1. Reviewing Canadian Aviation Security
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Canadian national security policy and the civil aviation sector
1.1.2 Canadian aviation security prior to 1985
1.1.3 The Air India
Flight 182 tragedy and its impact
1.1.4 The challenge of September 11, 2001
1.2 The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and Aviation Security
1.3 The Advisory Panel’s Mandate and the Review Process
1. Reviewing Canadian Aviation Security
1.1 Introduction
The security of Canadians has always been a leading national concern. Since the events of September 11, 2001, and the emergence of a terrorist threat that has struck in the past and could strike again into the very heart of North America, the safety and security of Canadians has become an urgent priority for their government. Among the most highly visible targets for terrorist attack are aircraft carrying large numbers of people. Americans vowed after 9/11 that never again would they allow commercial airliners to be used by terrorists as weapons to kill thousands of people. Canadians remember the terrorist bombing of Air India
Flight 182 in 1985 that took hundreds of lives of innocent people, most of them Canadian citizens. And Canadians too have vowed: “never again.”
The prevention of air terrorism is by no means a simple matter. It is highly complex. It involves different levels of government jurisdiction – federal, provincial and municipal – as well as foreign countries, international organizations and business in an increasingly global economy. It involves not only security, but also the commercial concerns of airline companies, the airports and the sectors of the economy that depend on air transport. It involves the travel plans of Canadians, who live in an increasingly mobile society. It involves the rights and liberties of Canadian citizens, and how much citizens may be prepared to give up in exchange for the promise of greater security. It involves difficult public policy questions. And it involves assessing threats that are always changing, always adapting to the security measures devised to prevent those threats from being realized. It is a tall order.
In attempting to fill that order, much has been accomplished over the past few years of which Canadians can be proud. This is due, in no small part, to the commitment and collaboration demonstrated by the key aviation security partners: Transport Canada, CATSA, the airport authorities, the air carriers, the RCMP and local police forces.
Much remains to be done. This report points to the unfinished agenda.
1.1.1 Canadian national security policy and the civil aviation sector
According to Canada’s National Security Policy, “there can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens.”
[ 1 ]
In a world of increasing ‘connectedness,’ threats to the safety and security of Canadians are often borderless, more so than in the past. Protection from these threats requires a “more integrated approach to national security – integrated inside the Government of Canada and with key partners.”
[ 2 ] National security is also closely linked to international security, which points to the need for countries to work closely together for a unified approach. The National Security Policy identifies three core national security interests that Canada should advance: protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and contributing to international security.
Aviation security – security of aircraft, airports and all elements of the aviation sector – is a key component of Canadian national security. The use of hijacked aircraft as weapons of mass destruction in the tragic events of September 11, 2001, has framed our understanding of the contemporary terrorist threat. The Madrid train bombing of 2004 further highlighted the vulnerability of the transportation sector, as did the suicide bomb attacks on London’s urban transit system in 2005 and, more recently, in August 2006, the alleged plot in the U.K. to blow up at least 10 U.S.-bound aircraft. But terrorist threats to aviation were apparent well before September 11, 2001.
1.1.2 Canadian aviation security prior to 1985
In the late 1960s and 1970s, hijacking of commercial aircraft emerged as the terrorist tactic of choice. In the early 1970s, in response to growing threats to civil aviation, member states of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
[ 3 ] Annex 17 requires each member country to designate an appropriate authority to develop national objectives, policies and programs for the prevention of unlawful acts that threaten the safety of civil aviation. Since that time, Annex 17 has been updated several times in response to emerging threats and events.
The Government of Canada designated Transport Canada as its aviation authority and developed an airport policing and security program based on the ICAO-recommended security specifications and practices for international airports. In 1972, the
Criminal Code of Canada was amended to include, as indictable offences, aircraft hijacking, endangering the safety of aircraft in flight and the taking on board of offensive weapons and explosive substances. Aviation security provisions were added to the
Aeronautics Act in 1973 and regulations were developed requiring operators of Canadian aircraft to search persons, their belongings and cargo as a condition of carriage. Operators of foreign aircraft were made subject to the same requirements in 1976. The
Aeronautics Act and its regulations underwent major revisions in 1985, and again after September 11, 2001, and continue to be updated to accommodate the changing requirements in aviation security.
Prior to 1985, air carriers were responsible for the security of their aircraft, while Transport Canada was responsible for the establishment of overall security standards for airports and airlines and, in its capacity as owner and operator of major airports, for providing aviation security equipment and facilities at airports. Particular attention was paid to carry-on items – that is, items brought on board aircraft. Transport Canada, through its aviation security regime, provided and maintained the hand-held metal detectors, walk-through metal detectors and X-ray devices used in screening.
