5. Delivery of Screening Services
5.1 Service Delivery Model
5.2 Performance
Management
5.2.1 Performance
indicators
5.2.2 Factors affecting performance
5.2.3 Achieving high performance
5.2.4 Performance reporting
5.3 Human Resources Issues
5.3.1 Pay and recruitment
5.3.2 Orientation and training
5.3.3 Oversight and supervision
5.3.4 Labour relations
5.3.5 Dispute resolution
5.4 Management of Incidents
5.5 Security Clearances
5. Delivery of Screening Services
CATSA delivers passenger screening services in 89 designated airports across the country, covering about 99 per cent of all passenger traffic in Canada. The 89 airports are listed in Appendix D. Nine of these designated airports are classified as Class 1 airports (one of which, Montreal-Mirabel, is inactive for passenger travel), 20 as Class 2 and 60 as Class Other airports. In Chapter 3, we outlined the procedures for pre-board, hold bag and non-passenger screening. All three types of screening are performed according to specific requirements, some aspects of which vary depending on the category of airport
Pre-board screening may vary somewhat from one location to another, due to variations in the equipment used and the airport layout. In some smaller airports, screening of hold baggage is performed in full view of the passengers, whereas in larger airports, this function takes place behind closed doors in the baggage handling area. Nevertheless, passenger and hold bag screening are designed to achieve the same level of security in all 89 locations. CATSA also performs random screening of non-passengers in the Class 1 and Class 2 airports.
Together with its service providers and screening officers across Canada, CATSA’s achievement in putting these screening operations in place in the first four years of its existence is truly commendable. Now CATSA begins an era in which it must refine its practices.
In this chapter, we will examine how CATSA’s screening services are provided. CATSA must select a suitable model or models for employing screening officers and develop a performance strategy to manage service delivery and ensure rigorous, visible accountability for that service. Finally, there are several human resources management issues to be addressed.
5.1 Service Delivery Model
The CATSA Act provides that CATSA may deliver its front-line screening services in any of three ways: directly, using CATSA employees; through independent contractors engaged by CATSA; or through the operators of airports, who themselves may use their own employees or contracted service providers, if this option is selected. [ 1 ] Since the CATSA Act came into being, service providers under contract to CATSA have performed all screening services. [ 2 ] Each of these service delivery options has certain advantages and disadvantages.
Service delivery contractors: CATSA has over 20 contracts with some 12 different organizations to provide screening services at the 89 designated airports across Canada. The use of contractors appears to provide screening services at a reasonable cost compared to the alternative of a government workforce employed directly by CATSA. However, because CATSA is not the direct employer of the screening officers, its oversight and supervision of those officers is indirect, and must be carried out by enforcing compliance with its
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and with the terms of the service provider contracts.
The contractors all organize and carry out screening according to CATSA’s SOPs, and they are bound by the terms of the contract they have in place with CATSA. We have nonetheless observed some significant differences among providers:
some have a larger pool of workers available; some may give more generous benefits and more consideration to seniority; some offer more training for screening officers beyond what is given by CATSA, as well as more training for and support for Point Leaders. They do not all maintain the same performance and discipline information on employees, and have different disciplinary and retraining procedures. They also differ in how they recognize and reward employee performance.
We are aware that there have been changes (sometimes several) in the contractors providing services at some of Canada’s largest airports, and there may be some consolidation under way in the industry. The Panel considers it essential for CATSA to design its Requests for Proposal (RFPs) and contract provisions carefully, and to monitor delivery of the services offered under contracts effectively and rigorously according to CATSA’s SOPs when service-providers are used, ensuring that any lessons learned are built into subsequent RFPs. This underscores CATSA’s accountability for the management of its contracts.
It has been suggested that using relatively lower-paid contract employees may have two disadvantages:
first, they may feel low job satisfaction and loyalty, and they may not therefore share CATSA’s mission and values, so turnover may be higher than optimal. Second, there could be potential for screening officers to be compromised by financial pressures. The Panel notes that while rates of pay have risen significantly since CATSA was established, there are regions where comparable jobs pay much more. The Panel also heard that in some locations, screening officers hold second, or even third, jobs.
A high rate of turnover of screening officers gives rise to significant costs to replace them – to recruit and obtain security clearances; to provide uniforms; to train, certify and arrange for designation; and to integrate new staff into the workplace. The Panel learned that the annual turnover among the contracted staff currently averages 12.2 per cent across the eight active Class 1 airports in Canada, though it varies widely across Canada according to competing local employment opportunities. Turnover of screening personnel in the United States declined dramatically when they became federal employees of the Transportation Security Administration. It averaged 126 per cent a year in 1998-99 at the 19 largest U.S. airports [ 3 ] ; we learned from TSA officials that it is now about 20 per cent annually. We were advised by TSA that employment as a screening officer within TSA is seen as an entry to the U.S. federal civil service, and this may be a contributing factor to the higher rate of turnover in the U.S.A. than in Canada. CATSA is a separate employer and does not provide access to other public-service jobs. Opportunities for screening personnel in Canada may be greater with a service provider organization than with CATSA, depending on its relative size, whether it has other local, regional or national locations and whether it has diversified lines of business that allow screening officers to plan a long-term career path. Regardless of the employer, the nature of screening, which is described as repetitive, often monotonous, stressful work requiring constant vigilance, is a significant contributing factor to turnover.
Airport Operators: Using its own employees or contractors, an airport may be well-placed to provide screening services in the context of its own customer service approaches. This could result in more seamless integration of screening within the wider airport operations. There may also be some scope for cross-utilization between screening personnel and airport staff performing other airport security tasks, and hence greater job variety. However, cross-utilization may be limited due to requirements for all types of staff during peak hours. Using an airport operator as a CATSA service provider would yield the same general advantages outlined above, and risk the same disadvantages. It would also introduce one more player into the service delivery process, but this might be justified by better relations between CATSA and the airport operator concerning shared objectives. On the other hand, procedures for administering contracts could complicate relations between CATSA and the management at that airport. Airports may also feel pressure for their own business reasons to focus more on efficient throughput, at the expense of effective security.
