Section 7 - Guidance on Safety Measures for Inbound/Outbound Deficient Vessels
- Table of Contents
- Section 1 - National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan
- Section 2 - Places of Refuge Contingency Plan - Pacific Region
- Section 3 - Pre-Designation of Places of Refuge
- Section 4 - Extract from Canada Shipping Act, 2001
- Section 5 - Communications Flow - Transport Canada Marine/ Canadian Coast Guard
- Section 6 - Calling Procedures during Office Hours (0800 - 1600 hours)
- Section 7 - Guidance on Safety Measures for Inbound/Outbound Deficient Vessels
- Section 8 - Decision Making Process - Checklist
- Section 9 - Places of Refuge Contingency Plan - Contact List
- Section 10 - Reference Documents
To provide guidance to Port State Control Officers in the Compliance and Enforcement Division (TME) and “standby” Marine Safety Inspectors in Vancouver Office on safety measures for inbound/outbound deficient vessels while transiting in Canadian waters, particularly in Juan de Fuca Strait, Haro Strait, Boundary Pass, Strait of Georgia and waters in their vicinity.
When a deficiency report of an inbound/outbound vessel is received from the Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS), the appropriate Transport Canada Marine (TCM) Port State Control Officer (PSCO), or Marine Safety Inspector (MSI) shall give direction to the Master of the vessel through MCTS without delay.
In determining the appropriate direction to the inbound/outbound deficient vessel, the PSCO or MSI shall take the following factors into account:
- the nature of the defect, deficiency, damage, failure or breakdown of the vessel, machinery or navigational/radio equipment,
- the type of vessel, its cargo and fuel,
- the effectiveness of radio communication (English Language),
- vessel location and proximity to land or other navigational hazards,
- vessel’s draught in relation to the available depth of water,
- weather, visibility, tide, current, wind and sea state,
- the time of the day, i.e. daylight or darkness,
- the traffic density, and
- the maneuverability of the vessel.
Despite the guidance in this document, depending on any special circumstances, the PSCO or MSI may use his/her discretion to impose other appropriate safety measures to the deficient vessel. If in doubt, he/she shall seek advice from the appropriate Manager immediately.
In all cases, the PSCO or MSI shall inform the Master of the inbound/outbound deficient vessel via MCTS that “ the Master is fully responsible for the safety of the vessel and should only proceed if the Master considers it is safe to do so”.
Transport Canada Marine Safety Inspectors who have been authorized by the Minister of Transport to carry out inspections respecting the protection of the marine environment for the purpose of Part 9 (Pollution Prevention – Department of Transport) of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001.
“The Master is fully responsible for the safety of the vessel and should only proceed if the Master considers it is safe to do so”
Inbound - Deficient Vessels
|1. damage - integrity of hull||
|2. propulsion, or steering failure||
|3. twin screws - one failure||
|4. cruise ship - one of the two Azipods disabled||
|5. only one steering pump operative, or loss of a required vessel's generator||
|6. only one anchor is available||
|7. loss of all radars||
|8. automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) failure||
|9. gyro failure||
|10. VHF / INMARSAT / AIS / VDR / speed log / echo sounder / nav. aids||
|11. missing navigational charts||
|12. English language difficulty||
Outbound - Deficient Vessels
|1. propulsion failure||
|2. repeated propulsion failure||
|3. gyro / radar / nav. aids failure||
SOLAS, Chapter V Safety of navigation, Regulation 16 Maintenance of equipment, paragraph 16.2 states “Except as provided in regulations I/7(b)(ii), I/8 and I/9, while all reasonable steps shall be taken to maintain the equipment required by this chapter in efficient working order, malfunctions of that equipment shall not be considered as making the ship unseaworthy or as a reason for delaying the ship in ports where repair facilities are not readily available, provided suitable arrangements are made by the master to take the inoperative equipment or unavailable information into account in planning and executing a safe voyage to a port where repairs can take place”.
In short, SOLAS’s stipulation means PSCO or MSI shall not detain or delay a vessel with certain malfunctions of the shipborne navigational equipment unreasonably. However, it does not preclude PSCO or MSI from imposing appropriate safety measures on such vessel leaving a port, such as tug(s) of appropriate size and power to be effective to escort, and/or daylight transit. Daylight transit may be imposed on part or all of the Canadian waters.