1.1.3 The Air India Flight 182 tragedy and its impact
On June 23, 1985, the terrible human cost of air terrorism was
brought home to Canadians. Air India Flight 182, en route from Toronto
to Delhi, was destroyed off the west coast of Ireland by a bomb that
claimed the lives of 329 innocent people, most of them Canadian
citizens. On the same day, two baggage handlers were killed in Tokyo’s
Narita Airport by a second bomb in transit from Vancouver and destined
for another Air India flight. To this day, the Air India Flight 182 bombing retains
the dubious record for the largest number of casualties incurred in any
aircraft bombing, exceeding the 270 people killed, on board and on the
ground, when a bomb destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland
in 1988.
These events transformed Canada’s civil aviation program and generated new approaches to protecting passengers, airports and aircraft. As an immediate response to the Air India disaster, significant improvements were made to Canada’s aviation security regime, including more rigorous measures to screen passengers and their carry-on baggage, and the physical inspection or X-ray of all checked baggage on international flights. In addition, 26 explosive detection units, which were in the final stages of testing and development at the time of the Air India and Narita Airport bombings, were quickly acquired and deployed, along with additional carry-on luggage X-ray units and hand-held and walk-through metal detectors.
The Air India and Narita Airport events led to a thorough review of Canadian aviation security, and additional measures were introduced, including:
- Passenger/baggage reconciliation [ 4 ] on international flights - a measure later extended to include domestic flights;
- More stringent security controls on passengers, carry-on baggage, checked baggage, cargo and mail;
- The purchase of additional X-ray detection equipment and explosive vapour detectors for inspection of carry-on and checked baggage;
- Strengthening of the pre-board screening training program and the introduction of a certification program for airport screening personnel;
- Enhanced training for airport security personnel and air crew;
- Enhanced procedures for handling bomb threats and improved search procedures;
- Comprehensive background checks for airport workers;
- Tightened access-control measures at airports;
- The consolidation of the security functions in Transport Canada by the creation of a dedicated Security and Emergency Preparedness Directorate; and
- The overhaul of the regulatory framework, including the creation of new regulations.
1.1.4 The challenge of September 11, 2001
However welcome these remedial security measures were at the time, and however appropriate to the specific challenge posed by the Air India disaster, the events of September 11, 2001, made it clear that much more had to be done to respond to a new and even deadlier generation of terrorists and terrorist threats.
Aircraft are a preferred target of terrorists because they offer a particularly large number of potential victims contained in a small area. The attacks of 9/11 demonstrate that a large aircraft loaded with fuel can be converted into a lethal weapon of mass destruction in the hands of hijackers who succeed in seizing the controls. Yet the high threat level associated with air travel is paradoxical:
according to comparative safety data, for example, aircraft have one of the lowest accident rates of any mode of transportation. However, when accidents do occur, their high visibility draws public attention and concern that are disproportionate to the actual safety record. Terrorists target aviation because they perceive a very high propaganda return from a successful attack. Following the events of September 11, 2001, commercial air traffic volumes fell sharply in North America, only returning to their former levels in 2004. The shock value of the four hijacked aircraft caused severe losses and created havoc in the airline industry, effects that were attributable to a somewhat exaggerated perception in the short run of the risks associated with air travel.
Nevertheless, strong public concern over air safety and air security brings benefits. Public expectations for safety and security are high and exacting. Governments are required to give priority to implementing security measures in this sector. Passengers are willing to undergo a certain amount of inconvenience in return for assurances of security.
This is the context for the measures taken by the Government of Canada after September 11, 2001. We now turn to a survey of these measures.
1.2 The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority and Aviation Security
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Canadian aviation security system underwent its most significant change. Literally overnight, it became an urgent priority for the Canadian government to enhance the country’s counter-terrorism capabilities and preparedness, including putting a renewed focus on aviation security. The federal Budget of December 2001 contained a $2.2-billion package of new funding for civil aviation security improvements. The Budget also announced the creation of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA). On March 27, 2002, the
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Act received Royal Assent, giving rise to the establishment of CATSA as a new Crown corporation on April 1, 2002.
CATSA became responsible for several core aviation security functions, including those associated with the screening of passengers and their onboard and checked baggage. Transport Canada concentrated its focus on the policy and regulatory aspects of aviation security. Close cooperation between the
Department and CATSA was a primary necessity while the new Authority was being established.