The Canadian Airports Council (CAC), in a survey of its member airports, confirmed the views the Panel heard from several airports: that they should have the option of being considered to carry out front-line screening services (PBS, HBS and NPS) as part of their wider security responsibilities. We are aware that, to date, CATSA’s RFPs have excluded airport operators from bidding on screening contracts. The Panel notes that CATSA’s RFPs have generally sought a contractor who would provide screening services at several airports in a region. Airport authorities are prevented under the
CATSA Act from offering screening services at competing airports, [ 4 ] and this restriction appears appropriate. Nevertheless, CATSA may want to encourage as open a market as possible, and therefore should consider the option of allowing airport operators to compete for screening contracts at their own airports. Like any other service provider, an airport provider would have to meet CATSA’s national service and performance standards, and be subject to its oversight and training program.
Delivery of front-line operations by CATSA employees: The key advantage of screening officers being CATSA employees would be that CATSA would have more direct oversight and therefore consistency in delivering front-line screening operations. Increased cost would be the main drawback – labour costs could be in the order of 40 per cent higher, or more than $2 per passenger screened. As CATSA employees, many screening officers would likely have much better employee benefits, and career progression opportunities within CATSA. Turnover may decrease further if employee satisfaction improves. As noted above, this also depends from region to region on competing job opportunities. The U.S. example cited earlier of screening officers using TSA employment as an entry to government as a whole is less relevant in Canada, as CATSA would continue to be a separate employer. CATSA would nonetheless face the human resources management rigidities of a larger public employer, for example in dealing with poor performance and reallocating resources. It would lose the operational flexibility inherent in a contracting-out approach.
On balance, the current arrangement seems to be working quite well – it is achieving CATSA’s objectives at a reasonable cost. However, the other options allow for CATSA to respond to changing requirements that may develop in the future. Where feasible, airport operators should be eligible to bid on screening contracts for their own airports. We conclude, therefore, that all three options for CATSA to deliver screening services should remain in the
Act.
Recommendation 5.1
(a) All three options for CATSA to deliver screening services should remain in the
CATSA Act.
(b) Airport operators should be eligible to bid on a screening contract for their own airport.
5.2 Performance Management
An organization’s performance is the level to which it meets expectations over some period of time. So we must consider what CATSA’s expectations or objectives should be, how it measures them, what results are achieved, and how results are reported.
The CATSA Act specifies five broad criteria for CATSA’s delivery of screening services: efficiency, effectiveness, consistency, public interest and the interest of the travelling public. Further criteria and duties provided in the
Act must also be addressed by CATSA in carrying out its core responsibilities. These include developing standards for qualifications, training and performance of screening contractors and screening officers – standards that are as stringent as or more stringent than those established in the aviation security regulations made under the Aeronautics Act. [ 5 ] CATSA is also given the mandate for certifying service providers and screening officers who have met these standards, and for enforcing the standards through amending, suspending or cancelling such certification if the circumstances warrant. [ 6 ]
Treasury Board has defined a performance measurement strategy as a system that “generates evidence-based information/data that answers the following questions:
are we achieving the outcomes expected for the targeted beneficiaries within the time set and at a reasonable cost?” [ 7 ] It can be subdivided into several different categories to fully address the whole range of activities that contribute to meeting overall expectations and objectives. CATSA must set measurable targets and develop indicators; these must be communicated within the organization and to partners; results must be monitored and reported, and timely corrective action taken.
For a public organization like CATSA, establishing performance standards means publicly committing to measures of effectiveness, efficiency and service to users, and auditing and reporting against these standards. The standards should make it clear what is considered acceptable performance, so that CATSA can show over time how it is succeeding (and where it must address weaknesses), and not simply report on activities.
5.2.1 Performance indicators
The five criteria specified for CATSA’s delivery of screening services – effectiveness, efficiency, consistency, public interest and the interest of the travelling public – must form the core of CATSA’s performance management framework. Public interest is a general criterion that is difficult to assess within a managerial approach. In Chapter 3, we recommended that the criterion of “consistency” be dropped from the
CATSA Act because it is implicit in the concept of security “effectiveness” and the overall purpose of the
Act. Assessment of CATSA’s performance should therefore focus on the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and the interest of the travelling public.
Security effectiveness:
Measurable indicators of effectiveness are difficult to devise:
should they be based on the number of aviation security-related incidents over time, or on the number of threat items seized? Like crime statistics, such measures depend on many other factors and it is difficult to determine whether more or fewer incidents measure an organization’s failure or success.
A study on performance measurement [ 8 ] undertaken for the Panel by Liane Benoit concluded that effectiveness for security organizations, such as CATSA, for which the consequences of failure are extremely high, is reflected in the characteristics of what are known as “high reliability organizations.” In general, such organizations must exhibit “adequate financial and human resources and a strong, shared sense of mission … that includes a collective commitment to highly reliable operations in terms of both safety and production.” [ 9 ] Seven essential elements are identified for the achievement of this level of effectiveness:
- extraordinary levels of technical competence;
- sustained high technical performance;
- regular and continuous training;
- structural redundancy;
- flexible decision-making processes involving operating teams;
- collegial, decentralized authority patterns in the face of high-tempo operational demands; and
- processes that reward error discovery, reporting and a continual search for system improvement. [ 10 ]
In our view, these are the security effectiveness characteristics to which CATSA should aspire, and it should establish performance indicators accordingly.
Indicators of efficiency:
Efficiency of CATSA’s screening operations is very important to aviation partners and to the travelling public. CATSA’s current efficiency commitment is to ensure that a passenger waits no longer than eight minutes for pre-board screening, at least 90 per cent of the time. This is a relevant measure for travellers, but is an average over a period of time. It does not reflect the longer wait times inherent in peak-period travel.
