Recommendation 6.1
We recommend that CATSA establish a national-level advisory committee, reporting to the Board of Directors, to represent the interests of the travelling public, including travellers with disabilities.
Recommendation 6.2
(a) It is recommended that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority either remain a Crown corporation or be transformed into a departmental corporation.
(b) If CATSA remains a Crown corporation, there should be an increase in the level of compensation provided to Board members.
(c) If CATSA becomes a departmental corporation, an advisory board representing the various stakeholders should be established. The Minister should appoint its members.
Recommendation 6.3
Whichever organizational model is adopted for CATSA, the organization needs to be provided with increased flexibility in the areas of operations, finance and administration.
Recommendation 6.4
(a) In order to carry out its mandate effectively, CATSA should be responsible and accountable for operational policy and decisions (including deployment of human resources and the lifecycle management of its assets), while Transport Canada would retain responsibility for overall aviation security policy, strategy and legislation.
(b) These responsibilities and accountabilities should be clearly communicated at all levels of both organizations, and their acceptance needs to be carefully monitored.
Recommendation 6.5
CATSA should have full responsibility for the lifecycle management of its capital equipment, including research and development, procurement, maintenance and replacement.
Recommendation 6.6
We recommend that CATSA’s budget reflect passenger volumes as well as productivity gains realized from enhanced technologies and procedures. CATSA should also be provided with the capacity to generate revenues, to recover costs in line with federal government policies, to carry forward operating funds, to re-profile capital and to transfer operating funds between budget items. These flexibilities should be awarded once CATSA has demonstrated it has the appropriate procedures and systems in place.
Recommendation 6.7
We recommend that, if CATSA becomes a departmental corporation, it remain a separate employer, be granted the same contracting authorities that it has as a Crown corporation and the maximum administrative flexibilities allowed for under the Financial Administration Act.
Chapter Seven: Future Aviation Security Implications
Recommendation 7.1
Recommendation 7.2
Recommendation 7.1
We recommend that Transport Canada and CATSA take steps to instil a culture of continuous learning from past events and forward-looking threat assessment throughout their organizations, and in collaboration with other security partners.
Recommendation 7.2
It is recommended that CATSA have responsibility for the assessment (including pilot projects) of emerging technologies and techniques in the detection of potential threats, as part of its lifecycle management of its capital program.
Chapter Eight: Other Observations
No recommendations
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