In addition to CATSA, Budget 2001 funded several other aviation security initiatives. These included additional Transport Canada security inspectors for each region of Canada; aircraft security modifications, such as reinforced cockpit doors; and the purchase of additional explosive detection systems for screening baggage at airports. The Budget also provided for increased police presence and security at airports, as well as an expanded program of armed police officers on aircraft. Another initiative instituted random secondary searches of passengers prior to boarding flights to the United States.
Budget 2001 also created the Air Travellers Security Charge (ATSC), to be paid by air travellers at a level sufficient to fund the enhanced air travel security system. The ATSC revenues flow to the government’s Consolidated Revenue Fund and not directly to CATSA, which receives its funding through yearly appropriations.
[ 5 ]
Further indication of the government’s intent in strengthening civil aviation security was contained in the Public Safety Act, 2002, passed in May 2004. This
Act was designed to enhance Canada’s capacity to prevent terrorist attacks and included provisions for a more secure environment for air travel. Substantive amendments were made to civil aviation security through the Public Safety Act and provisions of the existing Aeronautics Act. Among other things, authority was provided to the Minister of Transport that allowed for detailed security regulations. The Minister was also granted authority to make confidential security measures; to grant, suspend and cancel security clearances; to require air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems to provide passenger information to the Minister; and to delegate authority to give emergency directions to address immediate threats to security.
Under the CATSA Act of 2002, CATSA was assigned responsibility for effective, efficient and consistent screening of persons accessing aircraft or restricted areas through screening points, the screening of the property in their possession or control, and the screening of the belongings or baggage they give to the air carrier for transport. The
Act also requires that the Authority carry out its mandate “in the public interest, having due regard to the interest of the travelling public.”
[ 6 ]
Its jurisdiction extends to 89 airports across Canada as designated by
Transport Canada (see Appendix D). The legislation permits CATSA to enter into agreements with airport operators for the purposes of contributing to the costs of policing; all eight active Class 1 airports (the largest in Canada), as well as nine smaller airports, are included under this program. CATSA also may enter into financial agreements with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) for the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program (CACPP) that deploys armed police officers (or air marshals) on selected flights.
The legislation allows the Minister of Transport to assign other air transport security functions to CATSA. In November 2002, the Minister of Transport assigned to CATSA responsibility for random screening of non-passengers accessing restricted areas at airports. A non-passenger is anyone whose workplace is an airport, who visits an airport to provide a service or deliver goods, or who passes through an airport and requires access to its restricted areas. (The screening is similar to what is experienced by passengers.)
A second function assigned by the Minister to CATSA is the development and implementation of the Restricted Area Identification Card (RAIC) program. All non-passengers requiring access to restricted areas of an airport must carry a Restricted Area Pass (RAP). The RAIC is designed to augment the security of the RAP by employing biometric identifiers linked to a centralized database, as well as providing tracking of cardholders.
CATSA’s responsibilities may thus be broken down into six main elements:
1. Pre-board screening (PBS) of passengers and their carry on baggage;
2. Hold bag (checked baggage) screening (HBS);
3. Random non-passenger screening (NPS) at major airports;
4. Airport policing contributions program;
5. Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program (CACPP); and
6. Restricted Area Identification Card (RAIC) for major airports.
In a relatively short period, CATSA has achieved a great deal when measured against the security situation prior to its inception. Security screening contracts have been concluded with service providers employing over 4,000 screening officers at all 89 designated airports and screening over 37 million passengers per year. CATSA has established
Standard Operating Procedures and operational plans for all 89 airports. It has developed and implemented national training programs for screening officers and has adopted a common uniform across the country. The screening program for 100 per cent of checked baggage was implemented one year ahead of schedule. Advanced explosives detection equipment has been deployed in all 89 airports. Over
700,000 non-passengers are screened yearly, and the biometric RAIC pass is in the process of implementation. A Security
Communications Centre has been created at CATSA headquarters to capture and analyze security incidents in real time on a national basis.
1.3 The Advisory Panel’s Mandate and the Review Process
Built into the CATSA Act (section 33) was an obligation for the Minister of Transport to review the provisions and operation of the legislation and to report to Parliament on the results during the fifth year after the
Act was enacted. Accordingly, on November 23, 2005, the Minister of Transport announced the appointment of a three-member Advisory Panel to conduct independent study and analysis, to undertake consultations and to prepare a report with recommendations and observations. This report contains the results of the review, along with our recommendations.
Our recommendations are also listed for convenience in Appendix A.