Stakeholders, particularly the Canadian Airports Council and air carriers, expressed dissatisfaction with CATSA’s performance measurement and reporting standards for throughput. They criticized the methodology used and CATSA’s failure to invite airports and airline participation in the process. They called for CATSA to clearly articulate national throughput performance standards against which CATSA’s performance can be assessed. CATSA is now publishing national throughput performance statistics,[ 11 ] with summaries of average and peak waiting times, which is an important step in this direction.
The Panel agrees that a peak throughput commitment is a good idea. However, we note that airports affect throughput with design and space allocated for screening and waiting areas, and therefore suggest that CATSA’s published standards should reflect this.
Interests of the travelling public:
CATSA must develop reliable indicators for customer service as well. The Panel received comments and submissions from a number of organizations concerning the need for improved customer service skills, and greater sensitivity among screening officers for the needs of travellers with disabilities. Although the CATSA training program includes customer service training and a component on serving disabled persons, service providers acknowledged that more extensive training in both areas would be beneficial.
The Panel suggests that CATSA engage with interest groups, including representatives of disabled travellers, to help establish appropriate indicators for customer service.
5.2.2 Factors affecting performance
A wide variety of factors may affect the performance of CATSA and its service providers in their security screening role. Some are within CATSA’s control, some are not. The significant factors include whether organizational goals are mutually consistent, the nature of regulatory control, the screening officers, staffing flexibility and equipment, and input and infrastructure constraints. We recommended in Chapter 4 that CATSA should have the responsibility for operational policies so it can adjust and adapt to changing circumstances. This will give CATSA greater control over – and accountability for – meeting specified performance objectives. In this section, we will discuss elements that affect performance, and which CATSA should take into consideration when designing indicators.
General goals are reflected in overall priorities, and operational procedures and objectives should flow from those goals. In CATSA’s case, the goals are clear:
effectiveness – that is, assuring air transportation security – is most important. But efficiency is also required, which means,
among other things, providing customer service at a reasonable cost. In some circumstances, these two sets of statutory goals may seem to contradict one another. CATSA must find a balance between the criteria of security effectiveness and efficiency, and develop performance measures in consultation with Transport Canada, airport operators and air carriers, so that all parties are aware of the balance and how CATSA’s performance will be monitored and measured.
The prescribed procedures for screening (regulations, orders, SOPs) affect the other performance factors as well, such as the design and layout of screening lines, staff certification and use of technology and procedures. Enforcement also affects performance:
the Panel observed on several occasions that throughput declines significantly when Transport Canada inspectors are present and screening officers are anxious not to make mistakes. CATSA in turn must ensure that its service providers and their screening employees comply with the
Standard Operating Procedures.
Input constraints include peaks in passenger traffic at a given airport that result from concentration of flights, as well as the reliability of air carriers’ schedules, which together determine maximum staffing required at pre-board and hold bag screening. The type (business, leisure or charter) and destination of passengers affects the number of carry-on items and bulkiness of their outer clothing. Air carrier check-in processes can affect whether passengers arrive in good time at pre-board screening. The number of carry-on items permitted by air carriers and their maximum size also affect PBS operations. Air carrier scheduling, particularly in spacing flight departures, can assist with the efficiency and effectiveness of security services, though the Panel recognizes that flights are often bunched together to accommodate travellers’ plans at their destinations, and to allow for reasonable transfer to connecting flights.
Airport design can affect the flow of passengers, how easy it is for passengers to move rapidly from one screening point to another, and whether alternative layouts can be tried out. CATSA’s accomplishments in deploying equipment for pre-board and hold bag screening since it came into existence in 2002 have been achieved within architectural limitations. Security equipment has been squeezed into existing terminal building facilities and, for in-line hold bag screening, into baggage-handling systems that were not designed for it. As a result, the efficiency of a large number of these security systems is less than optimal. The Panel observed airports where inadequate space for pre-board screening lines renders these lines less than optimally efficient, and others where absence of back-up equipment or redundancy sometimes causes major delays.
Effectiveness and efficiency of performance is affected by the ergonomic design of the screening lines, such as the height and placement of tables, the space between screening lines and whether floor coverings and furnishing reduce standing fatigue. The design of the entry and exit areas is particularly important. An official of the U.S. Transportation Security Administration advised that having good practices for “divesture” (placement of outer clothes, electronics and pocket items for screening separately), and using secondary search screeners beyond the main processing line, can increase throughput by 25 per cent. Preparation of persons being screened (providing information so they are prepared as they approach the screening point) and arrangements for them to pick up their belongings and leave the screening area, are key to optimal flow through the lines. The screening point configurations – layout of queuing areas, arrangement of tables and bins for divesture, space available for secondary searches, and the pick-up area for divested items – vary from airport to airport. The Panel observed that layouts and practices that work well at one airport are not necessarily adopted at other airports.
Vancouver International Airport is one good example of cooperation between the airport authority and CATSA in the design of the pre-board screening space. As a result, the number of passengers processed per hour by CATSA screening officers at this airport is significantly higher than the national average. We urge other airport authorities to look at the Vancouver example as a best practice.
CATSA’s performance standards, including peak-hour throughput standards for pre-board and hold bag screening, should reflect the impact of design and ergonomic constraints. CATSA must work with airport operators and other partners to establish space allocation standards for pre-board screening lines and a throughput standard for an optimum configuration.
Budgetary constraints also play a major role for government organizations like CATSA, since budgets allocated within an annual appropriation model cannot easily be adjusted to changes in passenger volumes; this rigidity makes it difficult to allocate the proper resources to meet traffic demands.
The availability, capabilities and reliability of technology are also important factors in performance. Some equipment offers faster throughput with greater automatic screening capability, while other processes rely on manual actions like physical searches or scanning with a hand-held detector. The selection of equipment and associated technology, its reliability (and whether back-up redundancy is available for contingencies), and capacities (both in terms of the size of items handled and throughput per minute or other time period) are factors affecting performance.
The Panel encourages CATSA to continuously monitor the human/machine system
performance and adjust, as necessary, the processes to ensure maximum
effectiveness.
Operating highly automated equipment presents both challenges and opportunities for performance. This type of work can be much more monotonous for screening officers than manual searches, but such equipment can also build in features that stimulate alertness and help identify threat objects. Challenges can be addressed in part through defining competencies and aptitudes needed for particular roles; careful selection of candidates; training to develop and enhance competencies; and through retention of experienced screening personnel. Tools such as in-line virtual test objects and stand-alone interactive self-learning stations are good examples of technology that can improve screening officers’ effectiveness, and we were told that the screening staff welcome them.
Excellent performance depends on implementation of an operational plan, including human resources management, supported by rigorous oversight. At most Class 2 and all Class Other airports, there is now no on-site CATSA oversight; the Panel observed that the screening personnel in most locations would benefit from more direct interaction with CATSA managers.
The Panel has serious concerns about the role of Point Leaders, who have a crucial role at screening points. A Point Leader is a screening officer who has achieved a higher level of certification through success in extra CATSA training and, in some cases, seniority and who monitors the work of screening officers and operations at a screening point. The Panel was told that some Point Leaders receive little training in leadership; some are mainly concerned with staffing the screening points and monitoring break times, and some have been subjected to intimidation when they took disciplinary action against fellow members of a union. We are very concerned that there may be great variability in the activities of Point Leaders, coupled with insufficient oversight by CATSA managers, as noted above. The Panel notes that CATSA is actively considering options to improve operational supervision currently provided by the Contractor’s Service Delivery Managers and the Point Leaders. There should be a close look at the Point Leader function at screening points, including their role, responsibility, recruitment, status and training. Point Leaders should be selected on merit, and must be more effective in supervising the operational activities of screening workforce.
CATSA’s own Standard Operating Procedures affect performance and service standards, satisfaction of stakeholders and staffing resource decisions. The SOPs must be adequate in scope, but not excessively voluminous. New procedures should be considered that can improve performance. We are aware that a Registered Traveller Program with specialized screening points could speed up screening of low-risk travellers, but consider that the best gains would be made by investing in improvements that would benefit the processing of all passengers. The Panel recognizes that if time spent waiting and being screened, even at peak times, is reliable and reasonably short, there will be fewer delays, and fewer demands for separate high-speed treatment.
Finally, contract constraints affect performance through the number of screening officers available at a given time, how flexible their shifts and schedules are, and the quality of management provided by the contractor. The present constraints on CATSA’s budget planning and spending were cited as reducing funds available for overtime and additional staffing to meet unexpected traffic demands, particularly towards the end of a fiscal year.
Recommendation 5.2
(a) CATSA should develop measurable performance standards, including peak-hour throughput and wait-time standards for each airport that reflect, among other factors, the pre-board screening configuration at the various screening points.
(b) CATSA should establish space allocation standards for pre-board screening lines and a throughput standard for an optimum configuration.
(c) CATSA should develop workplace design standards to optimize screening effectiveness and employee working conditions and ensure best practices are shared with all airports.
5.2.3 Achieving high performance
As we have discussed above, there are many factors that affect how CATSA can achieve both effectiveness and efficiency in the interests of the travelling public. Many of these factors are beyond the control of CATSA alone. Achieving performance targets for security screening services requires the commitment and cooperation of the service provider, their screening employees, CATSA, air carriers, the airport operator and Transport Canada.
The air carriers and the airport operators are essential partners with CATSA in the design and delivery of security screening services. The location of screening points, the layout and space provided for the screening lines, as well as information and signage, all influence screening performance. At airports where this partnership works well, the benefits are evident. The Panel encourages CATSA and air carriers to develop protocols for ensuring that travellers arrive early enough and proceed promptly to pre-board screening, in order to reduce cases in which checked-in passengers must be escorted to the front of queuing lines so they will not miss their flights.
Transport Canada’s role is pivotal in assuring effective delivery of security services and is monitored and enforced by security inspections. Screening officers may feel anxious when inspectors are present, which can reduce throughput significantly. The Panel urges CATSA and Transport Canada to develop a more collegial and collaborative work environment for the screening staff.
The Panel notes that CATSA has implemented bonus systems for its service providers and for its own regional managers, and we support this initiative. However, bonus systems can have unintended consequences. If a performance bonus depends on reducing errors over time, a contractor or CATSA regional manager may have less incentive to report breaches, errors and incidents, or to assign responsibility for an error. This may bias both performance reporting and any follow-up learning from mistakes and, more seriously, could weaken security.
Reliable and measurable performance standards, consistent with its statutory mandate, are essential for CATSA to be able to work with its various partners. Such standards represent CATSA’s commitment to deliver results, to demonstrate value for money and to reassure travellers. CATSA must also communicate these elements clearly to its partners.
5.2.4 Performance reporting
CATSA has recently adopted the Balanced Scorecard [ 12 ] as a framework management system, with performance measurement being one of the outputs. CATSA advises that it employs a customized version of the Balanced Scorecard methodology, which is a system of linked objectives, measures, targets and initiatives that collectively describe the strategy of CATSA and how the strategy can be achieved. At present, the Balanced Scorecard system has been implemented at the senior management level and CATSA has plans to gradually introduce the system at other levels.
“CATSA’s Balanced Scorecard is supported by a comprehensive computer-based information system, Business Intelligence (BI) that records, analyzes and disseminates data on a real-time basis. It provides the national office with information from each screening checkpoint on a daily basis through reports filed with the newly established Security Communications Centre (SCC).”
“The Scorecard structures strategic management goals and the activities that support them in a continuous ‘double loop’ fed by performance indicators, metrics and targets, all geared towards ‘continuous improvement.’ While originally designed as a management tool for industry, the model has recently been adapted and implemented in some public sector organizations, impelled in part by the current trend in central agencies towards the adoption of more business-like approaches to public administration and a renewed emphasis on ‘value for money’ in publicly funded operations.” [ 13 ]
CATSA has devoted considerable effort to performance measurement, but has yet to settle on consistent performance objectives, measurement and reporting. The reporting appears blurred with “a hundred different indicators and measures divided between various performance profiles and programs that have been established to measure and assess how CATSA is performing.” [ 14 ] The performance priorities [ 15 ] and targets changed over time so it was difficult, on a comparative yearly basis, to accurately measure achievements.