The Advisory Panel has been tasked to:
- Examine the provisions and operation of the CATSA Act to ensure that the legislation provides a sound and adequate statutory basis for CATSA’s aviation security mandate;
- Provide advice on future aviation security requirements and other developments that may impact on CATSA’s future operations;
- Examine whether Canada has learned all it can in the area of aviation security stemming from the Air India
Flight 182 bombing; and
- Report to the Minister on other important issues that come to its attention [ 7 ].
The element of the Panel’s mandate related to Air India stems from one of the recommendations contained in
Lessons to be Learned, the 2005 report by the Honourable Bob Rae on outstanding questions regarding the bombing of Air India Flight 182 in 1985. The Minister of Transport tasked the Panel with determining whether further changes in practice or legislation are required to address the specific aviation security breaches associated with Air India Flight 182, particularly those relating to the screening of passengers and their baggage. The Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, with the Honourable John C. Major, Q.C., as Commissioner, was established on May 1, 2006, and is conducting hearings at the time of writing. The
Advisory Panel will be addressing this portion of
its mandate in a separate report that will be made available to the Commissioner in the course of his inquiry.
In the course of the Panel’s work, we consulted with a broad range of stakeholders across Canada, including CATSA and Transport Canada officials, and many others representing air carriers, airport operators, security service providers, industry and consumer associations, air travellers, labour organizations, law enforcement agencies, academic experts, freight forwarders, provincial and territorial governments, and other federal government departments and agencies. A series of public consultation sessions was held in five cities across Canada (Toronto, Vancouver, Calgary, Montreal, and Halifax) between April and June 2006. Individuals and groups were invited to present their views to us in these locations. A list of the organizations we met with can be found in Appendix C.
A Consultation Guidance Document was produced to provide background information and assistance to stakeholders. It contained a list of questions to help elicit responses on key issues that the Panel felt needed to be explored. A
CATSA Act Review website was also established to help communicate with industry and the public on our consultation process and to provide information on how to make a submission.
More than 40 written submissions were received from a variety of stakeholders representing industry associations, air carriers, airports (both large and small), labour representatives, groups representing persons with disabilities, provinces and territories. The submissions may be found on the website, at
http://www.tc.gc.ca/tcss/CATSA.
In addition, Panel members toured some two dozen airports, from the largest in Toronto to small and remote ones in every province and territory of Canada. To gain an international perspective, we visited Washington, D.C., London, Brussels and Tel Aviv, where we toured airports and consulted with airport operators, aviation security experts and government officials.
To aid in our understanding of some of the more technical issues, experts were asked to prepare research papers on subjects dealing with the aviation regulatory framework, aviation security, governance and government organizational models, and performance measurement.
We are greatly appreciative of the excellent cooperation extended by CATSA and Transport Canada during our review. Requests for information were always met in a most professional and courteous manner. We were provided with numerous informative briefings that served to deepen our knowledge of the subject. We were able to discuss the issues freely and frankly with both CATSA and Transport Canada. All this helped pave the way for our consultations with the countless other stakeholders we encountered who operate within our airports and the airline industry. The dedication of stakeholders to this subject, and the importance they placed on it, were evident in the submissions we received and the participation at our meetings.
We would also like to express our appreciation to the CATSA Act Review Secretariat for their commitment and dedication. Their assistance was invaluable to us in the completion of our task.
Our conclusions and recommendations reflect our discussions with all the players and stakeholders we met. But as an independent, arm’s-length advisory panel, we always sought to keep the public interest in mind, rather than the interests of any particular organization or group. We are pleased to report that the key aviation security partners (Transport Canada, CATSA, airports, airlines, RCMP and local police forces) are responding to the challenge of protecting Canadians with diligence and dedication.
It was evident from our consultations that cooperation between CATSA and airports, airlines and other air transportation stakeholders is a crucial element in maintaining and enhancing aviation security. The Minister may rest assured that CATSA is on track with its mission, in concert with Transport Canada and with the other players and stakeholders. Our recommendations should help to further empower and equip CATSA and its partners to cope with the challenges of the future. We thank all those who contributed to our work.
Chapter One: Footnotes
[1] Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National
Security Policy (April 2004).
[2] Ibid
[3] For a fuller discussion of ICAO Annex 17, see Chapter 2.
[4] Air carriers must reconcile baggage and passenger information to ensure that no bag is placed on the aircraft if the passenger does not board.
[5] See Chapter 8 for further discussion
of the
ATSC in relation to this review.
[6]Canadian Air Transport
Security Authority Act, section 6.
[7] The Minister’s Terms of Reference for the Panel are provided in Appendix B
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