Benoit’s research raises questions about the significance of the measures (objects seized are of varying degrees of risk); the difficulty of establishing targets; and the systemic bias where performance indicators attached to bonus systems may tend to reduce the number of reported incidents and breaches. [ 16 ] She comments that the performance data were linked mainly to activities, rather than results.
CATSA has nonetheless made progress in developing performance measurement reporting and in establishing more robust performance criteria and indicators comparable to internationally accepted norms… “and CATSA might be turning the corner in terms of the establishment of more robust performance criteria and indicators.” [ 17 ] Recent quarterly reports [ 18 ] show improvement in some areas, but still contain many elements that can be characterized as activity reports.
5.3 Human Resources Issues
The quality of personnel in an organization is a major performance factor. CATSA’s means to address this is through provisions of its contracts with service providers, and its training and certification procedures – as long as suitable performance standards have been established. Screening officers should have appropriate competencies, including language proficiency. They may be required to perform several different functions and be certified to move from one position to another and their level of training, absenteeism, alertness and motivation are key. A recent study concluded that while the performance of airport security is a function of their underlying institutional configuration, … three key factors are good predictors of screening performance: turnover, pay and training among screening officers. [ 19 ] This analysis indicates that
(T)he causal links between these variables and screening performance are straightforward. Without receiving proper training, screeners hardly know what to look for… A similar causal logic applies to low pay. It is one of the well-proven findings in labour economics that ‘you get what you pay for’. Low pay only discourages highly skilled workers from applying. It also reduces the employee’s incentive to perform well and increases the incentive to engage in moral hazard since similar or even better employment can be easily found elsewhere… The causal mechanism underlying the correlation between turnover and screening performance is as follows: As with most tasks, the performance of screening increases with experience… With a rapidly fluctuating workforce nothing like an ‘organizational memory’ can be developed that would enable managers to constantly update and review procedures in a process of trial and error. [ 20 ]
One of CATSA’s first initiatives was to negotiate increases in hourly pay of about 50 per cent. In most areas of the country, at $15 per hour, the average wage is considered generally competitive in 2006. As a result, the screening staff turnover at the Class 1 airports during the past year averaged a respectable 12.2 per cent.
As we discussed earlier in this chapter, turnover is an important issue since training new staff takes time and consumes scarce resources (about $4,000 per trainee, plus many other direct costs such as uniforms) before they become fully effective. Attention by management to human resources may reduce turnover, for example by recognizing performance, installing continuous learning on site, and offering better benefits with seniority.
Repetitive, stressful work requiring constant vigilance requires highly motivated, highly trained, committed individuals with a strong sense of mission. Douglas H. Harris, a specialist in ergonomics, emphasizes the link between aptitude and achievement, arguing that a critical factor for successful performance is a match between the aptitudes of the job incumbent and the skill requirements of the job. Harris states that
This matching is a function of the procedures employed for selecting and assigning personnel to jobs. Other important factors are opportunities to develop job-related knowledge and skills; measurement, feedback and recognition of job performance… and opportunities for career growth and achievement. [ 21 ]
The Panel notes that CATSA has succeeded in improving the status of the contracted screening workforce with increases in pay, introduction of standard uniforms, improved training and uniform standard operational procedures. The service providers were also satisfied that CATSA is improving provisions of contracts.
Several key human resources issues were brought to our attention in the course of our consultations.
5.3.1 Pay and recruitment
While pay levels have generally improved, the Panel notes that higher pay might be required to attract sufficient numbers of applicants with the highest aptitude for threat detection. In Alberta, there are still great disparities in hourly pay between screening officers and other workers in comparable jobs; recruitment is a major challenge there, and turnover is higher than in other parts of Canada.
The Panel was told that many screening officers hold second jobs – particularly at the larger airports, where almost 50 per cent of the screening workforce has second (or even third) jobs. In locations where the cost of living is high, or for screening officers with significant family responsibilities, income from screening may be insufficient, and many screening officers take on additional full- or part-time jobs. Such jobs are often at the same airport – for example, at a retail outlet or on an air carrier check-in desk. This situation can make it difficult to administer work shifts for screening officers, and may reduce alertness of screening officers working 16 hours in a row, perhaps for several days. Other employees work many hours of overtime at the screening points, partly to meet peak requirements when there are staff shortages. Indeed, we understand that screening officers are sometimes offered incentives to cover peak requirements by working overtime. Excessive hours of work, whether through overtime or extra jobs, can lead to fatigue.
We suggest that CATSA undertake a study to determine the extent to which screening officers are working overtime and at extra jobs, the effect on service delivery of their working long hours, and what remedies might be indicated.
5.3.2 Orientation and training
There is no doubt that training has improved considerably since CATSA became responsible for security screening services, and all stakeholders acknowledged this. CATSA has expanded the training curriculum to focus on security technology and people skills, and has recently moved to an in-house training service.
More on-going and refresher training is needed, especially related to new techniques and detection of improvised explosive devices, even for fully certified staff. CATSA conducts simulated infiltration tests for training purposes. The Panel strongly supports such performance measurement and feedback as a necessary element of training and quality assurance. The Panel also encourages use of in-line and stand-alone technologies, such as TIPS and XRT, to provide practice, rate performance and give direct feedback to screening employees. We suggest that results from any on-line performance training or measurement should not be used for punitive actions, such as fines, penalties, reprimands or decertification. We heard that such tools for continuous learning feedback are well accepted by screening employees, but that budget limitations have prevented installation widely enough to be worthwhile for all employees.
Comments from stakeholders at airports concerning customer service skills were mixed. Many reported courteous and friendly service, while others indicated problems with the attitude of some screening personnel and a need for more courteous service.
The Panel was told that there may also be a need for CATSA and, in turn, its screening contractors, to have more operational flexibility, so that screening officers with specific competencies can be located to best advantage, with appropriate rotation to maintain alertness. For example, screening officers with good interpersonal skills should be placed more frequently in positions which have the greatest public contact. Conversely, those with the best aptitude for detecting threat items in X-rays could specialize in this function.
As we noted in Chapter 4, all screening officers are expected to understand and master CATSA SOPs and Bulletins amounting to several hundreds of pages. They are required to engage in continuous review of these documents during downtime and before the shift begins. CATSA should develop and deliver refresher courses to screening officers on its
Standard Operating Procedures to ensure they maintain an up-to-date understanding of their complete content. Both new and experienced screening personnel would benefit from continuous training in new screening techniques, including recognizing newly identified threats and prohibited items.
The Panel was impressed by the approach of the Performance Accountability and Standards System (PASS) Human Capital Program implemented by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration. [ 22 ] It shows a genuine commitment to better integrate standards for performance with training for competency using the standards as benchmarks, and supervising and measuring performance (with quarterly feedback). This is over and above continuous online training, with hundreds of tests being performed on a daily basis in each screening position with computerized devices and people trying to infiltrate. [ 23 ]
Recommendation 5.3
We recommend that CATSA provide refresher courses to screening officers on new screening techniques, and on changes to the CATSA
Standard Operating Procedures, to ensure that screening officers maintain an up-to-date knowledge of their complete content.
5.3.3 Oversight and supervision
Many stakeholders observed that screening officers are monitored by too many people pursuing sometimes-conflicting goals: their employer (the contractor service provider); CATSA’s local managers; the airport management; air carriers; and Transport Canada inspectors.
Security tasks must be performed with the highest degree of integrity, which can be very costly. Employees must be highly reliable, with good attendance at work and in good health, competent and well-performing, and must be willing to comply with orders and respect discipline.
When a CATSA service provider for a given airport changes, the employees change employers. Because their certification is CATSA’s responsibility, this information must be kept active. The Panel considers that CATSA should require in the terms of its contracts that service providers obtain consent for transfer of relevant employment information. CATSA must ensure that its own rules, and those of its contractors, protect employees’ personal information effectively, and are complied with rigorously.
The Panel noted that at some airports, the screening staff works in teams – that is, the same group of five screening officers work together whenever they are on duty. We do not know whether this practice is frequent or systematic. The problem is that with this level of predictability, the potential of a group being compromised rises. Although the risk is unknown, it is a concern, and there should be standard procedures requiring random mixing of all screening staff.
As we noted earlier, at most Class 2 and all Class Other airports, there is at this time no on-site CATSA oversight, and the Panel was told that screening officers would benefit from more direct interaction with CATSA managers. Even at Class 1 airports, the Panel is concerned that oversight by CATSA management may be insufficient, because there are few on-site personnel. The problem for CATSA is to supervise screening delivery effectively through contractor service providers, who are the direct employers of screening officers. CATSA should be accountable for screening officer performance, including certification and designation actions. Visits by CATSA managers should be planned to give them maximum opportunity to observe screening operations and to meet with individual screening officers. When it is impractical to have a CATSA manager at less-busy Class Other airports, CATSA could consider delegating the contract management responsibility for security screening services to the airport manager, after he or she has been suitably trained by CATSA.
Recommendation 5.4
CATSA should consider options to improve supervision at all 89 airports. CATSA should deploy more management personnel in the field in order to provide closer supervision of security screening services.
5.3.4 Labour relations
Screening officers and Point Leaders who work for service providers under contract to CATSA are generally represented by a union, and their terms of employment are covered by collective agreements. Three unions represent most of the screening personnel across the country.
The unions representing security screening officers asked that the RFP for all CATSA contract renewals contain a commitment for the new contractor to recognize the seniority, pay, annual leave, sick leave, pensions and other benefits the screening personnel enjoyed with their previous employer. Such provisions may help address attrition at the time of a change in contract and reduce overall turnover. We understand that CATSA already follows this procedure. CATSA should continue to provide through its RFP that such benefits for screening officers are maintained when a new contractor becomes their employer.
Unions and CATSA both expressed concern about the uncertainty of third-party liability insurance coverage for screening personnel – for example, in the event that a screening officer is involved in an incident in which damages are claimed, or is called to testify in relation to such a claim. Some contractors have an insurance policy for their employees, while others do not. It should be a standard contractual practice for CATSA to require all its providers to cover their screening officers with personal liability insurance. The liability insurance available to CATSA should ensure that CATSA contractors and their employees have adequate coverage.
Several airport operators presented the argument that screening is an essential service and therefore screening employees should not have a right to strike. The Panel notes that the
CATSA Act contains a provision [ 24 ] that has the effect of declaring screening services at an airport to be an essential service (consistent with related provisions in the
Canada Labour Code) [ 25 ] and we suggest that this be retained. The provision does not remove the right to strike, and does not specify what staffing levels should be maintained to assure service. The parties affected would have to negotiate how to continue essential services in the event of a dispute.
5.3.5 Dispute resolution
In our consultation process, the Panel heard from several unions and other stakeholders that formal appeal mechanisms are needed, particularly in situations in which a worker employed at an airport is unable to work because his or her Restricted Area Pass has been suspended. We looked into the mechanisms for dispute resolution and appeals which are currently available, and offer the following comments.
All airport workers, including CATSA screening officers, require a Transportation Security Clearance (TSC) issued by Transport Canada. Transport Canada has a TSC Review Panel, which addresses missing or incomplete information. The applicant may provide new information, or seek further review of the TSC Review Panel’s recommendation. Appeals are possible to the Federal Court of Canada, in case of errors of law, or to the Security Intelligence Review Committee if the TSC is refused or cancelled based on information collected from CSIS.
All airport workers, including CATSA screening officers, also require a Restricted Area Pass (RAP) provided by the aerodrome operator (airport authority), when the TSC is approved. The airport operator has the power to refuse to issue a RAP, or to temporarily suspend or cancel it. The Panel was told that RAPs are sometimes revoked for apparently minor reasons, and there is frustration that airport workers may have no recourse for appeals. Any review process for actions by an airport operator would be conducted by the airport operator itself, through a mechanism it chooses. [ 26 ]
We understand that representatives of airport operators have developed
guidelines on sanctions and appeals for RAPs. These have been shared with other
stakeholders, and we commend this initiative. The Panel urges all airport
operators to implement a review mechanism, in consultation with interested
parties. Transport Canada inspectors may also take actions against improper use
of a RAP, including issuing fines or suspensions, as part of their enforcement
of the regulatory framework under the Aeronautics Act. Review of Transport
Canada’s actions goes to the Transportation Appeals Tribunal of Canada (TATC),
and appeals may be heard by a TATC Appeal Panel.
Because the two related documents – the TSC and RAP – are required by all airport workers, clear, timely dispute resolution mechanisms and good communications about how they function will benefit all workers. The Panel learned that screening officers have particular concerns, because regulations under the Aeronautics Act
require that they may not start their training for certification nor work in a restricted area until their TSC and RAP have been issued. This may take many weeks, during which time they may work only as greeters outside the restricted area. Other airport workers – even those with direct access to aircraft – may be permitted to start work with a temporary pass, under escort, before their TSC has been confirmed.
Screening officers also require certification from CATSA, with separate endorsements for each of five functions, on the basis of their competency following training. [ 27 ] CATSA is responsible for training, endorsement and certification, and requires a 12-month waiting period following two successive failures to re-qualify. CATSA provides an informal resolution process for disputes about certification. The process is conducted either by an adjudicator who is a CATSA employee with specific qualifications, including relevant and extensive knowledge or, for more serious cases, a CATSA Regional Manager or a three-member panel. Issues related to the certification process may be referred to other tribunals depending on the grounds – for example, to the Canadian Human Rights Commission or the Federal Court.
The last item a newly certified screening officer requires before he or she can start work is designation as a screening officer by the Minister of Transport, upon notification from CATSA that the worker has demonstrated the necessary competencies. Designation is a formal aviation document, so review for suspension, cancellation or refusal to renew by Transport Canada is through the TATC. [ 28 ] Appeals may be heard by a TATC Appeal Panel.
Once an employee has started to work, periodic performance appraisals may be conducted by the contracted service provider, not CATSA. Disputes or disagreements are processed according to rules for grievances in the relevant collective agreement. The Federal Court may hear cases where due process is not followed.
The Restricted Area Identification Card (RAIC) is being piloted at several airports, as further described in Chapter 3. It is under consultation as we are preparing this report, and draft amendments to the Canadian Aviation Security Regulations and Measures are in preparation. At present, procedures for review, dispute resolution and appeal have not been developed. The relationship between a RAP and a RAIC, and the respective responsibilities of Transport Canada and airport operators, must also be clarified.
The Panel concludes that screening officers providing CATSA services (as well as other airport workers) must have transparent and timely recourse and appeal mechanisms for all situations when actions are taken that affect whether or how they may work. We suggest that a dispute resolution and appeal mechanism should be implemented for the Restricted Area Identification Card system.
5.4 Management of Incidents
The Panel received many comments about confusion ensuing when a security breach related to screening occurs and part or all of the air terminal must be evacuated. When this happens, we consider it essential that clear and frequent communications with the public are maintained. It is of the greatest importance, both for the security of travellers and airport workers and for the effectiveness of the operation, that the public knows in proper time how to react, what to do and which organization is in control of the situation.
In one incident at a Class 1 airport, a screening officer identified an image of a prohibited item on the pre-board screening X-ray monitor, and referred it for physical examination by another officer. However, the traveller associated with it had left the screening point with the item and could not be found. After discussion among the airport operator, Transport Canada and CATSA, the sterile area, where departing passengers who had already been cleared through screening were waiting, was evacuated, and all were re-screened. Many flights were delayed and some passengers missed connections. Passengers complained that little practical information was provided. The suspect item was a kitchen knife that proved to be inoffensive, but once the emergency was declared, none of the participants could exercise any discretion.
The Panel became aware that there may be lack of clarity at some airports about who is in charge during certain security emergency procedures, and how responsibilities flow from the airport’s emergency plans and procedures. Although the airport emergency plans and procedures define the actions to be taken in any given situation, in practice there may sometimes be a reluctance to take charge. Security breaches at airports can cause considerable operational disruptions and performance problems. The time taken to investigate an incident and determine the action required delays aircraft departures and causes inconvenience for the travelling public. These are significant performance problems. From observations and reports received by the Panel, it seems that many security incidents involving CATSA screening result from passengers prematurely taking carry-on items identified for further scrutiny and leaving the PBS area without being identified. Because Transport Canada’s regulatory requirements are currently so prescriptive, particularly in relation to prohibited items entering the restricted area, screening officers and their supervisors may feel they have very little discretion over what action to take. This may be a contributing factor to some of the indecision that arises and the flexibility, or lack of it, in some circumstances.
Although these responsibilities are to some extent described in airport Emergency Plans and Procedures, they are not always clear to all users of the aviation system. The Aeronautics Act imposes various requirements on CATSA, on airport operators and on air carriers, for responding to threats to airports and airport facilities and for incident reporting.
Furthermore, the regulatory framework under the Aeronautics Act puts obligations on operators of the eight active Class 1 airports to make specific provision for portable explosives detection trace equipment, and to maintain or make arrangements with the local police for explosives detection dogs and their handlers to investigate threats at the airport. The Panel has observed a wide diversity of understandings between local police forces and airports. The Panel is not convinced that all airports have attained optimal solutions in this regard, and encourages airport operators and police to work closely to develop better arrangements.
The Panel learned that CATSA and associations representing the airport operators (the Canadian Airports Council), and air carriers (the Air Transportation Association of Canada), have together with Transport Canada established a working group to develop guidelines to coordinate their actions during a possible security breach. We commend this initiative, but we are concerned that the issue may not yet be fully resolved.
Recommendation 5.5
As a high priority, Transport Canada, CATSA, airport operators, air carriers and police services must develop unambiguous guidelines on the handling of security breach incidents at all screening points. The guidelines should include clear and timely communications to the public.
5.5 Security Clearances
One of the most common concerns expressed to the Panel related to the excessive time it takes for new employees to receive a Transportation Security Clearance, [ 29 ] required to obtain an airport Restricted Area Pass. Many examples were cited of workers waiting several months for the clearance to be received. This significantly affects CATSA’s operations, as well as those of all other employers at an airport.
We understand that the process begins with the applicant filling out a form with personal history information. This is vetted by the employer’s security office. It is then presented to the airport security office; the airport security office checks the form and takes biometric information, then forwards the application and biometric data to Transport Canada, which sends it to the RCMP for a criminal record check and to CSIS for a security assessment. With that information, Transport Canada makes the decision as to whether a Transportation Security Clearance should be issued, and informs the airport operator accordingly. If the TSC is confirmed, the airport makes its own decision as to the areas of the airport to which the employee will have access, and issues the RAP.
In discussions with CSIS, we were advised that although approximately 15 per cent of all requests for an assessment may be turned around in 24 hours, the median time for CSIS processing
was 33 working days in 2005-06. It is not known what the processing time is within the RCMP, Transport Canada, or the individual airport security offices. At every stage in the application process, delays may occur. We were told by all participants in the process that improper completion of the pass applications – with either inadequate information or errors – causes delays in processing. This appears to be a systemic problem that has persisted for many years. The Panel encourages individual applicants, their employers and the airport operators to be more vigilant in checking and verifying the information they provide on the application forms.
The time lag in obtaining TSCs correspondingly delays approval of RAPs, and this creates significant operational problems for CATSA and its screening providers. Prospective screening employees cannot receive training until the RAP is received; in many cases the prospective employee will not wait, and pursues another employment opportunity, especially in hot job markets such as Alberta. CATSA has given temporary relief to allow new staff to be hired in a temporary Level O position, and to begin work as a greeter at the start of a screening line. Although the greeter position may be non-sensitive from a security perspective, it is an important position from a customer service point of view, demanding good customer service skills. The Panel suggests that new screening recruits awaiting security clearance be given customer service training prior to starting in this role.
The delay in reviewing security clearances appears to arise from the volume of applications and lack of resources to deal with this volume. We are aware that this has been an issue for some time, and that demand for security clearances continues to increase. Nevertheless, given the significant impact of the delays in approving new employee security clearances, it is important that the government of Canada find a solution to this persistent problem.
Recommendation 5.6
We recommend that Transport Canada undertake a detailed audit of the security clearance process to determine the causes of delay, and take remedial action to correct these deficiencies, in order to speed up the process of issuing Transportation Security Clearances for persons requiring airport Restricted Area Passes.
Chapter Five: Footnotes
[1] CATSA Act, ss. 6, 7.
[2] With the exception of the City of Lloydminster, Alberta, which provides screening at its own small regional airport.
[3] United States General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems, Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, March 16, 2000, and Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation Security, Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, September 20, 2001.
[4] CATSA Act, s. 7. (1).
[5] CATSA Act, s. 8. (1).
[6] CATSA Act, s. 8. (2), (3).
[7] Quoted in Liane Benoit, World-Class Model or Potemkin Village? A Study of Performance Measurement in Canadian Air Transport Security, research prepared for the CATSA Act Review Panel, June 2006, page 14.
[8] Benoit, op. cit.
[9] Frederickson and LaPort, cited in Benoit, page 7.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Queuing Time and Throughput, Winter 2006, April 2006, CATSA website.
[12} Developed by Dr. Robert Kaplan and David Norton; see Paul Averson, “What is the Balanced Scorecard?”, Balanced Scorecard Institute, 1998, Washington, D.C. page 1;
The Balanced Scorecard, Robert S. Kaplan, David P. Norton (Harvard Business School Press), 1996.
[13] Benoit, op. cit., pages 12-13.
[14] Ibid., page 15.
[15] Ibid., pages 25-26.
[16] Ibid. pages 20-27.
[17] Ibid., page 25.
[18] Quarterly Performance Report – 2005-2006 / Q4. CATSA website.
[19] Jens Hainmüller and Jan Martin Lemnitzer, ‘Why do Europeans Fly Safer? The politics of airport security in Europe and the U.S.', Terrorism and Political Violence, v. 15, NO. 4 (Winter 2001) 4-5.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Douglas H. Harris, “How to Really Improve Airport Security”, Ergonomics in Design, vol. 10(1) Winter 2002, page 17.
[22] Transportation Security Authority, June 2006.
[23] One element of the TSA program authorizes recruits to act as testing officers, which is not possible in Canada, accordingly reducing the capacity for testing.
[24] CATSA Act, s. 27.
[25] Canada Labour Code, s. 87.4.
[26] Some airport authorities have established a recourse process with several steps - an initial review of decision by the manager of security, a possible appeal to the next level of senior management and, if required, to an internal appeals tribunal.
[27] “Currently, certification is valid for two years; however, under [CATSA’s] revised program, screening officers will be re-certified annually,” CATSA’s Story: Submission to the Advisory Panel on the CATSA Act Review, Backgrounder, “CATSA Training Program: Preparing our Screening Officers to Do the Job Right” (May 2006), page 10. Note that a screening officer may continue to work at PBS functions if certification for either of the advanced X-ray detection systems is revoked.
[28] Aeronautics Act, s. 6.71, 6.9, 7, 7.1, 7.1, 7.7, 8.3.
[29] This is a suitability/background check, and if issued does not entitle the holder to receive sensitive information.
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